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ABSTRACT 
Mary Elizabeth Basile Chopas:  Law, Security, and Ethnic Profiling:  Italians in the United 
States During World War II 
(under the direction of Wayne E. Lee) 
 
The story of internment and other restrictions during World War II is about how the U.S. 
government categorized persons within the United States from belligerent nations based on 
citizenship and race and thereby made assumptions about their loyalty and the national security 
risk that they presented.  This dissertation examines how agencies of the federal government 
interacted to create and enact various restrictions on close to 700,000 Italian aliens residing in the 
United States, including internment for certain individuals, and how and why those policies 
changed during the course of the war.  Against the backdrop of wartime emergency, federal 
decision makers created policies of ethnic-based criteria in response to national security fears, 
but an analysis of the political maturity of Italian Americans and their assimilation into American 
society by World War II helps explain their community’s ability to avoid mass evacuation and 
internment.  
Based on the internment case files for 343 individuals, this dissertation provides the first 
social profile of the Italian civilian internees and explains the apparent basis for the 
government’s identification of certain aliens as “dangerous,” such as predilections for loyalty to 
Italy and Fascist beliefs, as opposed to the respectful demeanor and appreciation of American 
democracy characterizing potentially good citizens.  Although only a fractional percent of the 
Italian alien population was interned, those who underwent hearings before alien enemy hearing 
boards did not have an opportunity to rebut charges of disloyalty.  By the time the Office of the 
iv 
 
Attorney General corrected problems in the process so as to provide greater democratic 
procedure, it was too late for the hundreds of Italians already interned.  Through stories of the 
Italian internees and the experiences of their families, this dissertation also provides insight into 
the lasting social and cultural effects of these policies on Italian immigrants.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 From the founding of this country through the wars against terrorism that followed the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, the federal government repeatedly has identified various ethnic 
groups as posing a national security risk based upon constructed profiles of dangerousness.  
Government policies designed to remove subversive elements from the population have clashed 
with laws and the American tradition of civil liberties and, in some cases, have undermined or 
violated them.  This dissertation investigates the administrative state during World War II, 
specifically examining how agencies of the federal government interacted in creating and 
enacting various restrictions, including selective internment, on Italians residing in the United 
States.  It further tracks how and why those policies changed during the course of the war.  The 
story of Italian internment and other restrictions reveals not only the pressures generated by 
wartime, the fears that influenced policy makers and those who executed policies derived from 
ethnic-based criteria, but also how the thorough political and cultural assimilation of Italians 
influenced how the government treated them.   
As the war progressed, the Justice Department recognized the problems of a legal policy 
that rested on presumptive guilt as applied to all alien enemies and made efforts to protect civil 
liberties even though a strict interpretation of the law did not require it.  Indeed, after the first 
two months of arrests of Japanese, Germans, and Italians, the Justice Department began to adopt 
protocols that expanded procedural protections for alien enemies in the internment hearings.  By 
this time, however, data shows that many Italians had already suffered the disgrace of 
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internment.  Despite this attempt at a mid-course correction in process, the government’s 
wartime policies caused Italian aliens, many of whom had resided in the United States for many 
years before the outbreak of World War II, to feel disillusioned about the promises of their 
adopted homeland.   
Supporting these claims demands a full legal analysis of the processes for examining 
aliens and a discussion of how the alien enemy hearing boards functioned.  This analysis is 
provided through detailed case studies of internees from across the country.  This dissertation 
therefore fills a gap in the historical scholarship that has focused on narratives of people affected 
by wartime policies and on comparing the treatment of Germans and Italians with that of 
Japanese and Japanese Americans.  Scholarship on Italian aliens is relatively rare, and that which 
does exist has concentrated on Italians on the West Coast.  This project studies the full range of 
the Italian aliens’ experience nationwide, and provides the first social profile of the Italian 
civilian internees.    
Central to the argument here is the way in which the U.S. government categorized 
persons according to race and citizenship, as well as an appreciation of the legal context in which 
it applied its policies during World War II.  While persons of Japanese descent, aliens and 
American citizens alike, were subject to mass internment on the basis of race, the subjects of my 
study were identified to undergo the process of selective internment on the basis of their alien 
status and the perceived threat that they posed to American security.  The Alien Enemy Act of 
1798 allowed the government to arrest, detain, and deport aliens of enemy countries without any 
hearing and without legal representation once war was declared or invasion by the enemy nation 
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appeared to be imminent.  Under this act, persons of enemy nations were presumed to owe 
allegiance to the belligerent nation.
1
   
Some basic definitions and distinctions are necessary.  The designation “aliens” refers to 
Italians resident in or brought to the United States who were non-citizens; once the United States 
declared war against Italy they became, in government terms, “alien enemies” or “enemy aliens.” 
I refer to Italians who were born in Italy and obtained their citizenship in the United States as 
naturalized American citizens.  To become a naturalized citizen, an Italian national, as was and is 
the case with any alien, would have to take an Oath of Allegiance and Renunciation, effectively 
renouncing his former allegiance.
2
  The term “Italian Americans” refers to American citizens of 
Italian descent, inclusive of naturalized citizens and citizens by birth.  Reference to “Italians” 
means individuals of Italian descent, regardless of citizenship status. 
In the early 1940s, Italians comprised the largest foreign-born group in the United 
States.
3
  In accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940, all aliens fourteen and older 
were required to register at the post office and carry identification cards indicating their status.
4
  
Delays in the processing of citizenship applications may have accounted for why approximately 
seven hundred thousand Italian immigrants had not obtained their citizenship by the start of the 
                                                          
1
 50 U.S.C. chapter 3, §§ 21-24, was the 1918 codification of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.  Once Congress has 
declared war or when invasion has occurred or is imminent, this law gives the president the power to direct the 
apprehension and removal of “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government,” § 21. 
2
 Marian Smith, Chief, Historical Research Branch, US Citizenship & Immigration Services, e-mail message to 
author, October 3, 2013.   
3
 The census in 1940 recorded 1.6 million American residents as born in Italy, which was 14 percent of all foreign-
born people.  U.S., Congress, House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Fourth Interim 
Report:  Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others From Prohibited Military 
Zones, 77
th
 Congress, 2nd sess., H. REP. NO. 2124, May 1942 (Washington:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1942), 241 (hereafter “House Select Committee, Fourth Interim Report”).    
4
 Alien Registration Act of 1940 (or Smith Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940). 
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war.
5
  According to information collected by the National Council on Naturalization and 
Citizenship’s Committee on Administration in December 1941, an alien who submitted an 
application for his second paper (Form N-400) had to wait fifteen to eighteen months in the New 
York and Boston districts, and about a year in other districts before being called to file his 
petition for citizenship, for which the average waiting time was about three months.  
Extraordinary delays also occurred between the first and final hearings.
6
  As had happened 
during World War I, any immigrant from an enemy nation who had not completed the 
citizenship process at the start of World War II became an alien enemy of the United States.
7
   
Although approximately 700,000 Italian enemy aliens resided in the United States in 
1940, this study focuses on the 343 men and women who were eventually subjected to 
internment.  These “Italian civilian internees” came from three groups.  The first was Italian 
aliens who had resided in the United States before the outbreak of World War II and who were 
apprehended in the United States based on reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
identifying them as suspect, immediately detained, and subsequently interned after a hearing.  
The second group was a few naturalized citizens who experienced the same series of events 
                                                          
5
 House Select Committee, Fourth Interim Report, 241. 
6
 “Report on Progress:  Naturalization Delays Decreasing,” Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Monthly Review 1, no. 2 (August 1943):  20.  Note that Attorney General Biddle assured the alien 
population that there were three classes of German and Italian aliens who still could obtain naturalization:  those 
who had taken out papers at least two years before December 8, 1941, but not more than seven years before that 
date; those not required to take out first papers, such as spouses of American citizens; and those whose petition for 
naturalization was pending in court.  “Alien Curbs Aimed Only at Disloyal:  Naturalization Restrictions Imposed So 
‘Few Subversive’ May Be Weeded, Says Biddle,” New York Times, December 14, 1941.  In actuality, though, the 
delays in investigations for petitions by the INS meant no exception for individuals in these classes.   
7
 Under the Alien Enemy Act during World War II, nationals of Japan, Germany, and Italy were designated “alien 
enemies.”  Note that small numbers of Romanians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians suspected of disloyalty were 
interned, but they were designated “aliens of enemy nationality,” meaning that they were not subject to the 
regulations concerning travel, possession of signaling devices, and other restrictions on alien enemies.  See Memo 
attached to United States Department of Justice’s “Questions and Answers on Regulations Concerning Aliens of 
Enemy Nationalities,” (hereafter “Memo in Corsi File”), Folder “ACTIVITIES Alien Enemy Hearing Board 
Correspondence to cases 7 May 1941 to 11 Feb. 1944,”, Box 33, Edward Corsi Papers, Special Collections, 
Syracuse University Library (hereafter “Corsi Papers”). 
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despite being American citizens.  The third group was Italian nationals residing in Latin America 
and apprehended there, who were interned in the United States pursuant to an agreement entered 
into by the U.S. State Department and Latin American countries.  Excluded from my study are 
the approximately 1,300 merchant sailors from luxury liners in the Panama Canal and American 
ports suspected of sabotaging their ships beginning in 1939 and those Italian nationals who had 
worked at the 1939-1940 World’s Fair in New York, most of whom were interned beginning in 
March 1941 at Fort Missoula, Montana, and held through the end of the war.  Although these 
latter groups were interned with some of the subjects of my study, their legal status was 
substantially different.   
I identified these 343 persons by reviewing the Provost Marshal General’s files of Italian 
internees, identifying long-time residents of the United States and Latin Americans.
8
  I then 
checked the list of Italian aliens who satisfied my criteria against Army camp lists, some of 
which indicated each internee’s occupation, allowing me to verify that my subjects were not 
seamen or World’s Fair employees.9  Reference to Alien Registration forms filed pursuant to the 
1940 Alien Registration Act confirmed the nationality of the aliens and their occupations.
10
  
                                                          
8
 Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Alien Enemy Information Bureau, Records Relating to 
Italian Civilian Internees During World War II, 1941-1946, Boxes 2-20, Record Group 389; National Archives at 
College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter “PMG Records of Italian Civilian Internees, NARA”).  The contents of 
the folders for each internee vary, but each contains a “Basic Personnel Record,” indicating the individual’s date and 
place of birth, residence, number of dependents, date and place of capture or arrest, unit making the capture or 
arrest, occupation, education, languages, physical condition, marital status, religion, and camps where they were 
held.  The PMG Records also contain orders of the Justice Department for internment, parole, and release, allowing 
me to trace the course of their custody. 
9
 Although Army camp lists were supposed to be kept monthly, there are gaps of time in available lists in the PMG 
Records.  What became readily evident was that the internees were shifted among camps regularly. 
10
 I received the Alien Registration Forms (AR-2 Forms) courtesy of Marian Smith, Chief, Historical Research 
Branch, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services.  The AR-2 Forms also provide information on aliens’ arrests, 
military service, years of residence in the United States, and memberships and social activities. 
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Biographical information and data I compiled concerning their internment can be found in the 
Appendices. 
The U.S. government’s evolving calculation of the danger posed by Italian nationals on 
American soil was strongly shaped by American policy makers’ belief that Italy’s military forces 
were not as formidable as those of either Germany or Japan.  Regarding the safety of American 
shores, Italy posed no threat in comparison with Germany, whose submarines patrolled the 
Atlantic coast, and of course Japan, which had already attacked Pearl Harbor.
11
  It appears that 
President Franklin Roosevelt allowed these notable differences in the strength of the three Axis 
powers to influence his views on how to handle enemy aliens in the United States.  In discussing 
internment with Attorney General Francis Biddle, the president expressed his lack of concern 
about Italians, saying, “I don’t care so much about the Italians . . . They are a lot of opera singers, 
but the Germans are different, they may be dangerous.”12   
Another critical component of American policy calculation was the British example.  
Widely perceived outside of Great Britain as a mistake, that country hastily interned close to 
74,000 aliens, some of whom were German and Austrian Jews fiercely opposed to the Nazi 
regime.  Taking his cue from that lesson, Biddle insisted on selective internment for Italians and 
                                                          
11
 See U. S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied:  Report of 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing 
Office, 1997), 283.  From January through June 1942, German submarines destroyed many American ships along 
the Atlantic Coast before the United States used minefield defense and antisubmarine warfare.  See also Stetson 
Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, eds., Guarding the United States and its Outposts (Washington, 
D.C.:  Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000 ), ch. III “Preparations for Continental Defense,” also 
available at http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/. 
12
 Francis B. Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), 207.  Ironically, the FBI 
detained Italian opera singer Ezio Pinza, a Metropolitan Opera basso who had taken out his first American 
citizenship papers, and brought him to Ellis Island.  “Ezio Pinza Seized as Enemy Alien; FBI Takes Singer to Ellis 
Island,” New York Times, March 13, 1942. 
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Germans, and Roosevelt went along with this policy.
13
  With regard to Japanese and Japanese 
Americans, however, Roosevelt deferred to the War Department and their support for the 
proposal of West Coast military officials for mass internment, overriding Biddle’s opposition to 
the plan.
14
   
Roosevelt’s assessment that Italians as a group presented a relatively low security risk 
seems to have been accurate.  However, the Justice Department remained concerned with 
individual Italians with strong Fascist beliefs who might have wielded enough influence over 
their Italian communities to endanger the United States, or at least could have impeded the 
support the Roosevelt administration needed for the war effort.  These fears notwithstanding, of 
the 343 Italian civilians interned, less than ten percent were employed in the Italian language 
media where they were outspoken about their support of Fascism and their Italian sympathies.  A 
few possessed contraband weapons or had prior arrests, although none for sedition.  Such factors 
may or may not have constituted a serious security risk, but they arguably justified the selection 
of such individuals to undergo a process of examination.  Evidence from my study shows that the 
U.S. government chose to err on the side of interning more aliens (and a few citizens of Italian 
descent) than those who presented a legitimate security risk, resulting in the violation of the 
rights of innocent and potentially loyal individuals.  We should expect that the process of 
examining enemy aliens would explore whether they were ideologically and morally opposed to 
the United States, and therefore, whether they would make good citizens.  Some hearing boards 
seem to have grappled with the meaning of due process as it pertained to enemy aliens and strove 
                                                          
13
 Biddle, In Brief Authority, 207-208; see also Jerre Mangione, An Ethnic at Large:  A Memoir of America in the 
Thirties and Forties (New York:  G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1978), 320, who provides a larger number of 85,000.  Note 
that this number is much higher than numbers reported in other sources.  See, e.g., “My dad, sent to a prison camp 
for being Italian,” BBC News Magazine, accessed October 26, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
22278664 which cites 30,000 as the number of Germans and Austrians interned. 
14
 Alan Brinkley, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2010), 90.   
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for a contextualized adjudicatory process.  Ultimately, however, there were inconsistencies in the 
hearings process derived from the cultural biases of board members and the political influence of 
witnesses.  In February 1942, after more than 100 Italians had been interned, the Office of the 
Attorney General demanded transcripts of the hearings to be used to assess hearing board 
recommendations.  In March 1943 when it finally addressed the procedural defect that aliens 
were not informed of charges against them, most of the Italian internees were already serving 
their internment.  
To date, no organized effort among Italian Americans has sought reparations for the 
violations of civil liberties suffered by members of their ethnic community.  In fact, most Italian 
internees felt shame over having been considered enemies of the state, and they treated their 
experiences as private matters.
15
  In 1995, however, Italian American organizations in the United 
States secured government funding for a documentary called A Viva Voce which recounts the 
experiences of Italians residing in the United States during World War II.
16
  This documentary 
raised the awareness of Congressmen such as former Senator Alfonse D’Amato (NY) of the 
hardships faced by many Italian families during the war.
17
  In 2000, Congress enacted the 
Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act (Italian American Act), which 
acknowledged numerous violations of civil liberties of Italians across the United States.
18
  In that 
                                                          
15
 See John Mancini, Co-Founder Italic Studies Institute, to Senator Alfonse D’Amato, September 28, 1995, Folder 
3 (Italian American Internment), Box 96, Dominic R. Massaro Collection, Immigration History Research Center 
Archives, University of Minnesota (hereafter “Massaro Italian American Internment File”). 
16
 John (Balesteri) Krollpfeiffer, Producer/Director Bauhaus Pictures, to Honorable Dominic Massaro, Supreme 
Court of New York State, August 8, 1995, Massaro Italian American Internment File. 
17
  John Mancini, Co-Founder Italic Studies Institute, to Senator Alfonse D’Amato, September 28, 1995, Massaro 
Italian American Internment File. 
18
 To Provide for the Preparation of a Government Report Detailing Injustices Suffered by Italian Americans during 
World War II, and a Formal Acknowledgement of Such Injustices by the President, 114 Stat. 1947 (2000), also 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:h.r.02442: (hereafter “Wartime Violation of Italian 
American Civil Liberties Act”).  On July 1, 1999, U.S. Representatives Rick Lazio and Eliot Engel introduced the 
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Act, Congress stated that the government restricted the freedom of “more than 600,000 Italian-
born immigrants in the United States and their families . . . by Government measures that 
branded them ‘enemy aliens’” because they had not completed the naturalization process.19  In 
addition to the internment of hundreds of individuals in military camps, Congress estimated that 
the military evacuated about 10,000 Italians living in coastal areas on the West Coast, placed 
restrictions upon Italian fishermen and railroad workers, made arrests, issued detentions and 
curfews, conducted raids on homes, and confiscated property.
20
  Congress concluded that the 
“impact of the wartime experience was devastating to Italian American communities in the 
United States, and its effects are still being felt.”21  However, it was not until 2001, after the 
Justice Department conducted investigations pursuant to the Italian American Act and produced 
a report on its findings, that a more complete picture of the restrictions and resulting civil rights 
violations became known.
22
   
 In the late 1930s, as part of the FBI’s domestic intelligence operations, it prepared lists 
of individuals for arrest in times of emergencies.  By June 1940, these operations became known 
as the Custodial Detention Program.
23
  The lists provided the names of Italian aliens and some 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bill, H.R. 2442 which was subsequently referred to the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, on September 24, 1999.  After passing H.R. 2442 without amendment, the House referred it to the 
Senate where it passed with amendments on October 19, 2000.  President William J. Clinton signed the legislation 
into law on November 7, 2000. 
19
 Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, § 2, par. (1).   
20
 Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, § 2, par. (2), § 3.   
21
 Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, § 2, par. (6). 
22
 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Congress of the United States, A Review of the Restrictions on Persons 
of Italian Ancestry During World War II, November 2001, accessed November 13, 2013, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/Italian_Report.pdf. (hereafter DOJ Report).  The 245-page report includes appendices of 
lists of individuals subject to the various restrictions.  This dissertation adopts the terminology used by the Justice 
Department in its report to describe the various government programs affecting Italians.     
23
 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power:  The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York, The Free Press:  1987), 233. 
10 
 
naturalized citizens who were to be detained beginning on the evening of December 7, 1941.  
FBI field agents had gathered information on their Italian subjects’ expressions of sympathy or 
admiration for Mussolini, ties with the Italian government through work or membership in Italian 
organizations or unsubstantiated accusations by a single individual.  My case studies show that 
the questionable veracity of FBI reports tainted the process of investigating the loyalties of 
Italian aliens.  After a hearing before an “alien enemy hearing board,” those aliens not released 
or paroled were interned in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Army camps 
where many remained until the end of 1943, several months after Italy’s surrender to the Allies.  
By May 30, 1942, the number of Italian aliens arrested was 362; of that number, 151 were 
interned, 120 were released on parole, and 84 released.
24
  Through October 1942, a total of 229 
Italians had received orders of internment.
25
  My study demonstrates that by the end of the war, 
at least 343 Italian civilians, exclusive of Italian seamen and workers from the 1939-1940 
World’s Fair, had been interned for varying lengths of time.26 This number is drastically fewer 
than the greater than 110,000 persons of Japanese descent and approximately 5,000 Germans 
                                                          
24
 Department of Justice Release to Morning Papers, June 3, 1942, Folder 2 (“Enemy Aliens, 1942-1945”), Box 17, 
American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born Records, Joseph A. Labadie Collection, University of 
Michigan (hereafter “American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born Records”).  Of the 259 internees in 
the subject group for whom I found a date of apprehension, 182 had received internment orders by the end of May 
1942.   
25
 Memo in Corsi File.  By comparison, there were 233 Italian subjects in my study (of 259 for whom I had data) 
who had received internment orders by the end of October 1942. 
26
 Compare the figure of 343 from my study with 418, cited in Appendix D of the DOJ Report as the number of 
“persons of Italian ancestry who were interned.”  The Justice Department compiled its list of internees and where 
they were held, if known, from government records and personal interviews.  My data set, which I gathered 
independently, is smaller possibly because, as the Justice Department recognized, its list may have multiple 
inclusions of the same people identified by different names.    
11 
 
who were interned, which presumably includes Latin Americans as well as those residing in the 
United States.
27
 
In addition to internment, approximately 10,000 Italian aliens and their families were 
forced to evacuate their homes and businesses in prohibited zones on the West Coast and to 
relocate to areas outside these zones for about four months.  The process of “individual 
exclusion,” not discussed at length in this dissertation, affected a smaller number of Italian aliens 
and naturalized citizens.
28
  According to the Justice Department’s 2001 report, at least forty-
seven persons of Italian ancestry nationally were ordered to move from designated areas.
29
  The 
report states that twenty-four of the persons excluded from the Western Defense Command were 
of Italian descent, most from northern California with a few cases from Los Angeles and San 
Diego.
30
  Beginning in September 1942, persons subject to the process of exclusion for reasons 
of individual suspicion, perhaps for being a community leader, or because of the sensitivity of 
the area where they resided, had a hearing before an “individual exclusion board” comprised of 
three military officers of field grade that decided whether to prohibit the individual from military 
areas.  The Justice Department made an agreement with the War Department that it would 
                                                          
27
 Mangione, An Ethnic at Large, 319, 321.  Note the distinction between the approximately 5,000 Japanese who 
were interned pursuant to the Justice Department’s selective internment policy beginning in December 1941 and 
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prosecute exclusion cases, although the departments disagreed about the minimal number of 
exclusion cases that the Justice Department ultimately prosecuted.  The Attorney General 
doubted the necessity and the legality of the exclusion program.  He believed that there was no 
correlation between exclusions and essential defense facilities or between the number of 
exclusions per state and the size of its enemy alien population.  With respect to the procedure for 
determining exclusion, American citizens excluded could not cross-examine witnesses before 
military tribunals which violated their constitutional rights.
31
 
My study builds upon existing studies of the relationship between civil liberties and 
governmental authority in American society.  In Freedom’s Fetters:  The Alien and Sedition 
Laws and American Civil Liberties (1956), a detailed study of the Alien and Sedition Laws 
investigating the relationship between liberty and authority in the early Republic, James Morton 
Smith showed how these laws played a role in shaping the American tradition of civil liberties by 
provoking a public response to the presumption that the government was master, evident in state 
cases.
32
  Robert Justin Goldstein discusses political repression in the late nineteenth and most of 
the twentieth century in Political Repression in Modern America:  From 1870 to 1976 (2001), 
arguing that governmental authorities have interfered with the “free market of ideas” in 
American society through such means as denials of freedom of speech and assembly, political 
deportations, and discriminatory arrests.
33
  He posits that President Roosevelt’s civil liberties 
record during World War II was good for the first two months of the war, with the exceptions of 
the summary arrests and subsequent internment of alien enemies and the “considerably more 
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serious early exercise of political repression” in the establishment of martial law in Hawaii.  
Beginning in February 1942, Roosevelt’s record “began to seriously disintegrate,” according to 
Goldstein, with the mass internment of persons of Japanese descent, followed by sedition 
prosecutions and harassment of war opposition in the press, the military’s orders for individual 
exclusions, and the expansion of surveillance activities by the FBI and military intelligence 
agencies.
34
  Goldstein’s comparison of all forms of political repression during World War II 
rightly places the subjection of American citizens to martial law and the mass internment of 
Japanese and Japanese Americans at the most severe end of the spectrum, causing him to devote 
much less attention to the internment of Germans and Italians and other restrictions on these 
groups.  My in-depth analysis of the selective internment process, however, uncovers many 
layers of political repression not evident in Goldstein’s framework, namely presumptive guilt in 
the initial arrest, internment based on one’s membership in social and political associations and 
expression of political ideas, and ultimately bars to citizenship. 
At the highest level, my study traces interactions and conflicts among governmental 
leaders and agencies in the process of constructing policies for enemy aliens.  Specifically, it 
expands upon Geoffrey Stone’s portrayal of Attorney General Biddle in Perilous Times:  Free 
Speech in Wartime (2004).  Stone argues that in each of the major wars, the United States has 
overreacted to the dangers of wartime, causing it to go too far in restricting civil liberties by 
trying to punish individuals for criticizing officials or policies, but demonstrates that Biddle was 
committed to constitutional values, particularly in his strong opposition to political and military 
pressures for the mass internment of Japanese.
35
  My study provides the first account of how 
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Biddle adhered to the spirit of democracy in the selective internment process, first in deciding to 
provide hearings to enemy aliens when they were not legally required, and later in directing 
hearing boards to afford increasingly greater procedural protections.  However, it gives a more 
comprehensive picture of the operation of the administrative state in wartime than Stone’s study 
by revealing the process at work, particularly problems that occurred when federal mandates 
were implemented at the local level.  The Justice Department’s delegation of authority to 
approximately 100 enemy alien hearing boards to examine subjects in their districts and to make 
recommendations of internment, parole, or release resulted in inconsistencies in the adjudicatory 
procedures nationwide.  Further, case studies of individual internees provide insight into the 
FBI’s abusive power by showing how domestic intelligence sources often produced unreliable 
information on which to base hearing board recommendations, thereby giving context to the 
aggressive political institution that Richard Gid Powers describes in Secrecy and Power:  The 
Life of J. Edgar Hoover (1987).
36
   
Viewing the specific experience of Italians on the American home front during World 
War II adds a cultural dimension to the historiography on the national security state about how 
war and national security led to comprehensive social changes.  Although Michael Sherry’s 
conclusion from In the Shadow of War:  The United States since the 1930s (1995) that America’s 
political and military leaders built a “capricious apparatus of internal security” in the twentieth 
century aptly describes the restrictions placed upon Italians at this time, his view of all aspects of 
societal transformations—political, economic, technological, social, and cultural—through the 
lens of militarization generalizes how persons living in the United States experienced the 
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national security state.
37
  My study demonstrates that the experience of Italian aliens who came 
under suspicion once Italy became an enemy of the United States was unique given their 
assimilation into the fabric of American society.  This factor may have checked the 
government’s encroachments upon civil liberties in the implementation of national security 
policies because many of the Italian aliens, although falling into the category of non-citizens, had 
become productive members of American society, and prominent Italian Americans could vouch 
for their loyalty to the United States.   
Civil-military relations in the national security state were also a factor in the treatment of 
Italians.  While the Justice Department insisted on a policy of considering each case of a 
suspected Italian alien or naturalized citizen on an individual basis, the military favored a more 
general approach to handling the Italian alien population based on what it perceived as the 
exigencies of the national security crisis during World War II.
38
  The military’s exclusion of all 
persons of Japanese descent and the short-term evacuation of about 10,000 Italians from the 
West Coast fit Andrew Bacevich’s model in The Long War:  A New History of U.S. National 
Security Policy since World War II (2007) of a military that thwarted the U.S. Constitution’s 
promise of civilian control.
39
  Focusing on President Roosevelt’s strategy for handling 
operational matters, Bacevich explains how Roosevelt chose to deal directly with the armed 
services’ uniformed leaders without consulting their civilian heads, which initiated an American 
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tradition of limiting the formulation of national security policy to a small group of specialists, 
thereby excluding democratic influences.  He argues that the American people have had no 
significant decision-making role.
40
  My study acknowledges the upper hand that the War 
Department asserted in the handling of citizens of Axis powers in the United States, beginning 
with the reactivation of the Provost Marshal General’s Office for this purpose in July 1941.  
Then in February 1942, President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 shifted the power from the 
Attorney General to the Secretary of War, giving the military discretion in imposing exclusion 
and restrictions.
41
  However, my study also demonstrates that the Justice Department managed to 
limit the military’s power in directing national security policy, specifically in its refusal to 
prosecute exclusion cases against naturalized citizens and in its eventual insistence on a fairer 
adjudicatory process in internment hearings.   
Although considerable scholarship has been devoted to the story of the mass internment 
of persons of Japanese descent, far less is known about the evacuation, selective internment, and 
individual exclusion of Italians during World War II.  During the war, the government 
deliberately kept information from the public concerning the various restrictions imposed on 
Italians.
42
  The American media conveyed confusing information to the public about who the 
Italian internees were, alternately referring to them as prisoners of war and internees.
43
  
Historians had to rely upon the oral histories of individuals who could recollect their wartime 
experiences and interviews of their family members, piecing together the story of the short-term 
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and long-term effects of the restrictions on this ethnic population.
44
  In 1987, the declassification 
of information on internees contained in the Provost Marshal General files made their 
experiences accessible to researchers at the National Archives.  Most research on this topic, 
however, has focused on the effects of the government’s restrictive policies on Italians living on 
the West Coast.  Stephen Fox is the earliest scholar who relates their experiences in his 1990 
book, The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of the Relocation of Italian Americans during 
World War II, which was updated in his 2000 book, Uncivil Liberties:  Italian Americans Under 
Siege during World War II.
45
   
Drawing on government documents, newspapers, and interviews with surviving internees 
and their family members in central and northern California, Fox concludes that economics, 
politics, and concerns about morale drove U.S. policy with respect to enemy aliens, “with race as 
a reinforcing factor.”  He suggests that the overriding explanation for why the millions of Italians 
and Germans living in the United States avoided mass evacuation and relocation was that their 
numbers as well as the fact that they were scattered across the country made it impractical; not 
only were they necessary to civilian production jobs, but relocating them would have presented 
logistical problems.  He also recognizes their assimilation into American society as a benefit.
46
  
Fox structures his book around personal stories reflecting the experience of Italians on the West 
Coast, mainly relocation, and relies predominantly on anecdotal evidence and only sources for 
the Western Defense Command for his conclusions about the government’s motives.  His work 
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lacks a comprehensive treatment of selective internment and a legal analysis of the actual 
hearings process.   
Unlike Fox’s study, most scholarship on the treatment of Italians has emphasized racial 
prejudice as a motivation for government policies regarding Italians during the war.  Lawrence 
DiStasi believes that similar to its treatment of Japanese Americans, the U.S. government 
associated Italians with the Fascist government because their “ways were racial, genetic, 
indelible,” requiring branding as enemy aliens and removal from the general population.47  Rose 
Scherini, who studied internees from San Francisco, suggested that all enemy aliens – Japanese, 
Italians, and Germans – were scapegoats for the attack on Pearl Harbor, as immigrants were 
“often the targets of fear and hatred.”48  I argue that the government perceived racial distinctions 
among the enemy alien groups, showing in Chapter 3 how the Western Defense Command’s 
belief that the Japanese posed the greatest threat resulted in a stricter interpretation of federal 
policy than in the Eastern Defense Command where Italians and Germans primarily comprised 
the population of enemy aliens. 
Part of the issue here is the distinction, as made at the time, between ethnicity and race, 
and the mid-twentieth century notion of “whiteness.”49  In his survey of the history of European 
immigration in Whiteness of a Different Color:  European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 
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(1998), Matthew Frye Jacobson argues that even though Europeans arrived as “free white 
persons” under the Naturalization Law of 1790, the racial color-coding system in the United 
States made them inferior to Anglo-Saxon stock, causing them to assume different racial 
identities between the 1840s and the 1920s.
50
  The decades following the Immigration Act of 
1924 ushered in “a new politics of black and white” that allowed European immigrants to claim 
privileges of identification as whites.
51
  Civil rights agitation by African Americans and 
coalitions that formed around the issues of segregation and desegregation in the mid-twentieth 
century “solidified whiteness as a monolith of privilege,” according to Jacobson, causing racial 
differences within the white community to lose their salience.  Jacobson explains that 
contemporary references to ethnicity and ethnic groups occurred as a result of developments in 
Nazi Germany that influenced the substitution of culture-based ethnicity for race, revising the 
framework that distinguished “racial characteristics of Jewishness or Irishness or Greekness.”52 
Tightly linked to this generic problem of ethnicity and race was the more specific issue of 
Italian immigration and how citizens of the United States perceived Italians, an encounter which 
also affected the immigrants’ desire to become citizens and their development of national 
identity and loyalty.
53
  The work of Donna Gabaccia and Fraser Ottanelli best represents the 
most recent paradigm shift from assimilation/acculturation models to an appreciation of the 
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transnational nature of immigration.  In Italian Workers of the World (2001), a book of essays 
which Gabaccia and Ottanelli edited, they argue that the migration of mostly unskilled peasants 
and laborers from Italy to other parts of Europe, North America, South America (mostly Brazil 
and Argentina), Australia, and Africa must be analyzed in conjunction with studies of nation 
building, ethnic identity formation, and labor activism.
54
  In particular, Ottanelli’s essay about 
the efforts of Italian American Antifascists in the 1920s and 1930s to undermine the widespread 
sympathy that Mussolini enjoyed among Italian American laborers highlights how support for 
Fascism was a key element in Italian American identity in the decades leading up to the war.  It 
was the rise of a countervailing Italian Antifascism that became a vehicle for the incorporation of 
Italians into American society.
55
   
The changing attitude of American natives and government officials toward Italians and 
its effects on federal policies concerning the Italian alien population played a key role in the 
internment decision making and its bureaucratic processes.  The race/whiteness paradigms that 
scholars have applied to European immigrant groups before they were all considered “white” are 
consistent with what my research reveals about the dichotomy between the legal and social 
treatment of Italians, and how Italians responded to the persistent expectation for 
Americanization and amalgamation.
56
  Although Italians experienced racial prejudice in the 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century, much of the literature on whiteness argues that by World 
War II they enjoyed certain key privileges of white status among ethnic groups, particularly with 
respect to political power.  Those assessments are supported by the data in this study.  This factor 
weighed heavily in the government’s use of selective internment of Italian aliens rather than 
mass internment.  Chapter 2 delves deeper into the role of immigration, assimilation, whiteness, 
and acceptance, tracing the evolution in Italians’ social, political, and economic status in the 
United States and their eventual adoption of an American national identity. 
Chapter 2 also outlines the historical roots of the government policies for enemy aliens 
during World War II.  It begins with a discussion of immigration law, revealing that federal 
policies took an anti-alien and racist tone in the early twentieth century, resulting in more 
stringent deportation and exclusion legislation and stricter enforcement of naturalization law.  
The Alien and Sedition Act of 1918 embodied the climate of suspicion of aliens, which set the 
backdrop for the political violence of the 1920s and the first Red Scare, followed by the 
xenophobic hearings of the Hamilton Fish Committee in the 1930s and the Dies Committee in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s.  This chapter also explores the changing attitudes of the Italian 
population in the United States toward Fascism, influenced by the positive relationship between 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Benito Mussolini in the mid 1930s, and later 
the deteriorating relations between the United States and Italy after the Ethiopian War.  Italians 
first embraced Fascism as a way to bolster their reputation, or at least their sense of self respect, 
in the face of discrimination in their adopted homeland, and then rejected it as they became 
enamored with America’s democratic system.57  Through a discussion of how Italian Americans 
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rose in stature in American society, mainly through their participation in politics, this chapter 
shows how government attitudes toward an immigrant group’s supposed security risk 
fundamentally derived from a perception of how fully that group has assimilated.  The 
prevalence of Italians in prominent political and economic positions explains their influence in 
the Congressional hearings discussed in Chapter 3 and their ability to help their ethnic 
communities avoid the disgrace of mass internment.   
Nevertheless, the FBI relied upon custodial detention lists for identifying suspected 
Fascists and subversive Italians.  Italian social organizations and the Italian media in America 
believed to be sympathetic to Fascism contributed to the federal government’s growing suspicion 
of Italian aliens.  This analysis suggests that the FBI’s belief that memberships in certain 
organizations, such as the Italian War Veterans, and employment in the media were premises for 
threatening action against the U.S. government may have been sufficiently irrational so as to 
violate due process.  Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters evaluate the process that the 
administrative state put in place for finding out the truth and affording Italian aliens justice in the 
time of war.   
Having established the cultural, and to some extent the administrative, position of Italians 
within America, Chapter 3 provides a social profile of the 343 Italian civilian internees, assessing 
their ages, the regions of the country where they were apprehended, their occupations, and the 
duration of their internment.  Most hailed from the East and West Coasts of the United States, 
consistent with both the areas of concentration of the Italian population and the government’s 
fears about militarily sensitive zones.  The internees represented the entire economic spectrum, 
but were predominantly unskilled laborers or accomplished professionals.  In general, it would 
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seem that the government focused on persons who worked in leadership roles in their 
communities or possessed special knowledge that could be used against the United States.   
The second section of Chapter 3 traces the debate among President Roosevelt and his 
advisors, the War Department, the Justice Department, and legislative committees about whether 
to intern the entire population of Italian aliens as opposed to selective internment.  The record of 
this debate survives in military reports and memoranda, transcripts of conversations among 
decision makers, diaries, and the congressional records of hearings of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration.  Having solicited 
the testimony of prominent members of the Italian American community and of sympathetic 
resident aliens who attested to the loyalty of the Italian population, the congressional committee 
convinced the Roosevelt Administration and the War Department that Italians as a group 
cherished the democratic ideals of the United States and held no special allegiance to Italy.  
Ultimately, the logistical concerns of interning the huge Italian population, the need for Italian 
labor in the wartime industries, racial distinctions among the alien enemies, and the political 
significance of the country’s largest immigrant population were factors in the federal 
government’s decision to selectively intern Italians based upon individual suspicion.   
President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 generated the broad outlines of protecting 
designated military areas against sabotage and espionage, but it was then interpreted and 
implemented by regional military commanders according to their perception of threat in each 
area, including the location of wartime industries and proximity to Pearl Harbor.  Chapter 3 
concludes by parsing the variation in this interpretation, noting the stricter interpretation of 
Executive Order 9066 on the West Coast as compared to the East Coast.  Interviews of former 
Italian internees and their families taken by Stephen Fox in the 1980s provide narratives of how 
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the Western Defense Command applied restrictions indiscriminately to non-citizens and how 
they affected the Italians’ day-to-day lives.  This section further develops the theme of racial 
prejudice by tracing the shared perception among the War Department, General John DeWitt of 
the Western Defense Command, and California politicians and the media that the Japanese posed 
the greatest threat among the enemy alien groups, justifying mass internment of persons of 
Japanese descent.  In contrast, in the Eastern Defense Command, where the population of enemy 
aliens was comprised primarily of Germans and Italians, General Hugh Drum narrowly defined 
prohibited and restricted zones and instituted a policy of removing any disloyal or dangerous 
person, alien or citizen, regardless of ethnicity.  Consequently, the program of individual 
exclusion was much less extensive in the East than in the West, despite the seemingly greater 
proximity of the American East Coast to Europe. 
 Chapter 4 provides details of specific cases of interned Italians, following them through 
their arrest, hearings, and the decision to intern.  The evidence found in Justice Department 
litigation files and records kept by hearing board members, strongly suggests that there were 
inconsistencies in the hearings process.  Similar to non-punitive deportation hearings, the alien 
enemy hearings did not require the constitutional protections granted alleged criminals.  They 
were informal and did not follow evidentiary standards of a criminal trial.  Even so, it is clear 
that at times the adjudicatory process was notably thoughtful; at other times, however, the 
cultural biases of board members and the political influence of witnesses compromised 
institutional standards to prevail over objectively measurable threats.  The Justice Department’s 
issuing of a series of remedial instructions to the hearing boards, beginning in February 1942 and 
continuing through 1943, indicates that the hearings could have been uniformly fairer, 
specifically by notifying subjects of charges against them and giving them an opportunity to 
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present rebuttals.  Arguably, the war-time conditions made pre-emptive measures acceptable, as 
opposed to following procedure that presumed the innocence of the subject until he was proven 
guilty.  To explore the question of what process is due to enemy aliens, I engage legal 
constitutional theories concerning the rights of aliens developed in case law, legal treatises, and 
law review articles.  Attorney General Biddle believed that enemy aliens were not entitled to 
hearings before being interned, but should be afforded them as a matter of courtesy.   
Chapter 5 turns to the daily lives and experiences of the internees in INS and Army 
camps, from work and entertainment to communications with loved ones.  The evidence for this 
chapter derives from INS reports, correspondence in the Provost Marshal General internee files, 
and essays written by family members of the internees, collected in Lawrence DiStasi’s Una 
Storia Segreta:  The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment during 
World War II.
58
  Because the United States opted to extend prisoner of war protections in the 
1929 Geneva Convention to enemy aliens held in internment camps, internees could refer to the 
convention’s guarantees to redress complaints about their living conditions.  They also exercised 
agency by finding ways in the camp setting to prove that they could be loyal American citizens.  
In showing how the balance of power still weighed heavily in favor of the government, however, 
this chapter describes the manifestations of the legal and political manipulations discussed in 
earlier chapters. 
The Conclusion emphasizes how the government made determinations of loyalty based 
on its categorization of persons of enemy nations according to citizenship and race.  It explores 
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the somewhat hypothetical question of whether the U.S. government successfully targeted the 
most dangerous group of Italians, considering factors of their legal status, age, and the number of 
years spent in the United States.  Experts on Fascism at the time theorized that the most militant 
group of Fascists was the younger generation of Italian Americans, that is, first-generation 
Italians who had obtained American citizenship by birth but whose parents were aliens.  These 
theories are parsed against my own findings about the level of threat posed by naturalized 
citizens as opposed to aliens.  This final chapter also offers perspective on the trajectory of 
Italians’ assimilation into American culture.  While World War II generally strengthened 
Italians’ increasing identification as Americans, accounts of persons who had been interned or 
excluded show that their wartime experiences reversed their assimilation processes by narrowing 
their job prospects and tarnishing their reputations in their former communities.  Finally, the 
Conclusion suggests lessons that the history of selective internment during World War II might 
offer for understanding current debates over what process should be afforded to individuals 
residing in this country whose ties to nations or non-state actors at war with the United States 
cast suspicion upon their activities.
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CHAPTER 2:  THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ITALIAN IMMIGRANTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES:  1880-1941 
 
The history of the treatment of alien residents in the United States reveals a continuous 
tension between the liberty of the individual, as expressed in state and federal bills of rights, and 
the security of the state.  The concepts of “guilt by suspicion” and “guilt by association” 
pervaded statutory law concerning aliens from as early as the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, a 
series of four bills passed by the Federalists in the aftermath of the French Revolution to remove 
political heresy and to silence dissent that might undermine their administration.
1
  These laws 
asserting the power of the government over the public initiated a pattern of imposing limits on 
civil liberties through legislation and executive action during the Civil War, the World Wars, and 
the Cold War.
2
  In all cases, government policy was directly shaped by fears that foreigners on 
American soil would commit disloyal acts and threaten U.S. security.  Those fears were typically 
heightened by a broader cultural xenophobia that has existed at various key moments in 
American history. 
The widespread xenophobia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century led to 
specific immigration laws and restrictions that also laid the groundwork for the national security 
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programs applied to Italians during World War II.  During the 1880s and 1890s, the United 
States initiated immigration and deportation procedures of a summary and non-judicial nature 
that stemmed from associating aliens with radicalism, despite the basic conservatism of the 
peasant immigrants in their yearning for tradition (especially religion), status, and authority.
3
  In 
1893, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that deportation was not a punishment for crime but an 
administrative process for the return of undesirable alien residents.
4
  As a consequence, 
immigration officials could follow procedures that guaranteed results instead of providing due 
process for deportees.  Fearing anarchists, Congress passed a series of immigration acts 
beginning in 1903 that excluded certain immigrants from entry into the United States because of 
presumed beliefs and associations.
5
  The Naturalization Act of 1906 under President Theodore 
Roosevelt further targeted alien radicals in requiring an oath that the alien was not opposed to 
organized government, supported the U.S. Constitution, and had exhibited five years of good 
moral character.
6
 
Hysteria over the threat to security posed by resident aliens heightened with the entry of 
the United States into World War I.  After signing the declaration of war in 1917, President 
Woodrow Wilson issued a proclamation invoking the 1798 Alien Act, asserting his right to 
apprehend and deport “alien enemies,” and requiring them to register.  Regulations enforceable 
by the attorney general prohibited alien enemies from possessing, among other things, guns or 
explosives and radio transmitters, from coming within a half mile of military zones, from 
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entering and leaving the United States, and from publishing attacks or threats against the 
government.
7
  Attorney General Thomas Gregory instructed his department that his plan was to 
consider each individual alien enemy separately.
8
  John Lord O’Brian, head of the Justice 
Department’s Emergency War Division, interned German and Austro-Hungarian aliens for the 
duration of the war whenever a government official had reasonable doubts about the alien’s 
reliability, and he overruled clemency pleas, believing that the law required internment whenever 
an alien appeared to pose any measure of danger
.9
   
In addition to these activities within the executive branch, national anxiety over alien 
radicals also found expression in legislation.  The Espionage Act of 1917 and the Alien and 
Sedition Act of 1918 were aggressive measures designed to ferret out disloyal elements in the 
population.  The Espionage Act made it a crime to make or convey false reports for the purpose 
of interfering with American military success, to cause disloyalty in the military, or to obstruct 
recruitment or enlistment in the armed forces.
10
  Although it was intended to protect the armed 
forces from propaganda, the Justice Department and the judiciary used the Espionage Act of 
1917 to suppress all “‘disloyal utterances.’”11  Under the Alien Act, the government could deport 
any alien who was a member of an anarchist organization by an administrative process that did 
not afford the alien the right to counsel in the preliminary investigation nor a jury in the hearing 
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or a subsequent right of appeal.  Naturalized citizens were subject to the same process.
12
  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Alien Act did not require a hearing before detaining an enemy alien.  
The hearings for such individuals during World War II resembled these deportation proceedings 
in the limited extent of due process afforded aliens.  Specifically applicable during wartime, the 
Sedition Act forbade, among other things, the uttering or printing of disloyal or abusive language 
about the U.S. government.
13
   
It was in this climate of suspicion that the General Intelligence Division within the 
Bureau of Investigation, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, gathered information on the 
radical activities of individuals, many of whom were deported during the first “Red Scare” of 
1919 to 1920.  The “Palmer Raids” were attempts by the Justice Department, under the direction 
of Attorney General Alexander Palmer, to arrest and deport radical individuals from the United 
States, including anarchists from recent European immigrant populations, who wanted to 
eliminate the state.  Hoover’s method for proceeding in deportation of alien radicals was to 
obtain a ruling that an organization to which they belonged fell within the class proscribed under 
the Immigration Act of 1918, for advocating political violence or anarchy, and then to produce 
membership cards, dues books, or testimony of attendance at meetings without direct evidence of 
personal beliefs.
14
  In 1919, there were 650 individuals arrested on suspicion of radicalism, of 
whom 249 were deported.  In 1920, there were 4000 additional people suspected of radicalism 
who were rounded up in raids in thirty-three cities.
15
  Jurists criticized the Justice Department for 
using undercover spies and in not following proper legal procedures in the arrests, detentions, 
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and so-called trials of aliens before inspectors, which eventually led to an end to the 
deportations.
16
 
Coinciding with the Red Scare was the conviction of Italian immigrants Ferdinando 
Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti for the murders of two men during an armed robbery at a 
shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts in 1920.  The public attention given to their case 
may account in part for the FBI’s increased efforts to eradicate Italian radicals believed to pose a 
risk of revolution against the U.S. government.  Sacco and Vanzetti were linked to the anarchist 
group the Galleanists, the same group that a year earlier had sent letter bombs to prominent 
government officials and businessmen and law enforcement officials.  In what has frequently 
been called a kangaroo court, Judge Webster Thayer, outspoken about his desire to suppress 
Bolshevism and radicalism, allowed the introduction of circumstantial evidence, including 
information about Sacco and Vanzetti’s radical background, to influence the outcome of the 
case.
17
  The duo’s sentencing to execution by the electric chair in 1927 had broad social and 
political implications as the international community claimed a miscarriage of justice in the 
court’s allowing the racism and nativism of legal authorities and the prejudices of the community 
to be factors in the treatment of these defendants.
18
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Legislation of the 1920s reflected a fear of foreigners’ ability to organize subversive 
activities against the U.S. government.  By targeting those perceived as misguided followers of 
radicals, these laws were to prevent radical leaders from having any influence.  The Immigration 
Act of May 10, 1920 punished aliens for merely possessing subversive literature and advising, 
much less than advocating, sedition, and for membership in particular groups and societies or 
financially supporting these organizations.  The federal government’s policy consisted of 
amnesty for “political prisoners,” but deportation of all aliens, either interned or convicted during 
World War I.
19
  Although many aliens had chosen voluntary repatriation by 1920, the legislation 
could still facilitate deportation of those convicted as opponents of the war and America’s 
policies.
20
 
The racist tone of immigration legislation was best exemplified by the acts of 1917, 1921, 
and 1924.  Laws included mandates for literacy tests which aimed at excluding new immigrants 
from Southern and Eastern Europe.
21
  The Quota Act of 1921 established numerical limits on 
immigration from Europe and established quotas restricting the number of immigrants from any 
country annually to three percent of the number of residents from that country living in the 
United States as of the 1910 U.S. Census.
22
  The Society for the Protection of Italian Immigrants, 
founded in New York City in 1901, assisted Italian immigrants who arrived at Ellis Island in 
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locating relatives and finding work.
23
  According to this society’s January 1922 report, the three 
percent rule effectively reduced the number of immigrant arrivals, but failed in its other intended 
purpose by admitting “a non-productive class of immigration, but den[ying] admittance to good 
productive laborious immigrants, who were not within the preferred clauses of the law.”24  The 
Immigration Act of 1924 set the quota for immigrants entering the United States at two percent 
of the residents from that country living in the United States as of the 1890 U.S. Census, thus 
further restricting Italians and other Southern Europeans since fewer of them lived in the United 
States at that time, and encouraging newcomers from Northern Europe.  As a result of the 1924 
Act, Italy was accorded a maximum of 3,845 persons, which was less than two percent of the 
296,000 Italians who had come over in 1914.
25
   
Despite this restrictive legislation, by 1930, Italian-born residents constituted a significant 
portion of the American population.
26
  Just a year before the entry of the United States into 
World War II, there were more than four million persons in the United States of Italian descent, 
of whom 1.6 million had been born in Italy.  Of this latter number, approximately seven hundred 
thousand were aliens, the vast majority residing on the Atlantic seaboard.
27
  Before turning to 
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specific government policies for Italians at the outset of World War II, we need to understand the 
evolution of Italians’ place in American society from the start of their immigration to the United 
States.  As a whole, resident Italians underwent processes of assimilation in terms of their 
economic status and political consciousness which afforded them increasingly greater power in 
employment and politics, even while they retained their Italian identity through language and 
customs.  Victims of discrimination for years in American society which classed them as 
undesirable aliens, the force of economic and political improvement served to diminish 
discrimination against them. 
The progression that Italians experienced in the labor market was intertwined with their 
changing racial identity and white consciousness.  Italians’ racial status was complicated by the 
distinction between race and color.  From when Italian immigrants arrived in the United States in 
the late nineteenth century, color was a social category rather than a physical description, 
meaning that “white” Italians could have darker skin than “black” Americans, and race was a 
description of nationality like North and South Italians.  Thus on the federal government’s 
naturalization papers, Italians stated their region of origin for the category of race and white as 
their color.
28
  Unlike African Americans already resident in the United States who were 
prevented from enjoying the full extent of their constitutional rights, Italians could obtain 
citizenship and partake of all attendant rights upon their arrival.  They enjoyed full access to the 
normal rights of citizenship, such as voting, owning land, serving on juries, and marrying 
whomever they wanted.  But there was a dichotomy between the legal and social treatment of 
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Italians.  They suffered discrimination in housing, in labor unions, in their children’s schools, 
and in other public places.
29
  Italians experienced control of Catholic churches by the Irish who 
had been in the United States longer and dominated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
30
  In 
certain regions of the Jim Crow South, Italian immigrants were stigmatized for accepting jobs 
marked as “black” by local custom and for living and working among blacks.  In Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and West Virginia, Italians were lynched for alleged crimes or for fraternizing with 
blacks in violation of local racial codes.  Italian organizations reacted to violence in New Orleans 
by demanding protection against racial prejudice.
31
  Poor southern Italian peasants sometimes 
“replaced” freed black slaves in the Gulf states, worked for low wages, and proved eager to work 
as “scabs” during strikes in factories of the Northeast.32  Italians in the North were known to take 
the dirtiest jobs of digging ditches, picking rags, and shoveling manure off the streets.
33
  They 
were also farmers, fishermen, and laborers in the transportation industry, building roads, 
railroads, and the New York City subway.  The more skilled opened businesses as barbers, 
tailors, butchers or undertakers.
34
  As late as the interwar years, Italian immigrants remained over 
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represented in low-paying unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, limited by their poor command of the 
English language.
35
   
Scholars have explained the acculturation of Italians into American society and their 
economic improvement as a group through immigrant-community institutions, such as the 
Catholic Church, schools, the padrone system of labor bosses who helped immigrants overcome 
language barriers and differences in labor practices, politics, and even organized crime.
36
  Once 
Italian immigrants established themselves in this country through these channels, their 
achievement of middle-class status, experienced by those who moved away from the ethnic 
colonies in the city to better locations in the city and eventually to outlying neighborhoods, 
depended upon their social mobility in an industrial society and their adoption of American 
culture.
37
  In contrast to this model of progression, we might view the process of social change 
that immigrants experienced in America through a paradigm based upon economic factors in a 
capitalist system, specifically their diverse responses to the demands of the marketplace, which 
emphasizes class distinctions among immigrant groups.
38
  According to this model, middle-class 
status resulted from one’s background in his former country, meaning that social inequality 
among immigrant groups originated with one’s inherited status.39  If you were an artisan or 
intellectual in your homeland, then you had a greater chance of attaining a higher status in your 
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American ethnic community than if you had been a laborer.
40
  Most importantly, under this 
model, Italian immigrants’ economic mobility lay in their agency to respond to urban capitalism 
on their own terms through pursuit of public schools and politics to serve their familial and 
communal needs, such as access to jobs and services, thus ensuring their personal welfare.
41
  
Another example of their self-enterprising nature was their formation of welfare institutions 
requiring initiation fees and dues which guaranteed sickness benefits and funeral costs, as well as 
aid to surviving family members.
42
 
Regardless of the model used to explain the socio-economic mobility that Italians 
experienced, their status had improved demonstrably in the course of the several decades since 
they had first arrived in the United States.  Rising out of the labor class, some Italians living in 
rural areas became farm operators whose produce supplied cities in the Northeast, the West, and 
parts of the South.  Italians specifically became known as growers of strawberries in Louisiana 
and of grapes in California.  They even grew cotton in Alabama and Tennessee, and rice in 
Texas.
43
  Italians living in urban centers found success in a variety of professional roles.  Writing 
in the early 1920s about the assimilation of Italian immigrants into American society, Gino 
Speranza, a director of the Society for the Protection of Italian Immigrants, stated that although 
the “Italian colony” in New York City was among the poorest in the United States, its total 
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estimated material value was seventy-five million dollars.  His breakdown of professions was as 
follows:  115 physicians; 63 pharmacists; 4 dentists; 21 lawyers; 16 public school teachers; 9 
architects; 7 mechanical engineers; 4 manufacturers of technical instruments.  Other signs of 
economic and social progress by New York City Italians were their support of two hospitals, a 
savings bank, a trust company, and a chamber of commerce.
44
  However, nationally, the Italian 
professional class remained small and unremarkable.  From 1900 to 1920, it consisted mainly of 
physicians, dentists, and lawyers, most of whom had attended second-rate professional schools 
and did not attain any eminence in their field.
45
   
A more successful vehicle for raising the public perception of the Italian community in 
the United States was the involvement of Italian Americans in politics.  Italian immigrants 
displayed an active interest in local and national politics once expectations of return migration 
subsided and they decided to remain permanently in the United States.  Those who entered 
politics at the turn of the century had already achieved prominence in their communities and 
enjoyed the support of an Italian American political base.  Examples in New York include 
Democrat Antonio Zucca, president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce, who was elected 
coroner for Greater New York in 1897, followed by Democrat Pietro Acritelli who was elected 
to that same position in 1904.  Also benefiting from the support of a heavily Italian district in 
New York City, financier James E. March (Antonio Michelino Maggio) won a seat to the 
Electoral College in 1904.  After World War I, there was an increasing number of Italian 
Americans achieving political positions, most noticeably in major cities like New York, San 
Francisco, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New Orleans where there were large populations of 
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Italians.
46
  During the Prohibition Era in New York City, for instance, Italians made inroads into 
politics through the Tammany machine, but the links that some Italian American politicians such 
as Al Marinelli had to illicit means of acquiring wealth eventually cost them their positions.  One 
historian has attributed the powerful political influence of Italians in New York City by the early 
1940s to Frank Costello, a former bootlegger turned real estate investor, and Generoso Pope, the 
owner of the two largest Italian-language dailies and a radio station who controlled the channels 
of communication with Italian speakers in that city and became a leader in the Democratic 
Party.
47
  Pope was accused of engaging in Fascist activities and authoring pro-Fascist articles, as 
well as maintaining close links with officials in Mussolini’s regime, all of which led to an 
examination of his character by the Dies Committee in 1941.
48
  Although Pope never held an 
appointed or elected office, he built a status as the most important Italian political leader in the 
country, with the exception of Fiorello H. La Guardia, with whom Pope often found himself in 
opposing political camps competing for the Italian American constituency.
49
   
From 1916 through 1946, La Guardia was a dominant political figure both in New York 
and nationally.  La Guardia was the first Italian American elected to Congress where he served 
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for several terms and he was the first to serve as New York City’s mayor, an office he held for 
three consecutive terms.
50
  La Guardia’s Italian heritage put him in an awkward position in the 
1930s with a constituency largely sympathetic to Italian Fascism, causing him to hedge in his 
attacks on Mussolini and even attend events in support of Italy in its fight against the 
international coalition led by England.
51
  As mayor he secured many jobs for his Italian 
constituents, which proved to be an asset to him when he sought re-election.
52
 But his popularity 
crossed ethnic lines and political parties as evidenced in the widespread support that he received 
when the mayor came under attack from members of Congress and the media who urged 
President Roosevelt to remove him from his position as Director of the Office of Civilian 
Defense.
53
  Upon his resignation from this position, Rabbi Isserman of Temple Israel in St. 
Louis, Missouri, explained La Guardia’s appeal in a radio broadcast in which he told listeners 
that it was wrong to characterize La Guardia, the son of a naturalized citizen and decorated 
veteran of World War I, as an Italian because to do so failed to capture his essence as the 
ultimate “people’s candidate” who represented the true spirit of democracy.54   
Overlapping with La Guardia’s career was that of Vito Marcantonio, a seven-term 
congressman from East Harlem whose constituents included Italian Americans, Puerto Ricans, 
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and African Americans.  Known for his radical positions such as his support of the Communist 
Party and labor unions and his initial opposition to American involvement in World War II, 
“Marc,” as he was affectionately called, was able to retain the support of his more conservative 
Southern Italian immigrant followers even in the face of Italian competitors.  However, after his 
public attacks on Mussolini and Fascism cost him the 1936 election, he avoided events in protest 
of the Italian government, which allowed him to regain popularity and his congressional seat in 
the next election.
55
  However, he did not refrain from counteracting “the combined forces of 
reaction in [his] district, composed of Tammany, Hearst and Fascists” through the publication of 
The People’s Voice, dedicated to local issues such as unemployment relief and slum clearance as 
well as the campaign against war and Fascism.
56
  In addition to helping to build a Farmer Labor 
Party, the goal of the weekly newspaper was to send Marcantonio back to Congress and to 
promote other “liberal and progressive legislators who will fight for the rights and civil liberties 
of the people” such as stronger trade unions and better working conditions.57   
Marcantonio was very close to his constituents, many of whom contacted him for help in 
obtaining jobs or food stamps and for assistance in housing and discrimination issues, often 
writing in Italian.
58
  He received appeals from numerous Italian organizations such as the Italian 
Welfare Association, the Italian-American World War Veterans, the Harlem Italian Defense 
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League, and the Sons of Italy Grand Lodge, Inc.
59
  In many instances, he served as a sponsor 
before the Immigration Bureau for Italians seeking to obtain their American citizenship and 
contacted the Justice Department on behalf of aliens who failed to register.
60
  Although there 
appeared to be no evidence of appeals to Marcantonio specific to internment and other 
restrictions placed upon Italian aliens during the war, the congressman was called upon to aid an 
Italian naturalized citizen named Domenico D’Aggiola whose personal account was blocked 
upon America’s entry into the war and later the accounts for his food import business because of 
his position as the director of the Italian War Veterans in New York.
61
  That an organization 
incorporated under the laws of New York whose mission was to aid “unfortunate, disabled and 
impoverished Italian veterans of the first World War” became targeted as a promoter of Fascism 
is merely one example of how the hysteria of the times caused the government to forego 
thorough investigations into the activities of Italian organizations as well as those of their 
members.
62
    
Italian Americans held prominent political positions in other regions of the country as 
well.  Angelo Joseph Rossi, a florist by trade, held several offices in San Francisco before being 
elected that city’s mayor in 1931, a position he held until 1944.  Subpoenaed in May 1942 by the 
Committee on Un-American Activities in California, headed by State Senator Jack Tenney, to 
answer to allegations that he supported Fascism, Rossi pledged his complete loyalty to the 
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United States.  The following year he failed to be reelected mayor.
63
  Like other Italian American 
politicians, Rossi enjoyed the benefits of a political base from his ethnic community, but had to 
navigate a tricky course between establishing his own political profile and retaining the support 
of an Italian population with strong ties to its homeland.  Having political leaders from their own 
community helped to solidify Italians’ identification with the United States and their adoption of 
its democratic ideals, which in turn accelerated their acceptance as fellow citizens.   
Although this history of immigration, assimilation, and government fears of radicals and 
anarchists laid a crucial foundation for the government policies of the 1940s, a more immediate 
context was the shifting attitudes of Americans toward Mussolini and Fascism in the 1920s and 
1930s, alongside the parallel vicissitudes in Italian Americans’ nationalistic sentiment for their 
homeland.  Understanding the political identity of Italians in the decades leading up to World 
War II helps explain the power that they had as a voting bloc in elections.  As future chapters 
reveal, the power reflected in that bloc translated into influence among Italian American 
politicians during Congressional hearings to prevent the Italian population from undergoing mass 
internment and to save individual Italians from a decision of internment by alien enemy hearing 
boards.   
In the 1920s, Americans were not attracted to Fascism as a political ideology but 
rationalized it as acceptable or even laudable on grounds of “‘efficiency,’” “‘discipline,’” and 
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“‘progress.’”64  The middle class and business community admired the leadership qualities of 
Mussolini whose rationality and willpower seemed to model American values.
65
  John Diggins 
describes the progression in the American businessmen’s opinion of Fascism as follows:  
suspicion of Fascist violence and lawlessness; optimism and even enthusiasm after the 1922 
March on Rome and the take-over by the seemingly anti-radical Mussolini and his Fascist Party; 
skepticism about the announcement of corporatism involving state intervention in private 
business in 1926; positive feelings about Italy’s centralized economy during the early years of 
the Depression; and repudiation of the Fascist “experiment” after 1934.66      
Once Mussolini came into power in Italy in October, 1922, il Duce fostered Italian 
Americans’ pride in their homeland, especially after revitalizing Italy and restoring the grandeur 
of ancient Rome.  Perhaps in response to anti-alien sentiment culminating in the discriminatory 
immigration laws of the 1920s, which gave immigrants a sense of inferiority, Italian Americans, 
including anti-Fascists, looked to Italy for self-esteem.
67
  But while Italians in the United States 
took pride in how Mussolini’s political and economic accomplishments raised Italy’s 
international status and hoped his achievements would raise their own status in American 
society, these sentiments did not translate into a desire to import Fascism into the United 
States.
68
  Historian Oscar Handlin argued that “among some Italians in the New World, 
admiration for Mussolini implied not so much approval of Fascism as gratitude for the 
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achievement of having earned the respect and fear of the great powers of the earth.”69  The 
middle and working classes were united in endorsing Il Duce for dealing with homeland 
problems of church-state relations, the Mafia, and radicalism, and hoped that their glorification 
of Italy would defend against American contempt for new immigrant groups.
70
  Jerre Mangione, 
a journalist and the director of the public relations program of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service during World War II, recalls that his relatives believed Mussolini “would 
bring increasing glory to Italy and respect to all Italians, even to those in the United States.”71       
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, he had to be aware that his 
relations with Mussolini were under close scrutiny by Italian Americans.  By his own admission, 
President Roosevelt miscalculated the course that Mussolini and Fascism would take.  In 1932 he 
believed Fascism was a political experiment akin to Communism in Russia.  Reflecting on his 
initial analysis in a memo, he said that “‘during those years Mussolini still maintained a 
semblance of parliamentary government, and there were many, including myself, who hoped that 
having restored order and morale he would, of his own accord, work toward a restoration of 
democratic processes.’”72  Roosevelt’s initial regard for Mussolini affected the reputation that 
Italians enjoyed in the United States.  Even the majority of non-Italian American citizens 
admired Mussolini for his charisma and plans for Italy.  During the early 1930s, accounts 
reached Americans of “trains running on time, of vast public enterprises, of the ‘tremendous’ 
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building projects,” as well as the elimination of slums and beggars from Italy’s streets.73  
Mussolini’s appeal crossed religious lines in the United States; Catholics credited Mussolini with 
the “‘resurrection’” of Italy, while Protestants liked his anticlericalism.74 
President Roosevelt and his party could not forget that Mussolini had widespread support 
in Italian American urban districts on which they depended for the Italian vote.  After 
Roosevelt’s private appeals to Mussolini to halt the invasion of Ethiopia and to submit to 
arbitration failed, the president persuaded oil shippers in 1936 to restrict their trade with Italy.  
Italian Americans vociferously opposed Roosevelt’s shift from neutrality to a moral embargo and 
economic sanctions.  During the election that fall, hostility toward Roosevelt lingered in Italian 
neighborhoods in the face of the government’s refusal to recognize Italy’s annexation of 
Ethiopia.
75
  For example, the effect of Italy’s war in Ethiopia on Chicago’s Italian-American 
community was generally one of mobilization in support of the homeland, as this community 
understood the Fascist campaign in terms of racial and national identity.
76
  Some Italians, 
however, who had initially turned to the Fascist doctrine for strength at a time when they needed 
a prop in their adopted homeland, where many people treated them as inferior, became 
disillusioned by Italy’s attack on Ethiopia.  Writing contemporaneously with these events, 
Constantine Panunzio said that “Italian Americans all over the land, beginning to realize the full 
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significance of fascism” withdrew from Fascist groups, took out their naturalization papers and 
arranged to have their families join them in the United States.
77
   
The United States persisted in refusing to recognize Italy’s African conquest, although it 
followed a pattern of diplomatic leniency toward Mussolini and Fascism.  Roosevelt continued 
corresponding with Mussolini, but after 1937, he did not allow his press secretary to publicize 
his relationship with il Duce.
78
  This behavior was in keeping with Roosevelt’s “evasive and 
political cautious” style, as seen in his later partnership with Winston Churchill.79  In March 
1938, the German annexation of Austria and the Nazi occupation of the Brenner Pass met with 
“tacit acceptance” from the Fascists, and in May, Hitler marched into Italy at the invitation of the 
Fascists.
80
  Roosevelt’s administration also was deeply troubled by Italy’s anti-Semitism, and 
would not defer to Mussolini’s policies.  In January 1939, after Roosevelt learned of the fate of 
Jewish refugees in central and southern Europe as a result of Fascist pogroms, he proposed to 
Mussolini that they be resettled in Ethiopia, a plan Mussolini rejected.
81
   
By 1940, Roosevelt was convinced that Mussolini would bring Italy into the war on 
Hitler’s side.  Angered by Italy’s decision to enter the war with the Axis powers even as France 
fell, Roosevelt added the famous line to his University of Virginia commencement speech about 
“the hand that held the dagger striking its neighbor in the back.”  He ignored objections from the 
State Department that adding this phrase would complicate the relations of the United States with 
Italy and instead followed his conscience.  Believing that the two countries were “long past the 
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stage of diplomacy when we could curry the favor with any of the Nazi nations,” Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson told Roosevelt that he had no objection to the phrase because “[t]he only 
language that they understood was force.”82  Roosevelt boldly risked offending Italian American 
communities, but stood firm in America’s posture with respect to Italy.  
 The actual number of Italian Americans who actively supported and participated in 
Fascist activities in the United States in the years leading up to World War II has been the 
subject of wide debate.  While Italy’s aggressive military activities in Ethiopia during 1935 and 
1936 turned American public opinion against Italy, Italian American support remained strong as 
tens of thousands turned out for mass rallies in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston, 
and communities collected gold wedding rings, watches, and other items to help finance the war 
effort.
83
  Italian Americans vociferously opposed Roosevelt’s change of position from neutrality 
to a moral embargo and later support of economic sanctions upon Italy.
84
  Yet Gaetano 
Salvemini, a political exile from Mussolini’s Fascist dictatorship and Harvard lecturer, estimated 
that in 1940, only five percent of Italian Americans were “out and out Fascists.”85  California 
State Senator Tenney, in hearings before the Commission on Un-American Activities in 1943, 
estimated that a much higher figure of ten percent of this population at that time was under the 
influence of Fascism.
86
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In pure isolationist rhetoric, U.S. Congressman Martin Dies from Texas once wrote that 
“we invited the evils of the old world’s social, political and economic disorders by offering our 
fertile lands and priceless resources, which our fathers designed as a heritage for their children’s 
children, as a refuge for the problems and malcontents of Europe.”87  Included in his list of 
undesirable aliens were Italians, many of whom he believed were Fascist.  In evaluating 
testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1940, Dies, the 
chairman of the committee, estimated that there were approximately 10,000 members of the 
Italian Black Shirts in the United States, and that approximately 100,000 people of Italian 
descent participated in meetings of Fascist organizations.
88
  Dies’ greatest concern with the 
Italian community was that Fascist ideology and support for Mussolini were “concealed behind 
the barrier of the Italian language.”89  Even though Dies admitted that this factor cast an air of 
mystery over meetings of Italian societies at which Italian consular officials addressed members, 
he maintained that “Italian consular officials and secret Fascist agents are spreading Fascist 
propaganda throughout the ranks of many Italian-American organizations in the United States.”90  
He also believed that the seven dailies published in the Italian language in the United States were 
“Fascist publications under direct guidance from Rome.”91  Additionally, radio stations and the 
film industry were supposedly promoting Fascist propaganda.
92
  Dies was convinced that danger 
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lurked in the younger generation of Italians after testimony before HUAC that American children 
of Italian extraction were indoctrinated in Fascist ideology under the guise of education both in 
the United States through the Dante Alighieri Society and in Italy during vacations at Fascist 
camps.
93
   
Despite these “findings” on Fascism in America, the Dies Committee was harshly 
criticized for not broadening its investigation of Fascism and Nazism to include homegrown 
elements of these movements.  Like its counterpart in the 1930s, the Special Committee to 
Investigate Communist Activity in the United States headed by Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr., 
the focus of the Dies Committee was Communism and its frequent target the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU).
94
  Finding fault with its “un-American” methods of relying upon 
rumors and encouraging character assassination and libel without providing fair hearings, 
attorneys of the ACLU argued that the Dies Committee spent most of its efforts on exposing 
Communism, condemning every progressive cause as such, and relatively little time on 
uncovering the operations of native organizations that took on a Fascist character.
95
  The ACLU 
believed that “vigilante” groups, such as the Silver Shirts, the Black Legion, and the Ku Klux 
Klan, were “vastly more active in the United States than other movements aimed at our 
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democratic liberties” since they “arose in almost every strike to serve the interests of employers 
against the interests of law and order.”96  Still another Fascist organization with considerable 
influence in the Southwest and Midwest during the late 1930s and early 1940s that threatened the 
U.S. government was the Union Nacional Sinarquista (the National Union of Sinarchistas) 
which exploited the racial discrimination suffered by Mexican Americans to advance the fascist 
cause.
97
 
United States Senator Huey P. Long from Louisiana, who embodied the politics of 
economic protest and was a champion of the common man, and Father Coughlin, the Detroit 
priest who rose to national popularity through his radio sermons denouncing concentrated wealth 
in the hands of the few, allegedly represented early forms of American fascism.  During the 
1930s when the United States was recuperating from the Great Depression in the latter part of its 
transformation from a rural, fragmented society to an urban, industrial one, accompanied by a 
new mass culture, the charismatic personalities of Long and Coughlin appealed to a population 
seeking social justice.
98
  As Alan Brinkley explains, “[t]here is nothing to suggest that either man 
ever communicated with or even thought much about Hitler, Mussolini, or any other European 
fascist leader.”99  Indeed, those fascists in the United States who tried to organize popular 
movements on the German and Italian models did not follow Long and Coughlin.  But there was 
a group of intelligent and well-educated men who believed that these popular leaders could be 
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vehicles for their ideas.  Coughlin did begin to discuss fascism in 1938, but neither he nor Long 
openly approved of fascism or showed interest in connecting with fascist movements or 
thinkers.
100
  In his exploration of whether Long and Coughlin were implicitly counterparts to the 
movements of Hitler and Mussolini, Brinkley draws similarities in their appeal to the traditional 
community and “hostility toward ‘internationalism’ in politics and economics.”101  But there 
were sharp contrasts in the openly racial and religious hatred and commitment to “a belligerent 
super-nationalism” of European fascists as compared to the less defined social philosophies of 
Long and Coughlin who espoused greater sharing of wealth, power, and influence.
102
  Despite 
debate over forms of fascism, homegrown fascist-like movements with roots in American 
populism preceded most Fascist organizations formed by Italian immigrants in the United States.   
Until the summer of 1940 when Italy attacked France, “there was no question that Italian-
Americans in general were solidly behind Mussolini,” although the basis of that support seemed 
driven by love for their homeland rather than a belief in Fascist ideology.
103
  After this invasion, 
however, they found it essential to their acceptance into American society to abandon patriotic 
nostalgia for Italy for loyalty to their adopted homeland.  There were 122 Italian organizations in 
New York alone that pledged allegiance to the United States in approval of President Roosevelt’s 
resolutions condemning the invasion and his characterization of Mussolini as a “backstabber.”104  
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At the Supreme Convention of the Order of the Sons of Italy in America in August 1941 before 
the United States’ declaration of war, members unanimously adopted a resolution pledging its 
loyalty and resources to America and its unity, which Roosevelt warmly acknowledged.
105
  One 
historian has described Italian American sentiment from June 10, 1940 until December 7, 1941 
as “hung suspended between hope and fear”; hope that the United States would remain out of the 
war, and fear that if it entered, Italian Americans would be forced to fight against their 
homeland.
106
   
The Italian community was aware of how the American population perceived them.  The 
association of aliens generally with criminal activity was unmistakable in 1941.  That year 
Congress debated the Hobbs Bill concerning the detention and deportation of alien criminals and 
proven Nazis, Communists, and Fascists.  One editorial cited a Justice Department estimate of 
“at least 100,000 aliens illegally in this country,” a number which included “Nazis and Fascists 
sent here to swell the fifth column.”107  The author traced the “alien-criminal situation” to the 
practice of the INS, when it was under the Department of Labor led by the “misplaced 
sympathy” of Secretary Frances Perkins, to free deportable aliens and make them legal residents.  
According to testimony at a Senate hearing in 1939, “nearly 6,000 mandatory deportations were 
suspended by Secretary Perkins in six years.”  The editorial also cited the failure of the Justice 
Department to impose an immigration statute making re-entry of deported aliens a felony, 
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punishable by five years of prison.
108
  Thus, the author argued that a lax INS in the 1930s set the 
stage for the presence of law-breaking and potentially subversive aliens in the United States at 
the start of the war. 
Anti-alien sentiment varied by regions of the country.  A government report issued in 
April 1942 indicates that nationally, discrimination against Italians and Germans took the form 
of discrimination in employment opportunities.  The perception of Italians, as reported in 
newspapers, state by state, was most negative in Massachusetts where skepticism toward the 
alien population was “directed especially toward Italians, those naturalized as well as those of 
alien status.”  In this respect, Massachusetts differed from other Northeast states such as Rhode 
Island where “[n]o real feeling exist[ed] against Italians, a substantial proportion of State’s 
population,” and New York, where the average citizen thought that “we should try to avoid 
hurting innocent aliens,” and labor groups felt that aliens should not be set aside as a class.  
Pennsylvania reported few instances of discrimination against Italians and Germans.
109
 
In some communities, employers adopted blanket policies of not hiring persons of Italian, 
German, and Japanese extraction, and government departments and war industry contractors 
made efforts to weed out potentially dangerous persons from their work forces pursuant to Army 
and Navy regulations on the employment of aliens in defense production.
110
  Non-citizens 
already employed in a defense or related industry could lose their jobs unless their employer 
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submitted an affidavit to the Naval or Army authorities stating that he believed the enemy alien 
to be loyal to the United States.  If an employer was not willing to do this, the only recourse that 
an Italian alien had was to write to the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practices and 
claim discrimination on the basis of ancestry.
111
  One Italian language newspaper decried 
employers who discriminated against aliens, saying that the United States needed the skill of 
every able and loyal person, citizens and foreigners, to participate in the war effort.
112
 
In order to combat “fear, hysteria and rumor-mongering – three weapons of the enemy 
that are as deadly as bombs, or tanks or guns,” James Rowe Jr., Assistant to Francis Biddle, 
spoke on the radio, urging listeners to leave the handling of suspects to the government, 
particularly agents of the FBI who were trained in matters of espionage and sabotage.  To assure 
the public of its safety in the able hands of the Justice Department, Rowe claimed that it was 
“significant that nearly half of the alien enemies that have been apprehended by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation since the war began were taken into custody within 48 hours after the 
start of the war.”  The public’s job, then, was to stay “level-headed” and not to take matters into 
their own hands, thereby “engendering a spirit of national unity which no one can ever break.”113 
Sensing the discrimination and anti-alien sentiment in Boston prompted some 
organizations to urge tolerance of aliens and American born citizens of Italian, Japanese, and 
German descent.  At the annual dinner of the International Institute in Boston, the executive 
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secretary told members that citizens should leave it to the FBI to handle the subversive 
individuals and to be sympathetic and tolerant of the rest.  A consul of Czecho-Slovakia and 
lecturer from the Tufts School of Law and Diplomacy said that the “only solution for 
international cooperation is cultural pluralism,” an acceptance that this is “a world of the 
many.”114   
Tolerance was also the message of Attorney General Biddle’s address on “Democracy 
and Racial Minorities,” before the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City.  
Biddle reminded attendees that “[o]ur sons today are fighting side by side with the sons of 
Italians, of Germans and of Japanese. . . . For this is the essence of our democracy in practice.”115  
Ultimately, the war solidified Italians’ loyalty to the United States, as many families sent their 
sons to fight in the U.S. armed forces and many Italians worked in the war industries.  Some 
families with one or more members of alien status sent several sons to war, such as the Massaglis 
of the Humboldt Bay area in California who had four sons in different divisions of the armed 
services.  Gino Massagli described “a little flag, a little banner with four stars” on his parents’ 
front door while he and his brothers were serving.  When encountering Italian soldiers overseas, 
he recalled that his Italian heritage did not divide his loyalty.
116
  
The war also strengthened Italians’ appreciation of democracy, which in turn caused 
more Americans to accept them as fellow citizens.  Don Rafaelli’s parents were not alone in their 
disapproval of Mussolini’s building of a military state and their decision to sever their ties with 
                                                          
114
 “Tolerance Toward Aliens Urged at Annual Dinner,” The Boston Daily Globe, March 20, 1942. 
115 “The Attorney General Warns Against Race Prejudice and Discrimination,” Excerpts from speech given 
November 11, 1943, reprinted in Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review 1, 
no 6 (December 1943):   8-9.  Attorney General Biddle emphasized the importance of public opinion supporting 
state and federal governments’ indignation against racial discrimination and for leaders to enforce the law.  
116
 Gino Massagli, interview by Stephen Fox, Eureka, California, July 30, 1986, in Uncivil Liberties, 140. 
57 
 
the old country.  Rafaelli remembered how his father spoke out against Mussolini which was a 
reason why “he tried to assimilate so readily into the American community.”117  Another 
example of political assimilation was the transformation experienced by Joseph Maniscalco’s 
father in San Francisco.  Mr. Mansicalco idolized Mussolini until he saw “that the Italian people 
were very deeply offended by Mussolini’s actions,” and realized that “Mussolini did make a big 
mistake,” causing him to feel “very pro-American, even more pro-American than before.”118   
The absence of Italian American disloyalty during the war and the Italian American 
newspapers’ swift repudiation of Mussolini and Fascism after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor suggest that pro-Fascist sentiment, regionally concentrated in northeastern metropolitan 
areas, resulted from pride in Italy, rather than ideology.
119
  Government suspicion of Italian 
aliens with ties to Fascist organizations remained, however, and led to plans for removing them 
from their neighborhoods, some for the entire duration of the war.  Those plans took root well 
before the formal U.S. declaration of war in 1941. 
 
************************************* 
 
Building an extensive domestic intelligence operation requires balancing the need for 
secrecy in national security plans with the right of citizens in a democratic society to know what 
their government is doing.  Several years prior to the restrictive wartime programs imposed on 
the Italian population, plans were already under way for security measures against particular 
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alien groups.  In 1936, the FBI began collecting information about any Communist, Fascist, or 
subversive individuals or organizations.
120
   
When President Roosevelt in 1936 asked the FBI for “a broad picture” of the effects of 
Communism and Fascism on “the economic and political life of the country as a whole,” he did 
not appear much concerned with public accountability.  His request went beyond investigations 
of violations of law, and therefore, lacked the legislative authority for the type of intelligence 
activity that he wanted the FBI to undertake.  For a legal basis, he resorted to the Appropriation 
Act which allowed the FBI to investigate matters referred to it by the State Department.  Thus, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked that such investigation be conducted.
121
  Although there 
was no evidence that Congress or the Attorney General had intended the appropriations statute to 
authorize the type of permanent domestic intelligence structure that FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover envisioned, that is, broadly sweeping activities from the steel and coal industries to 
Fascism and Nazism, organized labor, and the activities of African Americans, Roosevelt 
approved Hoover’s plan in 1938 for a joint FBI-military domestic intelligence program.122   
The need for referrals from the State Department for FBI investigations ended in June 
1939 when Roosevelt issued a directive that “investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, 
and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the 
Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office 
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of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department.”123  One analyst suggests that the relationship of 
trust and loyalty between Roosevelt and Hoover “erased any limit set by custom or law to the 
requests the president might make of the FBI director, or to the favors the director might do for 
the president.”124  The fact that Roosevelt gave Hoover assignments directly maintained their 
covert nature, giving Hoover the ability to direct investigations of Communist and Fascist 
activities without Roosevelt formally notifying Congress.
125
  The domestic intelligence program 
became public in September 1939 when war broke out in Europe.
126
  In January 1940, Hoover 
formally announced to a House subcommittee that the FBI had revived the General Intelligence 
Division of the Palmer Days and that it was operating a general index.
127
 
In 1939, the FBI’s domestic intelligence program had the dual purposes of supplying 
Roosevelt and his executive officers information for decision-making and developing 
governmental policies, and of gathering “preventive intelligence” to be used in the case of an 
emergency or war.
128
  FBI field offices were tasked with obtaining information on a variety of 
categories of persons:  “persons of German, Italian, and Communist sympathies,” including 
subscribers of German and Italian language newspapers and officers of these newspapers in the 
United States and newspapers published by Communist Party or its affiliates, as well as members 
of German and Italian societies and other organizations whether they be “of a fraternal character 
                                                          
123
 Senate Intelligence Report, 403, citing Confidential Memorandum of the President, 6/26/39. 
124
 Powers, Secrecy and Power, 216. 
125
 Powers, Secrecy and Power, 215-16, 230. 
126
 Senate Intelligence Report, 403. 
127
 Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, 248. 
128
 Senate Intelligence Report, 412-13. 
60 
 
or of some other nature” and other organizations with “pronounced Nationalistic tendencies.”129  
Persons in these categories went on to what became the FBI’s Custodial Detention List, the 
sources for which were “public and private records, confidential sources of information, 
newspaper morgues, public libraries, employment records, school records, et cetera.”130  Those 
persons in “Class 1” were to be apprehended and interned immediately, while “Class 2” persons 
were to be carefully watched.  The primary subjects in mid-1940 were active Communists, the 
German-American Bund, Italian Fascist organizations, and American Fascist groups.
131
  Unlike 
pro-Fascist activities of the late 1920s and early 1930s which were confined largely to 
propaganda, analysts believed that espionage agents joined propagandists in the following 
decades.
132
   
By 1939, the FBI had lists of Italians organized both alphabetically and geographically.  
In clarifying instructions two years later, Hoover requested his offices across the country to 
submit names of “[m]embers of all definitely identified Italian Fascist organizations,” as well as 
persons reported as “pro-Italian, or pronouncedly disloyal or hostile to the United States, or loyal 
or sympathetic to any foreign country.”133  Investigations of such individuals were to focus on 
the nature of their occupations and activities, whether they held leadership positions in 
subversive organizations, their military and criminal background, and information on whether 
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they had relatives in the armed forces of a foreign country.
134
  Italians could appear on the FBI’s 
list if they had been members of the Italian War Veterans, subscribed to or were associated with 
Italian newspapers or magazines, listened to Italian radio broadcasts, or taught Italian in schools 
sponsored by the Italian Consulate.
135
   
Well before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the FBI had created a special list of 
individuals, aliens and citizens, to be arrested in case of war.  The “ABC list,” which further 
defined persons in Class 1 by categorizing their level of security risk, was to be applied equally 
to persons of Japanese, German, or Italian descent:  A, the most dangerous category, was 
comprised of “aliens who led cultural or assistance organizations”; B were “slightly less 
suspicious aliens”; and Category C “were members of, or those who donated to, ethnic groups, 
Japanese language teachers and Buddhist clergy.”  All those on the ABC list were promptly 
arrested in early December 1941.
136
   
There were in fact Italian Fascist organizations and individuals at work within the United 
States, many of which were identified by the FBI with the help of Gaetano Salvemini, who 
consulted with government officials.
137
  Constantine Panunzio reported that from the early 
1930s, Fascists had worked through organizations already established in this country, chiefly the 
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Italian Embassy, Italian consulates, the Dante Alighieri Society, Fasci Abroad, and the Sons of 
Italy.
138
  Other Italian organizations that appeared in intelligence files, some considered 
inherently dangerous and others seemingly innocuous in character, were as follows:  Casa 
Coloniale, Cenacalo Club, Combattenti (Italian War Veterans), Council of Marconi, Italian 
American Chamber of Commerce, Italian Language Schools, Mario Morgantini Circle, Italian 
Fascists, and the Italian National Tourist Information Bureau.
139
  The FBI targeted members of 
certain Italian social groups believed to be fronts for Fascist organizers.  But often agents’ 
suspicions were based on vague information.  For example, FBI informants reported that Aldo 
Ghirardi was espousing Fascist beliefs within the Sons of Italy, based on evidence such as his 
membership in the Fascist Party, a photo of him and the Black Shirts at the March on Rome in 
1922, and his donation of silver medals for the Ethiopian War.
140
 
In addition to concern about these organizations, the government feared that the foreign-
language media had the potential to sway Italian communities toward allegiance to Italy.  On the 
FBI’s list of suspicious Italian publications, distributors, and book stores were:  L’Italia, L’Italia 
Press Company, Italian Chamber of Commerce, Il Grido della Stirpe (newspaper published by 
the Italian Lictor Society), Fair Play (magazine published by the Lictor Society), Sons of Italy, 
and La Voce Del Popolo.
141
  Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy recommended that Italian 
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publications not be prohibited categorically, but rather reviewed individually.
142
  Publications 
considered subversive were to be reported to the FBI and then referred to the Postmaster General 
for investigation by a committee that included the Attorney General and Secretary of War.
143
  
Also on the FBI’s radar were Italian radio stations and their announcers who broadcast Fascist 
propaganda directed at New York and Boston Italian neighborhoods where an unassimilated and 
mostly illiterate audience listened to broadcasts on their short-wave radios, particularly to 
maintain contact with the “old country.”144  
The FBI targeted many individual Italian aliens for their involvement in the media.  For 
example, Mario Giovanni Favoino, an Italian newspaper and magazine editor, author, and radio 
commentator who went by numerous aliases during his almost twenty-year residence in the 
United States, was the subject of a report from a “highly confidential informant” saying that he 
“scorned democracy and exalted Fascism” as a radio announcer for a New York City station.  
The FBI had transcripts of radio programs on multiple dates reflecting “that the Subject presents 
Fascism most favorably under every condition, even to insinuating that the system of 
government in the United States has broken down, and when a machine has broken down, the 
thing to do is to ‘get a good mechanic’ to repair the damage and operate the machine.”145  Such 
expressions of political ideology did not receive First Amendment protection, as it was seen as 
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dangerous propaganda, unfavorable to the Allies’ cause.  Favoino, among the first Italians 
apprehended on December 9, 1941, spent almost two years interned before being paroled.  He 
did not receive his order of release from the Justice Department until November 15, 1945.
146
  
The aim of the Custodial Detention Program was to allow the government to make 
individual decisions about the threat posed by individual aliens or U.S. citizens instead of basing 
internment decisions on race or ethnicity alone so as to avoid the discrimination of a race-based 
policy of internment.  The primary problem with the method of identifying suspect individuals 
was that it created a risk that mere affiliation with an organization for social purposes or 
otherwise harmless reasons like ethnic solidarity could be used as proxies for disloyalty, a weak 
justification for detention and further violations of civil liberties.  Perhaps the gravest violations 
were experienced by those Italians who had become naturalized American citizens before the 
war but were nevertheless interned as if enemy aliens.  Although the United States Senate’s 1976 
Report on Intelligence Activities states that “the plans for internment of potentially dangerous 
American citizens were never carried out,” the Provost Marshall General’s internee files indicate 
that a number of American citizens were actually interned in different locations.
147
  In July 1943, 
Attorney General Biddle expressed grave concerns about the Custodial Detention Program.
148
   
Although Biddle informed Hoover that the lists generated through this program lacked legal 
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justification, that the FBI’s classification system was flawed, and that the lists should not be 
used, Hoover persisted in using it, calling it a “Security Matter” instead of “Custodial Index.”  
Hoover directed his agents to continue researching and maintaining lists.
149
   
According to historian Robert Justin Goldstein, Roosevelt’s record on civil liberties 
during World War II “began to seriously disintegrate during the early months of 1942.”  
Goldstein explains that “[f]ears of invasion, bombardment, and enemy sabotage and espionage 
seized the minds of the public and government officials . . . reflected in increasing and hysterical 
demands for action against Japanese-Americans and other alleged pro-fascist forces.”150  He says 
that from 1942 to 1945, the FBI installed “over six hundred ‘bugs’” by “surreptitious entry or 
other techniques . . . not formally approved by the Attorney General until 1954,” and “placed 
over eighteen hundred wiretaps on phones during the war.”151  Confusion over what Roosevelt 
actually authorized by his directive was reflected in Biddle’s September 1942 order describing 
the duties of the FBI as “‘investigating’” criminal offenses against the United States and acting 
as a “‘clearing house’” for the handling of “‘espionage, sabotage, and other subversive 
matters.’”152  It was not until the Allies began to believe victory was certain that the FBI began to 
limit its general intelligence investigations.
153
 
************************************* 
 Simultaneous to the FBI’s pre-war intelligence collection of information on persons of 
Italian descent and others in preparation for an emergency was the establishment of internment 
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policies and programs which were first applied to Italian seamen in American waters.  In March 
1941, the U.S. government’s anxiety over Italians and the threat that they posed domestically 
heightened when intelligence reports reached the Secretary of War’s office indicating that if 
Congress passed the Lease and Lend Bill for aid to the Allied forces, a large Italian liner 
anchored in the Panama Canal since June 1940, would be sunk.
154
  There was a plan by the 
Italians to sabotage vessels in U.S. harbors, including two ships at Panama, and to obstruct the 
channel.  The large Italian liner in the Canal was the Conte Biancamano, a luxury liner of some 
23,000 tons, which the Army seized before it could be damaged.
155
  In early 1941, President 
Roosevelt ordered the Coast Guard to impound all Axis ships stranded in U.S. ports upon the 
suspicion that the crewmen were sabotaging their own ships, by setting fires and jamming the 
ships’ gears, on the orders of Axis governments who feared the United States was going to take 
control of the vessels and use them against the Axis powers.  The Conte Biancamano had been 
stranded in the Panama Canal Zone for almost eighteen months.
156
  The United States issued 
warrants to over 1,200 Italian seamen in 1941, but since most of their ships were damaged and 
could not provide a means of deportation, they were turned over to the INS for detention at Ellis 
Island and eventual internment at Fort Missoula in Montana.
157
  The seamen were charged with 
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numerous violations of immigration law at hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry on Ellis 
Island.
158
  The INS operated Fort Missoula, a former army post as well as internment camps at 
Fort Stanton, New Mexico and Fort Lincoln in Bismarck, North Dakota, both of which were 
utilized for German seamen taken from vessels in American ports and the Panama Canal.
159
 
The legal status as enemy aliens and the form of hearings afforded the seamen set the 
precedent for the treatment of resident Italian aliens who were arrested after the United States 
declared war on Italy, some of whom were interned alongside the seamen at Fort Missoula.  In 
contrast to the seamen, most of the resident Italian aliens were permanent legal residents, with 
the exception of those who failed to register under the 1940 Alien Registration Act.  Secretary of 
War Stimson raised the question of how to classify individuals who were citizens of enemy 
nations with Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, indicating that reference should be made 
to Article XIII of the Hague Convention X of 1907, which specified that such persons be treated 
as internees rather than prisoners of war.
160
  Although Italy was not a party to the Convention, 
Stimson explained that “the provisions referred to may be regarded as a criterion as to the action 
that may be taken in such circumstances.”161  The International Committee for the Red Cross had 
already proposed to belligerent states on September 4, 1939 that there be a general statute 
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applicable to enemy civilians to afford them protections at least comparable to those given to 
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, since individual civilians, like 
civilian populations, were not explicitly afforded protection under any treaties.
162
  Thus the terms 
of the 1929 treaty, signed by the United States and forty-six other countries including Italy and 
Germany but not Japan, was read to apply to civilian internees by states who chose to do so, but 
there was no formal mandate.
163
  Although a majority of the state governments agreed to grant 
legal status and treaty guarantees to those enemy civilians residing in the territory of a belligerent 
at the outbreak of war, the terms unfortunately did not apply to civilian nationals in an enemy-
occupied country.
164
  The treaty permitted “Protecting Powers” or neutral powers, on behalf of 
the warring states, to inspect internment camps and to report to the governments the extent to 
which the Detaining Power was abiding by the treaty’s terms.165  A typical inspection report 
commented on the ethnic and gender composition of the camp, the physical structure, medical 
care, food services, and activities of the internees.
166
  As discussed in Chapter 5 which details life 
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in the camps, the United States decided to apply prisoner of war provisions to internees and 
instructed its internment camp commanders accordingly.
167
 
The INS records of the Italian seamen interned at Fort Missoula beginning in April 1941, 
and continuing until 1944, indicate the type of risk that the government perceived this group of 
Italians presented.
168
  Shortly after being taken into custody at ports such as Ellis Island in New 
York Harbor or Savannah, Georgia, they were required to complete an Alien Enemy 
Questionnaire which sought a variety of information, including names of family members, dates 
of entrances into the United States, criminal background, residences, property ownership, years 
of schooling, employment history, military service, financial portfolio, outstanding applications 
for U.S. naturalization, languages spoken, whether they read any foreign language newspapers, 
and memberships in organizations whose purpose was to overthrow the United States 
government.
169
  Those seamen who were not deported were transported to Fort Missoula.  After 
a period at the camp they underwent an evaluation before an alien enemy hearing board to assess 
their “appearance, testimony and demeanor.”  The Justice Department asked the board to give 
“as full a description of the man as possible together with [an] evaluation of his potential danger 
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 See U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, Instruction No. 58 “To The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service:  Subject:  Instructions concerning the treatment of alien enemy detainees” from Lemuel 
B. Schofield, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, April 28, 1942, in German-Americans in the World Wars, 
ed. Tolzmann, 1580-89. 
168
 Declassification Review Project, 775033, Immigration and Naturalization Service, World War II Internment 
Files, Record Group 85, Fort Missoula, Box 37, National Archives at Washington, DC.  It has been explained to me 
by Marian Smith, Chief, Historical Research Branch, US Citizenship & Immigration Services, that when the 
internment camps closed after the war, the camp files were sent to the INS headquarters in Washington, D.C., and 
combined with the official INS files or “A” files.  Telephone conference with Marian Smith, February 9, 2009 (notes 
on file with author). 
169
 This questionnaire resembled that administered to all adult Japanese internees in 1943 by the War Relocation 
Authority in conjunction with the military to determine whether to grant the internees release or impose stricter 
confinement.  See Eric Muller, American Inquisition:  The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World War II 
(Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 35.  In addition to biographical and citizenship 
information, affiliations with Japanese and non-Japanese organizations, the questionnaires asked questions 
concerning willingness to serve in the American armed forces, to promise to abide by the laws of the United States, 
and  not to  interfere with the war effort of this country.   
70 
 
to the internal security.”170  The board’s recommendation of parole or continued internment had 
to go before Attorney General Biddle for his approval.   
During this same period before the United States entered World War II, domestic plans 
were in place to handle persons of enemy nations residing in the United States.  On July 18, 
1941, Acting Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Francis Biddle, who was acting Attorney 
General at the time, entered a Joint Agreement concerning the internment of all alien enemies 
within the United States or its territories in the event of war.  Pledging to make efforts to avoid 
“(a) Over-internment, . . . (c) Interference with labor through reckless internment, and (d) The 
internment of persons solely for careless statements made prior to the outbreak of war,” the Joint 
Agreement anticipated cooperation between Army Corps Area Commanders and U.S. Attorneys 
in the transferring of alien enemies into the custody of the military for permanent detention.
171
  
The Attorney General was to issue warrants for the apprehension of persons “believed to be 
dangerous to the public safety” based on information submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s Office by 
an FBI agent or other informant.
172
  The Joint Agreement called for a report from the U.S. 
Attorney concerning information on the alien enemy’s “citizenship, immigration, alien 
registration, and selective service status, his age, loyalty, and acitivities[sic]” to be forwarded to 
the Attorney General with his recommendations for either internment, parole (with or without 
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bond), or conditional or unconditional release.
173
  Each alien enemy assigned to permanent 
detention would be required to fill out a questionnaire about his life, activities, and associations 
and to obtain affidavits from persons who have known him before review of his case before a 
review board.
174
  Provision for a committee comprised of two representatives from the War 
Department and two representatives from the Justice Department indicated a plan to coordinate 
the handling of alien enemies.
175
   
As the following chapters reveal, however, the course of relations between these 
departments throughout the war was characterized by power struggles.  In particular, they 
disagreed over the implementation of President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 regarding the 
exclusion of persons of Japanese, German, and Italian descent from military zones.  While the 
Justice Department insisted on a policy of considering each case on an individual basis, the War 
Department believed that the exigencies of the national security crisis demanded a more practical 
and more sweeping approach by the military to ensuring the safety of the nation.
176
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CHAPTER 3:  THE FACE OF SELECTIVE INTERNMENT AND HOW OTHER 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AFFECTED THE ITALIAN POPULATION   
 
On the night of December 7, 1941, the very day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Attorney 
General Biddle authorized the FBI to take several hundred persons into custody without warrants 
due to the emergency.
1
  In a message to FBI Special Agents in Charge, Hoover ordered the arrest 
of all German and Italian aliens previously classified in Groups A, B, and C on the FBI custodial 
detention lists and those not previously classified in the above categories whose arrest was 
“necessary for the internal security of this country,” and turn them over to the nearest INS 
office.
2
  Most aliens were not told the specific reason for their arrest and subsequent detention or 
where they were going, only that President Roosevelt had ordered their arrest.
3
  Filippo Molinari, 
a forty-eight year-old agent for the daily newspaper L’Italia in San Jose, California described the 
abruptness and mystery of his capture:   
I was the first one arrested in San Jose the night of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  At 
11 p.m. three policemen came to the front door and two at the back.  They told me 
that, by order of President Roosevelt, I must go with them.  They didn’t even give 
me time to go to my room and put on my shoes.  I was wearing slippers.  They 
took me to prison . . . and finally to Missoula, Montana, on the train, over the 
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snow, still with slippers on my feet, the temperature at seventeen below and no 
coat or heavy clothes!
4
 
 
Thus, four days before the United States declared war on Italy, government agents had 
already begun arresting Italian aliens and detaining them at INS facilities for processing before 
internment.  On December 8, President Roosevelt, pursuant to authority under the Alien Enemy 
Act of 1798, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2527, declaring the approximately seven 
hundred thousand Italian immigrants without American citizenship “alien enemies,” and making 
them subject to regulations and immediate apprehension or deportation if determined dangerous 
by the Attorney General or the Secretary of War.
5
  Similar to the regulations in the Presidential 
Proclamations against the Japanese and Germans, the status of alien enemy made Italians subject 
to restraints and multiple regulations including those pertaining to geographical location, the 
possession of contraband articles, travel, and membership in certain organizations.
6
  Alien 
enemies did not enjoy constitutional rights and privileges such as freedom from home invasions 
and seizure of one’s possessions without probable cause, according to the guidelines of the INS.7  
Under the proclamations, duties and authority in executing the regulations rested with both the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of War.   
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By all accounts there was a flurry of arrests in the days and weeks following the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  By 11:00 a.m. on December 9, approximately eighty-three Italian aliens 
were in custody.
8
  On December 10, 1941, Attorney General Biddle promised that the 
government would make every effort to protect aliens from “discrimination or abuse” and would 
not “engage in wholesale condemnation of any alien group.”9  The New York Times reported 222 
Italians arrested as of December 12.
10
  This number is significantly higher than the 169 Italian 
aliens cited by Biddle in his press release, “Remember Pearl Harbor.”11  Many Italians arrested 
had no chance to speak with family members before leaving home for several years.  For 
example, Carmelo Ilacqua, a forty-six year-old alien employed by a poultry company who also 
served as a local officer of the Italian Consulate, was arrested at his home in San Francisco on 
the evening of December 17, 1941 and had to leave without saying good-by to his family.  As 
was customary when apprehending Italian aliens, FBI agents searched Ilacqua’s home for 
contraband items such as guns and ammunition.  Although the agents found nothing 
incriminating, they still arrested him and took him to a local INS facility for detainment.  His 
wife and six year-old daughter did not know what had happened to him until he could telephone 
them before boarding a train to Fort Missoula with other Italians and Japanese Americans under 
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armed guard.
12
  Angelina Farese was likewise kept in the dark about the circumstances of her 
husband’s arrest, believing that it was all a mistake that would quickly be straightened out and 
that he would return home the day after his arrest.
13
 
Although Presidential Proclamation 2527 covered only alien enemies, a few American 
citizens of Italian extraction also were included in the FBI lists of persons to arrest.
14
  In fact, 
arrests of Italians, both aliens and American citizens, were reported in New York and 
California.
15
  In an effort to resolve the confusion over suspect American citizens of Axis origin, 
Hoover instructed officers to provide to FBI headquarters a list of such persons, emphasizing that 
“each recommendation must be justified by substantial evidence or information indicating actual 
danger to our internal security during present war effort.”16   
The social profile of the subject group of civilian internees reveals that the U.S. 
government believed that individuals holding positions where they might influence the Italian 
population, such as members of the media and leaders of Italian organizations and businesses, 
posed the greatest security risk.  As indicated above, government agents began to arrest 
individual Italian aliens as early as December 7, 1941 and continued to do so through mid 
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October 1944.
17
  This chapter then proceeds to develop arguments introduced in Chapter 2 about 
the Italians’ political maturity by the 1940s through a discussion of testimony from politicians in 
Congressional hearings in February and March 1942, which ultimately saved Italians from mass 
internment.  The third section analyzes the diverse experiences of Italians on the East and West 
Coasts.  I argue that the factors of the location of wartime industries and strategic military 
installations, the different philosophies of the military commanders on each coast, and the 
varying size of the Italian population resulted in geographic differences in the implementation of 
policy, with the first factor being most influential.  I also draw comparisons among the treatment 
of the Japanese, German, and Italian groups, emphasizing that the various interpretation of 
executive orders and proclamations with respect to each group reflected racial prejudices as well 
as economic and logistical considerations. 
The following chronology, beginning on December 8, 1941 when the U.S. government 
declared non-citizens of Italian descent enemy aliens, provides a framework for understanding 
how the government policies affected the lives of Italian aliens and some naturalized citizens.  
By mid-December 1941, with commercial traffic in and out of the San Francisco harbor already 
suspended, the U.S. Navy requisitioned dozens of fishing boats of Italians on the West Coast, to 
be followed by similar requisitions in the following months.  The commercial fishing industry 
felt an acute blow when Attorney General Biddle’s January 30, 1942 order prohibited fishermen 
who were Italian aliens from taking their boats out and denied them access to wharfs and piers 
out of concern over the threats of sabotage and invasion by the enemies.
18
  On the previous day, 
the attorney general had issued the first of several orders establishing prohibited zones on the 
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West Coast which all enemy aliens had to evacuate by February 24.
19
   Evacuation of more than 
10,000 Italians from prohibited zones on the West Coast and relocation to areas outside these 
zones occurred from February to June 1942, when Lieutenant General John DeWitt, Commander 
of the Western Defense Command, allowed them to return to their homes.
20
  In February 1942, 
the attorney general also announced restricted areas on the West Coast in which more than 
50,000 Italian aliens had to observe curfews and travel restrictions.
21
  In late April, Commander 
of the Eastern Defense Command, General Hugh A. Drum, established prohibited and restricted 
areas for the Eastern Defense Command along the Atlantic seaboard and inland, which affected 
sixteen states.
22
  Beginning in September 1942, the military instituted the process of “individual 
exclusion” for suspicious Italian aliens and naturalized citizens which resulted in their removal 
from military areas.
23
  All regulations other than selective internment and individual exclusion 
were in effect until the termination of alien enemy status for persons of Italian descent on 
October 12, 1942.
24
   
************************************* 
Although Attorney General Biddle was uncomfortable about internment, he felt 
Roosevelt simply believed that it must be done to defend the country.
25
  Jerre Mangione, who 
                                                          
19
 DOJ Report, 19. 
20
 DiStasi, ed., Una Storia Segreta, 316-17. 
21
 DOJ Report, v, 25.   
22
 Memorandum For The President (Draft), Subject:  East Coast Military Areas, April 14, 1942, in American 
Concentration Camps, Vol. 4, ed. Daniels.   
23
 The process of exclusion was pursuant to Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 143 (1942).   
24
 DOJ Report, 22-24. 
25
 Joseph Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War:  FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:  Random House, 2001), 
169. 
78 
 
was the director of the public relations program of the INS, which had initial custody of all 
enemy aliens and ran several internment camps, later suggested that it was Biddle who decided 
upon a policy of selective internment for Italians and Germans.  According to Mangione, Biddle 
was influenced by the realization of the British government that its indiscriminate mass 
internment of German and Austrian refugees had victimized active enemies of the Nazi regime.  
He believed Biddle convinced Roosevelt to institute selective internment of German and 
Austrian nationals rather than wholesale internment.  He also pointed to the likely role of letters 
from anti-Nazi refugees, including Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein, and Bruno Frank, in 
influencing the president.
26
  Undoubtedly Biddle was troubled by many concerns raised by the 
prospects of interning an entire population, including the difficulties of evaluating the loyalties of 
each individual and affording procedural due process, even though the law did not require it with 
respect to enemy aliens.  It is important to keep in mind that many more Italians passed through 
the alien enemy control program of the INS than were actually interned.  Some were released 
before a hearing, some after a hearing, while others were paroled.  By the end of the war, the 
total number of Italians that the INS had processed was 3,278.  This number was less than one-
third of the Germans (10,905) and about one-fifth of the Japanese (16,849) (although the 
Japanese were of course interned on a mass basis in much greater numbers).
27
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Turning to the social profile of the Italian internees reveals the nature of the Justice 
Department’s selective internment process.  The 343 Italians profiled in this section were those 
Italian aliens and a few naturalized citizens who had resided in the United States for many years 
before the outbreak of World War II and who were apprehended in the United States based on 
FBI reports identifying them as suspect, were immediately detained, and subsequently interned 
after a hearing.  In addition, this group includes forty-six Italian nationals residing in Latin 
America and apprehended there who were the subjects of an agreement entered into by the State 
Department of the United States and Latin American countries which provided for the 
internment of these individuals in exchange for Americans held by Axis powers, as explained 
below.  The approximately 1300 seamen, introduced in Chapter 2, that is, merchant sailors 
working aboard luxury liners in the Panama Canal and American ports who were suspected of 
sabotaging their ships beginning in 1939, are not included in my study.  Also interned beginning 
in March 1941 at Fort Missoula, and not part of my study, are Italian nationals employed at the 
1939-1940 World’s Fair in New York.  Although legally in a similar position to those long-term 
resident aliens apprehended beginning on December 7 in that they were also classified as enemy 
aliens, interned, and eventually went before alien enemy hearing boards, the seamen were 
charged with violations of immigration law which provided the grounds for holding them in 
custody since the war prevented their deportation.  In contrast, most of the resident aliens 
apprehended once the United States entered World War II had permanent legal residence status 
and were arrested under presidential warrant based on criteria established by the FBI in 
coordination with the Justice Department.  
Of those 343 long-term U.S. residents and Latin Americans interned, the average age in 
1941 was forty-three.  There were thirteen females of whom two were interned on their own 
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account, that is they did not volunteer to be with a male family member.  The group included six 
naturalized American citizens, although three of them were denaturalized or had an uncertain 
legal status at the time of internment.  Of the 268 subjects for whom marital status was recorded, 
165 were married.  Of the 254 internees from the United States and its territories with known 
home residences, approximately 82 percent hailed from the East and West Coasts, consistent 
with data on geographical regions where the Italian population was most dense and the 
government’s perception of where the greatest dangers were.  The breakdown of regions was as 
follows:  East - 112; West - 97; South - 11; Midwest - 24; Southwest - 4; Hawaii - 3; Alaska – 2; 
Puerto Rico - 1.  Of this group of U.S. residents, 33 internees reported having lived in the United 
States for ten years or more before internment, although not continuously in some cases.  The 
subject group includes forty-six internees from Latin America, five of whom were children.  
An important factor in comparing internment and restrictions on the East Coast with 
those on the West Coast was the much larger Italian population on the East Coast, making any 
large-scale evacuation and restrictions more problematic.  In 1940, the Middle Atlantic states had 
390,068 Italian aliens, with New York having the highest number at 247,837; New England had 
106,658 with Massachusetts having the most at 53,531; the East North Central states had 84,431, 
with Illinois having the most at 34,678; and the Pacific states had 57,797, with California having 
51,923.
28
  The FBI field offices reported the following cities as having the highest number of 
Italian aliens and naturalized citizens arrested:  San Francisco (453 aliens, 5 citizens), New York 
City (401 aliens, 5 citizens), New Orleans (233 aliens), Miami (212 aliens), and Los Angeles 
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(141 aliens, 1 citizen).  A comparison of East and West Coast cities indicates that there were 36 
percent more arrests on the East Coast than on the West Coast, which is far less of a difference 
than one might expect given that the population of Italian aliens on the East Coast was more than 
eight times greater.
29
  The number of subject internees in my study from states in the East was 
only 13 percent greater than those from West Coast states.
30
  According to this data, Italian 
internees from the West Coast were a greater percentage of the West Coast population of 
Italians, although still negligible, than East Coast internees were of the East Coast population.  
However, variables such as the compositions of alien enemy hearing boards which decided the 
fates of these individuals, discussed in Chapter 4, would prevent drawing any conclusion that the 
number of Italians interned from any one particular defense command was influenced solely by 
the philosophy of that region’s military commander.  
For the 259 internees for whom there is a date of apprehension recorded, about 77 percent 
of them were taken in the first six months of the war.  There were sixty-five subject internees 
detained in both the United States and Latin America in advance of the United States’ 
declaration of war on Italy on December 11, 1941, although Presidential Proclamation 2527 
permitting the apprehension of Italian aliens was only issued on December 8.  An additional 
seventeen subjects were apprehended before December 31, 1941 and eventually interned.  By the 
end of February 1942, the total was 135; by the end of May, 182.  The greatest spike in numbers 
of subjects ordered interned occurred in December 1941.  
                                                          
29
 Document 44, Federal Bureau of Investigation “Apprehensions By Field Offices, December 7, 1941 to June 30, 
1945” in German-Americans in the World Wars, ed. Tolzmann, 1740-49.  In my comparative analysis, the following 
are the cities on the East Coast:  Albany, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Charlotte, Huntington, Miami, 
Newark, New Haven, New York, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Richmond, Savannah, and 
Springfield.  The cities on the West Coast are as follows:  Los Angeles, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, and 
Seattle. 
30
 In my study, there were 112 from cities on the East Coast and 97 from cities on the West Coast. 
82 
 
An examination of occupations reveals a broad range of skills and educational levels.  In 
my study, there were twenty-nine persons, or approximately 8.5 percent, employed in the media, 
some exclusively and others as a second job either as newspaper editors or radio announcers.
31
  
Based on the type of testimony elicited in the HUAC hearings and the Tenney Committee 
hearings in California, the national and state governments were concerned with the potential 
influence that members of the media could have on Italian communities whose ties to their 
motherland were strong and whose loyalties to the United States were just developing.   
In addition to the 8.5 percent of my subjects employed in the media, the following are the 
occupational categories and approximate percentages of representation in the subject group:  
unskilled – 31 percent; professional – 23 percent; skilled – 13.4 percent; business owner –5 
percent; student – 2.9 percent; homemaker – 2.6 percent; unemployed – 1.5 percent; and 
unknown – 12 percent.  The two largest categories were either unskilled laborers (107) such as 
fishermen and farmers or professionals (79).  Included among the subject internees categorized 
as professionals are the following:  lawyers – 2; medical doctors – 2; teachers/professors 
(including some in the Italian language) – 8; engineers – 7; business executives – 5; accountants 
– 3; and employees of the Italian government – 4.  Persons who worked in the financial industry 
in roles such as accountants or credit managers in banks were of particular concern since the FBI 
believed they were in positions where they could assist the Italian government in raising money 
for the war.
32
  Perhaps most noteworthy in this subcategory is Prince Boncompagno 
                                                          
31
 Note that for those subjects who had multiple occupations including the media, I only counted them in the media 
category in my analysis of occupations. 
32
 See Testimony of Gilbert Tuoni before Assembly Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities in 
California, at 3662-65, May 26-27, 1942.  Tuoni testified that the government should close branches of Bank of 
America which he believed were supporting the Italian government, accessed on October 22, 2013, 
http://www.internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00408&search_id=77937&pagenum=2. 
 
83 
 
Boncompagni-Ludovisi, an export broker residing in New York City who was allegedly involved 
in an illegal exchange of Italian currency.  The government was also concerned with intellectuals 
who might have possessed special knowledge that could be used against the United States. For 
example, Dr. Vincent Anthony Lapenta, a surgeon and chemist who invented synthetic plasma to 
treat shock, was of particular interest.  He reportedly shared his invention with the U.S. Army.  
Persons employed in positions where they might have access to U.S. military information, like 
Pericle Chieri, a mechanical engineer employed by the Italian Embassy who is profiled in 
Chapter 4, presented a risk of sharing confidential information with the Italian government and 
were the subjects most legitimately detained and questioned.  
The high representation of unskilled laborers among the subject group (almost one-third) 
indicates that the U.S. government had reason to believe that such persons could influence fellow 
workers or members of their Italian communities who were in a similar social and economic 
position.  Given that they were in a lower income bracket, the government also might have 
perceived such persons to have been willing to engage in subversive political activity against the 
United States because they had little to lose, except of course their ability to remain in this 
country.   
Only twelve of my subjects appear to have had prior arrests or convictions, either in the 
United States or Italy, and three more were undergoing criminal proceedings during internment.  
Most of those with a criminal record had committed minor offenses such as petty larceny or 
public drunkenness and disorderly conduct.  There was only one internee implicated in a murder 
in Italy, one arrested in Rome for political reasons, and one brought up on two charges of 
suspicion in the United States in the 1930s, meaning that the arrest was for no specific offense 
and the suspect was released without formal charges.  Another internee had eighteen prior arrests 
84 
 
for narcotics violations.  One of the two women interned on their own account was arrested 
multiple times for keeping a house of prostitution.  Furthermore, there is no mention in the FBI 
files of any involvement in organized crime.  Given its prevalence in the decades preceding 
World War II, some of them may have been members of mobs, particularly those who owned 
their own businesses and sought protection of their property, but they were not identified as such, 
meaning that it was not necessarily a factor in their arrest.
33
  At least ten had undergone 
deportation proceedings by the time they were interned or were labeled a “criminal deportable 
alien enemy.” 
There were five possible outcomes after internment:  outright release by the Alien Enemy 
Control Unit after a hearing at the internment camp; parole with release or internment again 
later; repatriation on the basis of exchange for American citizens held abroad; voluntary 
repatriation; and involuntary repatriation after a determination that internee was deportable under 
immigration law.
34
  The average duration of internment, calculated from the date of 
apprehension until the date of release, based on 155 internees for whom both dates were 
recorded, was two years and four months.  For these 155 internees, the following are the 
numbers released by the dates specified:   nine by June 30, 1943; forty-four more by December 
30, 1943; twenty-five more by June 30, 1944; twelve more by December 30, 1944; fifty-nine 
more by June 30, 1945; and six more by February 21, 1946.
35
  Although most of the group of 
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155 internees was released after Italy surrendered in September 1943, the majority of all Italian 
internees were released by the end of 1943.  Two internees entered the U.S. Army upon their 
release.  The fact of there being so few may be related to their average age being above that 
allowed for registration with the armed forces.  There were at least fifty-one internees in my 
study group who repatriated.
36
  There were eight men among those studied who were diagnosed 
with psychosis and committed to mental institutions during internment.  At least seven died in 
camp. 
As indicated above, included in my study are forty-six individuals from Latin America.  
The countries of origin were Peru, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Mexico.  They came from all socio-economic backgrounds, ranging 
from laborers to professional businessmen and academics.  Most of the men were born in Italy 
and were Italian citizens, accompanied in some cases by women and children who volunteered 
for internment with their husbands, sons or fathers, called “voluntary detainees.”  In addition to 
being Italian citizens, they were all citizens of the Latin American countries from which they 
were sent.
37
  Local Latin American police apprehended a majority of this group of internees in 
December 1941 or January 1942 and subsequently turned them over to INS officials.
38
  These 
individuals were the subjects of a resolution drafted by the U.S. State Department and the Justice 
Department for the deportation of dangerous Axis nationals and adopted by a Conference of 
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Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held in January 1942 in Rio de Janeiro.  A 
justification for the program was the absence of adequate local detention facilities.  This group, 
called the Emergency Committee for Political Defense, was an inter-American agency tasked 
with organizing “hemispheric security measures” in light of the perceived threats to continental 
security.  The State Department offered to include in this arrangement any official and civilian 
nationals of participating republics in exchange for the return of Americans held by Axis 
powers.
39
  Although the committee did not approve Resolution XX, entitled “Detention and 
Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals,” until May 21, 1943 and did not transmit it to the 
governments until June 4, 1943, the United States and Peru engaged in a deportation-internment 
program in 1942.  In general, in most Latin American countries, the chief executive had sole 
authority to expel an alien, which could be done summarily and in the absence of an individual’s 
right to judicial proceedings.  This executive control allowed Latin American countries to enter a 
deportation-internment program with the United States outside of legislative oversight or public 
awareness.
40
 
The first vessel to sail from South America, the Etolin, left from Callou, Peru on April 5, 
1942, with 173 Germans, 141 Japanese, and 11 Italians, and proceeded up the western coast to 
pick up additional passengers.
41
  By late August, 1942, there were 3,300 American citizens in 
China, 3,000 in the Philippines, and 700 in Japan, seeking return to the United States, prompting 
Secretary of State Hull to call for continued efforts “to remove all the Japanese from these 
[Latin] American Republic countries for internment in the United States . . . [and] all the 
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dangerous Germans and Italians still there, together with their families.”42  Deportees from Latin 
America under this agreement came to the United States by plane or ship into the Gulf Coast 
with no legal status, that is, illegally, since deportees held no visa or passport, putting them at the 
mercy of American authorities.
43
  This program violated U.S. and international law which 
recognized humanitarian rights even before the codification of international human rights law 
after World War II.
44
  As Jerre Mangione pointed out, once the Latin Americans were brought 
over the U.S. border, they ironically were charged with illegal entry.
45
  The government did not 
afford any of these Latin Americans a hearing prior to internment.
46
 
 In early 1943, Attorney General Biddle noted the irony that these individuals were being 
held under the Alien Enemies Act even though many were not citizens of the Axis powers but 
nationals of the various Latin American countries, and therefore aliens of a friendly nation.  
There was also scant evidence that the deportees were dangerous.
47
  Biddle maintained his 
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department’s right to review cases even though Latin American internees did not undergo 
proceedings before alien enemy hearing boards.
48
  Biddle’s challenge to the State Department’s 
criterion of “dangerousness” eventually led to on-the-spot reviews of pending deportee cases by 
Raymond W. Ickes of the Central and South American division of the Alien Enemy Control 
Unit.  Ickes was able to halt deportation of individuals where evidence failed to support claims 
that they threatened security.
49
 
The INS used camps at Kenedy, Seagoville, and Crystal City in Texas for the internment 
of these Latin Americans and their families pending repatriation.  Swollen with passengers from 
countries north of Peru, the Etolin arrived in San Francisco on April 20, 1942.
50
  The first Latin 
American internee group at Kenedy was comprised of 456 Germans, 156 Japanese, and 14 
Italians.  Over 2600 more individuals were received from Latin America later in 1942.
 51
  The 
disposition of these cases could be one of the following:  repatriation to Italy; return to their 
Latin American country; detention until arrangements were made for return to Latin America; 
liberty in the United States but subject to the jurisdiction of the INS until a final decision on their 
case was reached; and “internment-at-large,” which, similar to parole procedure, required 
periodic reports to the internee’s sponsor and the INS.52  To be “interned-at-large” meant that the 
internee met INS standards for parole but could not be officially paroled because of agreements 
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between the Department of State and the aliens’ countries of origin.53 As of July 1, 1945, Italians 
fell into the following classifications:  seventeen were interned in camps; thirty-two were 
“interned at large”; and four were voluntary internees.54   
Even as hundreds of resident Italian aliens were hastily detained and sent to internment 
camps and the first groups of Latin Americans arrived at INS camps, federal and state legislative 
committees debated how to handle the perceived threat presented by the large population of 
Italian aliens.  The main policy for consideration was the evacuation of Italians from military 
areas. 
************************************* 
President Roosevelt’s issuance of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 marked a 
shift in the delegation of power from the Attorney General to the Secretary of War, with a 
resulting change in the execution of government policies.
55
  Many of the regulations in 
Presidential Proclamation 2527 were incorporated by reference into the order’s military 
proclamations.  Under 9066, President Roosevelt authorized Secretary of War Stimson and 
military commanders to exclude “any or all persons” from designated military areas and declared 
that “the right of any persons to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions 
the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commanders may impose in their discretion.”56  
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The order did not distinguish either alien from citizen or among ethnic groups, and thus could 
potentially have applied to all Japanese, Germans, and Italians regardless of their citizenship, 
although it is doubtful that this policy was ever intended indiscriminately for all groups.
57
  
Although the Western Defense Command imposed evacuation orders from the military zones 
only on aliens in the Italian and German populations, often family members who were citizens 
accompanied them.  In contrast, both Japanese aliens and Japanese American citizens were 
forced to leave their homes. 
Only days after President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, the House of 
Representatives Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration formed for the 
purpose of conducting public hearings on the situation of European aliens and for issuing 
periodic reports of its findings and recommendations.
58
  Unlike the case of the Japanese, there 
was no proposal before the committee “that the millions of second generation Germans and 
Italians, born in this country be treated differently from other American citizens.”59  In its 
Preliminary Report, the “Tolan Committee,” named for Chairman John H. Tolan of Oakland, 
California, determined that the numbers would be much larger than the Japanese exodus “if we 
generalize the current treatment of the Japanese to apply to all Axis aliens and their immediate 
families.”60  The Tolan Committee debated the strain that “tax[ing] the facilities of public 
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agencies” for the duration of the war would put on the federal budget and resources.61  Certainly 
the prospect of establishing enough military camps to house this large population that was widely 
dispersed across the country was a logistical nightmare and therefore, something to be avoided.  
Because the Japanese population was concentrated in identifiable communities on the West 
Coast, relocation was much more feasible.
62
   
Parts 29, 30, and 31 of the National Defense Migration Hearings regarding the evacuation 
of enemy aliens and others prohibited from military zones were held in February and March 
1942 in San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and Los Angeles.
63
  Since Congressman Tolan was 
sensitive to the plight of the Italian community, he set a positive tone in the hearings.  Personally 
familiar with leaders of the community who appeared to testify before the panel, he elicited 
testimony from them designed to evoke sympathy for the Italians from committee members and 
the War Department.
64
  At the start of the hearings held in San Francisco on February 21, 1942, 
Chairman Tolan stated the purpose of the hearings to be a fact-finding mission to assess how the 
evacuation orders affected the economic life of various communities, what labor evacuees should 
undertake, where they should be located, and whether any exceptions should be made to a 
wholesale evacuation order.
65
  Mayor Rossi captured public sentiment in testifying that:  “It is 
the well-considered opinion of many that most of these people are entirely loyal to this Nation; 
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are in accord with its form of government, believe in its ideals and have an affection for its 
traditions and that under no circumstances would they engage in any subversive activities or 
conduct.”  Rossi expressed a particular concern for persons essential to the community - 
“fishermen, janitors, garbage collectors, produce and vegetable workers in markets” – whom he 
suggested be given special permits to engage in their activities after the 9 p.m. curfew.  Rossi 
advised the committee that “in order to avoid injustice being done, the investigation of each 
individual case of German and Italian aliens is absolutely necessary.”  The mayor specifically 
suggested that federal authorities establish a system of appeal in tribunals where aliens and 
citizens could petition to have their loyalty verified, enabling their return to civilian 
occupations.
66
   
Another persuasive spokesperson for the Italian community was Ottorino Ronchi, former 
professor of Italian at the University of California and editor of La Voce Del Popolo, a 
newspaper that appeared on the FBI’s list of suspicious publications.  Ronchi testified about 
interviews he conducted of alien families in northern California whose sons were serving in the 
armed forces to impress upon the committee that Italians were loyal to the United States and 
should not be considered dangerous.  He retold a conversation that he had with a sixty-year old 
widow facing evacuation from Monterey whose son died in the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
whose second son enlisted the next day.  She told Ronchi:  “‘I wish I had a couple of more 
children.  I will send them to fight.  My interest is in America.’”67 
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 Fearing that all non-American citizens of Italian descent were unfairly classed as enemy 
aliens regardless of their loyalties, the Secretary of the San Francisco Chapter of the Mazzini 
Society submitted a report to the Tolan Committee explaining the distinct factions among Italian 
society.
68
  He identified three distinct groups:  (1) the “Fascist Italian” devoted to Hitler and 
Mussolini and therefore legitimately interned or placed on bail or parole; (2) the “decent Italian, 
who out of ignorance, stupidity or misguided feeling of loyalty to the old country” hoped for a 
Fascist victory, although he did not commit any unlawful action against the United States, but 
who nevertheless presented a potential security risk that this country had to guard against; and 
(3) the “Italian anti-Fascists” devoted to the struggle against Fascism who abandoned Italy only 
to face the injustice in the United States of bearing the label of enemy aliens, which carried 
restrictions in their movement and exclusion from the armed forces.
69
  The report from the 
Mazzini Society’s secretary raised the irony that “champions of nazi-ism and fascism” could 
produce naturalization papers and “wrap themselves in the American flag” while they continued 
their subversive activities.
70
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The committee elicited testimony from long-time resident aliens of San Francisco 
concerning illiteracy as a bar to citizenship.  For example, Luciano Maniscalo, mother of twelve 
children, four of whom were serving in the armed services, testified to financial difficulties after 
her husband’s alien status barred him from fishing after December 7.  He had no education in 
Italy and could not even write his name.  Mrs. Maniscalo said that his illiteracy was the only 
thing preventing him from becoming a citizen.
71
  Later testimony from the Assistant District 
Director of the INS in March 1942 that in the San Francisco area alone, there were about 2,000 
people who were classified as alien enemies because the government had not gotten around to 
processing their petitions, further emphasized to the committee that the legal status of citizen 
alone was not determinative of loyalty.
72
   
Demographic reality was one reason why the military and the general public considered 
Italians “potentially less dangerous,” than Japanese and Germans, the phrase used by Secretary 
of War Stimson.  As a general rule, the Committee concluded, Italians who had not become U.S. 
citizens were those who were illiterate and were often “elderly people, 50 to 60 years old” who 
had “raised large families, and frequently one or more of their children [were] in the armed 
services of the United States.”73  Months into U.S. involvement in the war, military officials 
came to understand that the younger generation of Italians, citizenship notwithstanding, 
particularly those born shortly after World War I, were the most dangerous.
74
  By this time, 
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General DeWitt agreed with other military leaders that “the older Italians and the refugees were 
harmless as a group.”75  Professor Gaetano Salvemini and Carmelo Zito who was the editor of 
Corriere del Popolo, an anti-fascist newspaper, assisted the FBI in its determination that there 
was more danger among American citizens, particularly younger Italians, both foreign and native 
born, than among the alien enemy groups.
76
   
Zito testified in May 1942 before the California State Assembly Fact Finding Committee 
on Un-American Activities in California, chaired by Assemblyman Jack B. Tenney (“the Tenney 
Committee”) about Italian newspapers, radio stations, and fund raising prior to the U.S. entry 
into World War II.  In contrast to the Tolan Committee hearings, the tone of the hearings before 
the Tenney Committee, which had begun in January 1941, was one of fear and suspicion.
77
  In 
this respect, they were similar to hearings of HUAC before Congressman Martin Dies described 
in Chapter 2.  In scathing testimony before the California assembly, Zito described the pro-
Fascist element in San Francisco from the early 1920s as “instrumental to drug the public 
opinion among the Italian Americans to the point they are not capable any more to understand 
the benefits of democracy and the blessings of the land in the country of their adoption.”78   He 
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identified Fascist sympathizers among radio announcers and newspaper editors, most of whom 
the FBI had already apprehended for internment, and claimed that San Francisco Mayor Angelo 
Rossi rendered the Fascist salute in public demonstrations.  Zito explained that the Italian 
Chamber of Commerce received subsidies from the Italian government and promoted Fascism 
through its newspaper, La Ressegna Commerciale, while Italian language “Fascistic” schools 
opened in 1932 indoctrinated young people into Fascism through textbooks filled with 
propaganda.
79
   
Mayor Rossi called his summons to testify before the Tenney Committee “political 
assassination” and the result of “religious and racial bigotry” against him.  Claiming ignorance of 
the curriculum of the Italian language schools and propaganda promulgated by the Italian 
Chamber of Commerce, Rossi affirmed his complete loyalty to the United States, evidenced by 
his decision to remove a signed photo of Mussolini from his office prior to the declaration of war 
against Italy.
80
  Both Mayor Rossi and Mayor LaGuardia had received decorations from Italy’s 
King Emmanuel, a gesture the Tenney Committee understood to be sanctioned by Mussolini, but 
only LaGuardia decided to destroy the decoration by melting it into bullets.
81
  Testimony of pro-
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Fascist sentiment among San Francisco’s Italian community may explain Mayor Rossi’s 
acceptance of multiple Italian decorations in the 1930s and his failure to recollect ever publicly 
denouncing Mussolini.
82
  He did not want to risk offending his supporters.  Even after the start of 
war when public sentiment had changed, as reflected in the pledge of loyalty to the United States 
by formerly Fascist-oriented newspapers, outright condemnation of Mussolini seems to have 
remained taboo.
83
 
While California was investigating suspicious individuals in its state, the legislative and 
executive branches of the national government reached a consensus on how to handle German 
and Italian aliens.  In May 1942, when the Tolan Committee released its Fourth Interim Report 
reiterating the statement from its Preliminary Report that any mass evacuation of German and 
Italian aliens was “out of the question if we intend to win this war,” Roosevelt, in consultation 
with the War Department, finalized his recommendation on the Germans and Italians.
84
  The 
repercussions that the implementation of a full-scale program of evacuation would have on this 
population concerned the executive office.  On May 5, 1942, Roosevelt wrote to Stimson, 
expressing concern that General Drum’s plans for creating a military zone on the East Coast 
caused a “state of confusion” among German and Italian people worried that they would face 
evacuation like those on the West Coast.  Roosevelt said that he was “inclined to think 
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[evacuation of German and Italian aliens] may have a bad effect on morale.”85  Certainly the 
president had to be concerned about losing a political base, as Italian Americans gravitated 
toward the Republican Party.  Attorney General Biddle agreed with the president that any 
German or Italian evacuation on the East Coast would weaken war morale since it would alienate 
persons of those nationalities, and he was also concerned with potential consequences to the 
nation’s economy.86  The president approved the extension of the military area system to all 
continental defense commands, but only after assurance that it was necessary to enforce dim-out 
and air defense regulations, primarily along the Eastern seaboard.  He did not understand this 
measure to be granting the military control over alien enemies.
87
  His perception that the Justice 
Department maintained authority over aliens of European enemies is evident in his statement to 
Stimson that “[t]he control of alien enemies seems to me to be primarily a civilian matter except 
of course in the case of the Japanese mass evacuation on the Pacific Coast.”88   
Contrary to the president’s understanding, however, the military did in fact treat the 
evacuation of Italian families from prohibited zones on the West Coast and restrictions upon 
enemy aliens in restricted areas as matters within its command.  Executive Order 9066 had 
placed authority in the hands of the War Department to determine military areas and policies of 
exclusion and restrictions upon enemy aliens in these zones.  Although Biddle expressed 
disagreement with the War Department’s handling of the mass evacuation of persons of Japanese 
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descent, Stimson was certain that Biddle should have no “hopes of getting a change made in the 
powers which the President had given to me.”  Stimson informed the president that “the problem 
of the Germans and the Italians was arranged . . . to handle those in a different way from the 
Japanese and to do it individually with reference to the danger to key positions rather than by any 
block evacuations on a ratio basis.” 89  The president was satisfied with this federal policy.   
The power of public opinion in the disparate treatment for persons of Japanese descent 
cannot be underestimated.  The Japanese perceived to present the greatest danger, specifically 
leaders of nationalistic organizations, those who had spent many years in the enemy nation, and 
those who had made substantial gifts to their homeland, had been apprehended within days after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Yet public sentiment about the special dangers of the Japanese 
population as a whole and fear of economic competition called for mass evacuation of this group 
alone.
90
  There was no comparable anti-German or anti-Italian agitation among the public which 
would have persuaded the War Department to press President Roosevelt to treat these ethnic 
groups similarly to the Japanese.
91
  As Martin Grodzins pointed out in the late 1940s, charges 
such as a low rate of naturalization, frequent trips to the homeland, and separate language 
schools and churches leveled against the Japanese as indicators of “a low degree of 
Americanization” could equally have been raised against the larger foreign-born population of 
Italians.  Likewise, there was a strong case for evacuation of Germans on the East Coast who in 
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the state of New York alone outnumbered 
 
all persons of Japanese descent on the entire West 
Coast.
92
  Writing more than half a century later, Joseph Persico remarks that what distinguished 
the treatment of Germans and Italians from that of Japanese was that there had to be some basis 
in law for declaring an individual potentially dangerous, while the Japanese and Japanese 
Americans were relocated en masse because of the color of their skin, regardless of the status of 
their loyalty.
93
  As documents cited in the following section reveal, racial prejudice is among 
several factors explaining the disparate treatment of the Japanese as opposed to Italians and 
Germans.     
************************************* 
Military policy with respect to the various government restrictions differed in the Eastern 
and Western Defense Commands.  The most important factor was the location of important 
wartime industries that could have been targeted by enemy forces.  Four days after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the Adjutant General declared the Western Defense Command a “theatre of 
operations” and gave the commanding general special instructions for facilitating the transfer of 
personnel and materiel to accommodate the creation of new air units for dispatch to Panama and 
Hawaii.
94
  By January 1942, the commanders of each defense command were assigned distinct 
missions.  General Drum of the Eastern Defense Command, was “charged with the defense 
against hostile attack by land, sea, or air, of United States bases in Newfoundland, the North 
Atlantic Coastal Frontier, that portion of the Southern Coastal Frontier east of the rear boundary 
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of the command, and all facilities and installations within the limits of his command.”95  The 
concern on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts was submarine, surface or air attacks by the Germans, 
although the latter two appeared improbable by the end of December 1942.
96
   
In addition to responsibility for protecting the Pacific Coastal Frontier - including Alaska, 
General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command, was “further charged with the protection 
against sabotage or other internal threat of the Boeing, Douglas, and Consolidated aircraft 
factories, since these critical installations are so intimately associated with his coastal defense 
mission.”97  The United States considered the 1,300 miles along the West Coast vulnerable to 
Japanese attack by air until June 1942.  Of greatest concern were the military aircraft factories in 
Los Angeles and San Diego in the south and in Seattle in the north.  Naval yards and ship 
terminals in the Puget Sound, Portland, San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas, as 
well as the California oil industry were also crucial to the war effort.
98
  Secretary of War Henry 
L. Stimson noted DeWitt’s anxiety about these areas where the “most important airplane 
factories and naval shipyards” were located.99  As revealed below, the different levels of 
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perceived security threats on the two coasts help explain the stricter restrictions in the Western 
Defense Command as compared to those in the Eastern Defense Command.
100
     
In a succession of press releases from the end of January 1942 until early February, 
Attorney General Biddle, on recommendations from the War Department, announced the 
designation of prohibited areas in the western United States from which all enemy aliens were to 
vacate by February 24 for the purpose of aiding the national defense and protecting the aliens.
101
  
After announcing the first two prohibited areas – one on the San Francisco waterfront and one 
including the Municipal Airport of Los Angeles, Attorney General Biddle announced 135 
additional prohibited areas in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona “in the vicinity of 
airports, hydroelectric dams and power plants, gas and electric works, airfields, pumping 
stations, harbor areas, and military installations.”102       
It is widely understood that the perception of greater danger on the West Coast because 
of its proximity to Hawaii and the probability that it would be the location for the Japanese Navy 
to attack the continental United States contributed to General DeWitt’s imposition of stricter 
restrictions.
103
  From the United States’ entry into World War II in December 1941, General 
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DeWitt intended to remove all enemy aliens from the area known as the Pacific Slope, stretching 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Sierra Nevada Mountains, starting by evacuating the Japanese, 
then the Germans and Italians.
104
  In January 1942, DeWitt conceived of a program under which 
all aliens of the Japanese, German, and Italian populations and Japanese Americans would be 
subject equally to evacuation from prohibited areas and resettlement outside these zones, limited 
access to restricted areas, and internment.
105
  He also believed that the assets of all alien enemies 
should be taken over by the federal government and liquidated while the aliens, including 
persons of Japanese and Italian descent who held dual citizenship in their native country and the 
United States, would work in internment camps “to earn their own keep.”106   
As a result of the evacuation program in the Western Defense Command in February 
1942, more than 10,000 Italians were forced to leave their homes and businesses in prohibited 
zones and to relocate to areas outside the prohibited zones.
107
  Estimates of the number of 
Germans moved inland during the war are close to that of Italians.
108
  DeWitt seemed much more 
concerned with carrying out the evacuation plans concerning these most sensitive zones as 
efficiently as possible than determining if any one individual actually posed a security threat to 
the country.  He was adamant that there be no exceptions to this evacuation program, even in the 
case of Italians whose loyalty was not suspect, such as the father of baseball legend, Joe 
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DiMaggio.  DeWitt claimed that “preferential treatment . . .  destroys everything that we have 
done in the past and have been working so hard to accomplish.”109 
On March 2, 1942, DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, which designated Military 
Area No. 1 – a coastal strip of land comprised of western portions of California, Oregon, and 
Washington, and the southern half of Arizona.  If the Western Defense Command had followed 
through with its original plan of a mass evacuation of Italians aliens in this much wider zone than 
the prohibited zones from which 10,000 had already been evacuated, 52,000 people would have 
had to evacuate.  However, under the Western Defense Command’s “Individual Exclusion 
Program of Non-Japanese,” only particular German and Italian aliens and naturalized citizens 
found to be potentially dangerous could be excluded from critical areas in Military Area No. 1.
110
  
In contrast, persons of Japanese descent were evacuated en masse; about 107,500 lived in 
Military Area No. 1, approximately 5,000 of whom left this area under a “voluntary” program.111  
Eventually, the rest were removed from this ocean to mountain zone.
112
 Also pursuant to Public 
Proclamation No. 1, any Japanese, German or Italian alien or person of Japanese lineage 
changing residence had to register the change.
113
   
Unlike the February evacuation from prohibited zones which indiscriminately affected all 
Italian aliens living and working there until June, the purpose of the exclusion program was to 
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identify individuals, regardless of citizenship status, whom the government deemed suspicious to 
undergo a process to determine if they should be prohibited from military areas across the 
country.  The program was also meant to exclude individuals who resided in militarily sensitive 
areas.
114
  At hearings held in major West Coast cities before a board of three military officers of 
field grade, subjects were informed of the general nature of the evidence against them and 
questioned about matters contained in intelligence reports.  The hearing boards made 
recommendations which were sent to the Commanding General of the Defense Command for his 
final decision.  Subjects of exclusion orders were given a date by which they had to depart the 
specified area.
115
  As will be discussed in Chapter 4 with respect to alien enemy hearings, 
subjects complained of due process violations at exclusion hearings.  Retired U.S. Army Colonel 
Angelo de Guttadauro recalls that his father Nino had short notice of the hearing and was not 
allowed to have an attorney represent him at the hearing.
116
  Nino Guttadauro, a naturalized 
American citizen who worked as an accountant for the Italian Consulate in San Francisco, was 
excluded from military areas in thirty states.  Like many persons excluded from San Francisco, 
Guttadauro went first to Reno, Nevada with his family but was unable to secure work in his 
profession due to his legal status which branded him as untrustworthy to potential employers.  
His exclusion lasted from the end of September 1942 until mid-March 1944.  His son believed 
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that the economic hardship and psychological scars of exclusion remained with his father for the 
remainder of his life.
117
  
There is inconsistency in the government reports concerning the number of Italian aliens 
and naturalized citizens who underwent the individual exclusion process.  The Justice 
Department reports that between September 1942 and April 1943, the Western Defense 
Command heard 335 exclusion cases.  The result was the exclusion of 174 individuals, 24 of 
whom were of Italian descent, most from northern California with a few cases from Los Angeles 
and San Diego.
118
  It also reports that at least 47 persons of Italian ancestry nationally were 
ordered to move from designated areas, and another 12 individuals appeared before individual 
exclusion boards although the outcomes are unknown.
119
  A 1980 report of the Congressional 
Research Service has slightly different data for the Western Defense Command.  It reports that 
from August 1942 to July 1943, 174 citizens and enemy aliens received exclusion orders, many 
of whom were German-born or Italian-born American citizens.  With respect to the Eastern 
Defense Command, this latter report states that 59 individuals received exclusion orders, as did 
21 in the Southern Defense Command.
120
  According to the Justice Department, by August 1943, 
there were a total of 417 exclusion cases reviewed or in process nationwide.
121
  Stephen Fox, 
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referring to “a wartime report,” indicates that the government excluded higher numbers of 
Italians.  According to Fox, there were approximately 88 naturalized Italians and an unknown 
number of Italian aliens excluded from the West Coast.  Italians were also included in the 69 
East Coast exclusions, as they were in the 16 exclusions from the Southern Defense 
Command.
122
   
The exclusion cases caused much controversy between the Justice Department and the 
War Department concerning which cases to prosecute.  Attorney General Biddle decided not to 
prosecute numerous exclusion cases of individuals who, after being sent away from their 
residences and jobs in military areas, returned in violation of military orders.  Biddle claimed 
discretionary power in determining whether to enforce exclusion orders, often finding “no overt 
acts of disloyalty” to warrant prosecution.123  At the heart of his decision not to prosecute cases 
was his disagreement with the effectiveness of the FBI’s Custodial Detention Index of 
dangerousness in designating individuals who might actually threaten the country’s security.  He 
found the evidence upon which the classifications were based “inadequate,” the standards for the 
evidence “defective,” and claimed that a determination of “how dangerous a person is in the 
abstract and without reference to time, environment, and other relevant circumstances is 
impractical, unwise, and dangerous.”124  Thus, without knowledge of the context in which a 
subject made a statement or participated in an activity giving rise to suspicion, hearing boards 
could not make well-informed decisions. 
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There was a shared perception among War Department officials and General Dewitt that 
there were varying levels of danger posed by each enemy alien group.  Despite his initial 
conception of a policy that applied equally to these groups, DeWitt expressed a discriminatory 
attitude toward persons of Japanese descent based upon physical appearance and public 
animosity:   
 All Japanese look alike and those charged with the enforcement of the regulation 
of excluding alien enemies from restricted areas will not be able to distinguish 
between them. . . . the very definite war consciousness of the people of California, 
as far as pertains to the Japanese participation in the war, the question of the alien 
Japanese and all Japanese presents a problem in control, separate and distinct 
from that of the German or Italian.
125
 
 
Correspondence between General DeWitt and the War Department indicates that 
Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy also believed that persons of 
Japanese descent presented a far greater danger to national security than Italians.  Stimson 
requested that DeWitt “not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian 
lineage except where they are, in your judgment, undesirable or constitute a definite danger to 
the performance of your mission to defend the West Coast.”  The reasoning was that Italians 
were “potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities.”  
Exemptions from evacuation orders illustrate the greater fear of persons of Japanese 
descent.  Only German and Italian aliens of seventy years of age or over would not be required to 
move, unless they were individually suspected.  Parents, wives and children of Germans and 
Italians in the U.S. armed forces would not have to move due to their financial dependence on 
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the military.
126
  There were also exemptions for German and Italians based on illness and 
disability and for those whose American citizenship had been held up by the backlog in the 
offices of the INS.
127
  However, testimony from aliens and their families (discussed below) 
indicates that government officials in charge of evacuations did not always adhere to these 
exemptions. 
The government also showed preference for Italians and Germans with respect to letting 
alien enemies back into prohibited zones.  In discussing who had access to prohibited zones 
around military installations, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy suggested letting some persons, 
particularly Italians, back into the zone if there was certainty that they were free of suspicion and 
they were necessary to the community.  DeWitt responded that he could conceive of Germans 
and Italians being allowed back in “because you don’t have to worry about them as a group . . . 
purely as individuals” while “a Jap is a Jap to these people now.”128  Apparently DeWitt believed 
that the public would be much more receptive to returning Germans and Italians if the 
government determined that they were not dangerous than it would be to the Japanese.  
According to plans discussed between McCloy and DeWitt on February 20, 1942, Italian aliens, 
designated as “Class 4” alien enemies in the Western Defense Command, would be allowed to 
remain in prohibited military areas “during good behavior” unless they were individually suspect 
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and fell under “Class 5,” meaning they were “actually or potentially dangerous either as 
saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth-columnists or subversive persons.”129   
California politicians and publishers and editors of the state’s leading newspapers shared 
DeWitt’s feelings about the greater threat posed by the Japanese and the need for full-scale 
evacuation and relocation.
130
  In a radio address in early February 1942, California Governor 
Culbert Olson expressed similar racist sentiment in distinguishing the Japanese from Italians and 
Germans.  He said that identification and registration did not help in determining loyalty or 
disloyalty among Japanese but that these processes were effective with respect to the other alien 
groups.
131
  California Attorney General Earl Warren believed the inclusion of Italians and 
Germans in evacuation would be “‘disruptive of the national unity’” and “cruel’” because in his 
opinion, first-generation Italians and Germans were “‘no different from anybody else, regardless 
of what the German government or the Italian government may think about their citizenship.’”132   
Logistics also figured into the plan for dealing with enemy aliens.  Stimson stated that 
due to practical considerations “of the size of the Italian population and the number of troops and 
facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan 
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would greatly overtax our strength.”133  It was General DeWitt’s plan for the Italians, including 
both aliens and citizens, to be the last group to leave the military strip along the Western coast, 
after the Japanese and Germans.
134
  On the question of whether the military legally had the 
power to prohibit entry into military areas by any particular class of persons or citizens, the Joint 
Evacuation Board determined that such power existed.  It determined that no infringement of 
constitutional rights would occur as long as the “classification of persons or citizens is 
reasonably related to a genuine war need and does not under the guise of national defense 
discriminate against any class of citizens for a purpose unrelated to the national defense.”135  The 
board justified the disparate treatment among the alien enemy groups by stating that “to bar the 
millions of persons of German or Italian stock from either seacoast area” would “present an 
insuperable problem of administration, not to mention the consequent disruption of defense 
production.” 136   
Thus, in addition to logistical concerns about moving and housing such large populations, 
such a proposition would potentially harm the economy.  The California Department of 
Agriculture felt that Italian and German aliens were more essential to agriculture than the 
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Japanese in Area No. 1A along the coast, particularly in the grape, dairy, and deciduous fruit 
industries which produced by-products and medicinal commodities needed by the armed forces.  
Director W. J. Cecil felt an exception from alien evacuation for Italian and German fruit laborers 
was justified because “the grouping of all Japanese without respect to American citizenship 
seems to dispel any particular consistency in the program.”137   
Italian Americans in government positions made great efforts to spare Italian 
communities the disruption of evacuation.  John Molinari, who had served as an Assistant 
District Attorney in California during World War II, was personally familiar with many of the 
Italians affected by wartime restrictions. Molinari, as a member of Citizens’ Committee to Aid 
Italians Loyal to the United States, a group created to forestall any efforts to evacuate the 
Italians, met with a subordinate of General DeWitt at the Presidio in San Francisco to argue that 
the movement of the Italian population would create a much greater logistical problem than that 
posed by the Japanese. 
We reminded the general that, particularly in this area, up through northern 
California, the Italians were very active in many industries and commercial 
endeavors:  the garbage collection, the farmers.  We talked about A.P. Giannini 
being the president of Bank of America.  And we impressed upon the general that 
if you moved all of these people, . . . it would have included people of Italian 
descent who were born in this country.  And we impressed upon him strongly that 
it certainly would disrupt the productive industrial and commercial endeavors in 
the community.  We had already had some indication of commercial activities.
138
  
 
The arguments of Attorney Molinari, however, did not delay the evacuation of 
approximately 10,000 Italian aliens from their homes and businesses from February 1942 
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through June 1942.
139
  Some like Celestina Stagnaro Loero were given only forty-eight hours to 
leave their homes.  Loero, an elderly woman who spoke little English, had lived in the coastal 
community of Santa Cruz for over forty-one years when Justice Department agents came to her 
door in late February 1942 to tell her that she had to move inland of Highway 1 or otherwise face 
arrest.  She had no choice but to comply.
140
  Often the evacuation orders resulted in the 
separation of one or more family members from the rest of the family.  A resident of Arcata, 
California, related both the hardship and illogic of this program: 
My mother, who lived here too, was born in France, so she was able to stay in her 
house, even though she was Italian.  I was able to stay because I was born here.  
But my dad and husband had to go across the street.  They both lost their jobs. . . . 
My dad had been here since 1902; nobody ever bothered you, so you didn’t 
become a citizen.
141
 
 
Italian families who moved as a unit went to cramped, makeshift homes.  Alien 
residents from Pittsburg, California moved to Oakley, a town fifteen miles inland, where 
they lived in little shacks built for migrant laborers who harvested fruit in the summers.  
The community of about twelve “little huts” resembled an army camp.  In recalling the 
difficulties of uprooted families in Oakley, such as the lack of transportation to shop for 
groceries and unfamiliar schools for their children, Frank Buccellato emphasized the 
confusion experienced by Italian aliens who had married American citizens and sent their 
sons to war to fight for the United States.
142
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These experiences on the West Coast reflected the harsher interpretation of threat and 
resulting stricter implementation of what was an open-ended proclamation in Executive Order 
9066.  The language of 9066 gave military commanders great discretion to determine the extent 
of the military zones and who were to be excluded or restricted within those zones.  As a result, 
the East Coast produced different wartime programs.  In contrast to General DeWitt, whose 
original intentions to remove all German and Italian aliens indicated a belief that nationality 
alone was the appropriate measure of a threat to national security, General Drum stated that his 
implementation of the government’s plan would be based on evidence of disloyalty or 
dangerousness.  Drum never contemplated mass evacuation as DeWitt had for the Western 
Defense Command.  In late April 1942, General Drum publicly announced his intention for the 
East Coast to establish prohibited and restricted areas along the entire Atlantic seaboard and 
inland, which were to affect sixteen states.
143
  However, he defined military areas narrowly so as 
to avoid displacing people.
144
  Drum thought in terms of individual action against dangerous 
aliens and citizens, rather than excluding groups.
145
   
….the fundamental policy embodied in the plan is not to interfere in any manner 
whatever with the lives of the great mass of loyal Americans in the States 
included in the military areas, or with the economic life of the area, but it does 
express the determination of the military authorities to prevent any enemy 
sympathizer, whether alien enemy, alien of other nationality, or disloyal 
American, if any exist, from committing any act detrimental to the national 
security.  Those persons whose conduct reflects their patriotic motives will not be 
affected by this administration.
146
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Drum’s approach of separating the potentially dangerous from the “mass of loyal 
Americans,” regardless of citizenship or ethnicity but rather based on an individual’s conduct, 
stood in stark contrast to General DeWitt’s policy of associating a particular heritage with 
suspicion, which resulted in the evacuation of thousands of Italians from their homes for 
approximately four months.  Unique to the East Coast was General Drum’s order to dim lights at 
night.
147
  Drum believed it was necessary to control lights in such places as Coney Island and the 
Florida coast.
148
      
Secretary of War Stimson confirmed the adoption of separate coastal policies in 
discussing Attorney General Biddle’s concern over a rumor about “various drastic steps in the 
eastern seaboard for mass evacuation of aliens – Germans and Italians.”  Stimson allayed 
Biddle’s fears by assuring him, as well as the president, that “we are not going to have any mass 
evacuations on the east coast but are going to do it very carefully with very small numbers.”149  
As mentioned above, the application of an individual exclusion plan was also far less extensive 
in the Eastern Defense Command than in the Western Defense Command, both in terms of the 
total number of persons and the percentage of the alien population affected in those regions.  
Only 59 individuals in the Eastern Defense Command and 21 in the Southern Defense Command 
received exclusion orders, compared to 174 individuals from the Western Defense Command.
150
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In addition to zones designated prohibited to alien enemies, in February 1942, the 
Attorney General announced restricted areas on the West Coast in which more than 50,000 
Italians had to observe curfews and travel restrictions.  Unlike prohibited zones, from which the 
government barred enemy aliens, they could remain in restricted areas.
151
  FBI agents searched 
the homes of aliens for contraband items, such as firearms, short-wave radios, cameras, and other 
items deemed possible instruments of espionage, and confiscated these items.
152
  The Justice 
Department reported that searches were conducted in approximately 2,900 Italian homes 
nationwide; approximately two-thirds of these searches occurred in New York, Pennsylvania, 
California, and Louisiana.
153
  Many Italians promised the return of their possessions at the end of 
the war were sorely disappointed when the government did not return items to them.
154
  Benito 
Vanni, whose father turned over two shotguns, two rifles, a handgun, a saber, and a pair of 
binoculars before he was sent to an internment camp, recalled his father’s futile efforts to reclaim 
the property after his release since he did not have a receipt, leading him to believe that the 
arresting officers took them.
155
  Harry Massagli’s father, who lost his radio, three rifles, and a 
shotgun during a search at his house, was particularly offended that the government made no 
                                                          
151
 DOJ Report, v, 25.  One was a large area that spanned the entire coastline of California from the Oregon border 
south to fifty miles north of Los Angeles, extending inland from thirty to 150 miles.  Other restricted areas 
surrounded hydroelectric generating plants.  DOJ Report, 20-21. 
152
 DOJ Report, 23.  The confiscation of such contraband, authorized by Proclamation 2527, included firearms, 
weapons, ammunition, bombs, explosives, short-wave radio receiving sets, transmitting sets, signal devices, codes or 
ciphers, cameras, and documents of military facilities, etc.  See Presidential Proclamation No. 2527, Federal 
Register 6 (December 7, 1941):  6324, incorporating provisions from Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 Federal 
Register 6 (December 7, 1941):  6321 (pertaining to Japanese).    
153
 DOJ Report, 24.  The Report states that 1,907 searches resulted in 1,077 confiscations of contraband and that a 
majority of searches occurred on the East Coast. 
154
 See “U.S. Not Inclined to Return Contraband to Enemy Aliens,” The Daily Boston Globe, October 26, 1943. 
155
 Benito Vanni, interview by Stephen Fox, Daly City, California, June 24, 1987, in Fox, Uncivil Liberties, 74-75. 
117 
 
exception since Massagli’s children were American citizens.156  Confiscations from Italian 
homes on the East Coast occurred in a similar fashion – police confiscated items by subpoena 
and did not provide the aliens a receipt to reclaim the items later.  Joseph Carroccia, a prominent 
member of the Lenolese Society, a social club of Italian immigrants in Farmington, Connecticut, 
never saw the return of his short-wave radio and flashlights which were taken from his home at 
the start of the war.
157
  
What appear to have been equally damaging to Italian aliens from Boston and Gloucester, 
Massachusetts to Eureka, California and down the West Coast to San Diego, and New Orleans as 
well, were restrictions placed upon fishermen.  Although the exact terms varied from port to port, 
the attorney general’s order of January 30, 1942 told fishermen where and when they could fish; 
they could not take their boats out and had no access to wharfs and piers, which were manned by 
armed guards in some locations.
158
  Many fishermen affected by the restrictions had been in the 
United States for up to 50 years, but they had not become naturalized because they were too busy 
working or were afraid of the examination since they were illiterate and could speak very little 
English.
159
  More importantly, in the fishing community, there was little or no pressure to obtain 
American citizenship.  The Italian fishermen worked with paesani or relatives who spoke Italian 
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and followed the same lifestyle.
160
  In such insular communities, the Italians did not need to 
speak English or acculturate to the United States. 
The effect of wartime restrictions on the fishermen’s livelihood was dramatic, as was the 
impact on the commercial fishing industry as a whole.  Many fishermen lost their boats for the 
duration of the war through purchase by the government or a lease arrangement.
161
  Here too, 
“[t]he most severe application of these restrictions occurred in the Western Defense Command 
and represented, at times, a conflict between the services” because the Navy was concerned with 
minimizing the impact on the fishing industry, while the Army was intent on ensuring 
security.
162
  According to Salvatore Ferrante, a naturalized citizen, the Army and Navy 
requisitioned the best fishing boats in Monterey and San Pedro for patrolling along the Pacific 
Coast down to Latin America and along the Atlantic Coast as well.  The Navy requisitioned his 
canning plant in Port Hueneme along with the entire harbor to use as “an assembly port to ship 
war material and men to strategic places.”  Ferrante did not believe that the armed forces took the 
fishermen’s boats because they were Italian.  Rather, “they just had to have boats, and they 
wanted the best ones that were in the fleet.  It didn’t matter whether a man was a citizen.”163   
While Ferrante seemed satisfied with the government’s compensation for his plant, other 
fishermen felt that the government had not treated them fairly.  Giuseppe Spadaro, also a U.S. 
citizen, lost his boat for two years while the government used it for patrolling.  The government 
paid him $600 a month for using it and covered the expenses of insurance and taxes.  Along with 
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other fishermen, he went to Seattle to charter boats in order to earn a living.  When the 
government returned his boat, it was in such bad shape that he had to continue fishing with the 
rented boat.  Spadaro ended up selling it to the shipyard for $4,000, considerably less than its 
original value, because he could not fix it himself.
164
  Compliance with the government’s 
requests for their boats did not win the fishermen favor with respect to other government 
restrictions.  Neither the requisition of John Russo’s purse seiner by the Navy on February 23, 
1942 nor the fact that his brother had been drafted into the Navy prevented the evacuation of his 
parents from their home in Monterey the very next day.
165
  As was the case with evacuation from 
the West Coast, the government made no exceptions for families who had contributed 
significantly to the war effort. 
On Columbus Day on October 12, 1942, Attorney General Biddle announced the removal 
of Italians from the category of alien enemies.  As of this date, 653 Italians had been brought 
before alien enemy hearing boards, and of these, 232 had been ordered interned.  The 
proclamation removing alien enemy status set forth the following terms:  Italians could travel 
without restriction throughout the United States; they could change their employment or 
residence without notice to the U.S. Attorneys’ Office; alien enemy certificates of identification 
were no longer required; the prohibition against the use of cameras, short wave radios, and 
signaling devices was lifted; and permits and curfews in military zones were dissolved.  
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However, there would be no change in the status of Italian aliens who had already been interned 
or paroled by the Attorney General.
166
 
************************************* 
After showing the immediacy with which the FBI arrested Italian aliens deemed the 
greatest security risks and detained them for the internment process, this chapter traced the 
debates among the three branches of government that ultimately saved the Italian alien 
population from mass evacuation and internment.  Instead, the military imposed short-term 
evacuation of approximately 10,000 Italians from prohibited zones along the West Coast and 
instituted individual exclusion of aliens and naturalized citizens from military areas across the 
country.  In implementing policies and affording exceptions to restrictions, the perception of 
threat, the philosophies of military commanders, and racial distinctions among the enemy aliens 
were all decisive factors.  The following chapter continues the discussion of how the U.S. 
government assessed the threat posed by aliens and naturalized citizens of Italian descent, but 
focuses on the hearings before alien enemy hearing boards in the selective internment process.  
Despite no legal mandate to do so, Attorney General Biddle upheld a policy throughout the war 
of affording hearings to enemy aliens before internment, yet struggled to maintain consistency in 
the initial hearings across federal districts and in rehearings during the aliens’ internment at the 
military camps.  
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CHAPTER 4:  “I WAS GIVEN A SO-CALLED HEARING”:  INCONSISTENCIES IN 
THE INTERNMENT PROCESS 
 
Dear Mr. President: 
 
Last night I listened to the “I Am an American” broadcast, sitting in a primitive 
barrack in an internment camp, and I could not help feeling sadly disillusioned. 
I had come to America as a poor young boy, thirteen years old, and have lived in this 
country ever since.  In 1918 I became an American citizen and served with the A.E.F. 
[American Expeditionary Force] in France.  I received an honorable discharge. . . . . 
I have always lived an honorable family life and am a businessman, head of the 
contracting establishment which I have created, of excellent standing. . .  . 
In Honolulu, I was given a so-called hearing which lasted five minutes.  No formal 
accusation against which I could have defended myself was ever brought against me, nor 
were the reasons for my arrest ever disclosed to me. . .  . 
. . . I would consider it an honor and a privilege to serve in the most exposed and 
dangerous spot, on an oil tanker, anywhere.  I would gladly sacrifice my life for my 
country. 
But I find it profoundly shocking to be treated in my own country like an enemy alien 
and to have been subjected to proceedings unworthy of American administration. 
Hoping that you will believe in my sincerity and that you will give orders so that the 
wrong done to my family and myself will be straightened out, 
 
        I remain, Mr. President, 
        very respectfully yours, 
        Mario Valdastri
1
 
 
Although it was rare for a non-Japanese naturalized citizen like Mario Valdastri to face 
internment during World War II, the shock over how he was treated by the U.S. government and 
his resulting disillusionment exemplify the feelings of many Italian internees that the hearings 
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process was unjust.
2
  Since government officials did not notify aliens of specific charges of 
misconduct, disloyalty, or even of suspicious activity, they did not know what they did wrong.
3
  
The absence of formal charges did not afford them an opportunity to defend themselves at 
hearings before alien enemy hearing boards by presenting evidence that might have explained 
the activity that came under suspicion and saved them from internment.  The Justice 
Department’s litigation files reveal the types of behavior that would convince a hearing board 
that a subject deserved internment, specifically reports of proclamations of loyalty to the Fascist 
cause or worse, statements to that effect during the actual hearing.  But it is far more difficult to 
discern a pattern in the types of favorable information that would result in a subject’s parole or 
release.  Avowing entire sympathy with the United States could work to one’s favor.4   Yet 
Valdastri’s futile attempt to prove his loyalty to the United States through a willingness to fight 
in the armed forces against the Axis powers echoes the efforts of other civilian internees in alien 
enemy hearings who tried unsuccessfully to provide evidence of their potential to be good 
citizens as a way of overcoming FBI reports of Fascist sympathies and anti-American 
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dispositions.
5
  Thus tribunals had considerable discretion to credit certain aspects of an 
investigative record and to discredit others in reaching a decision on a subject. 
Examining the Justice Department’s litigation files for alien enemies, chosen for 
particular factors such as the internee’s legal status, profession, age, or gender, and the files of 
hearing board members in Boston and New York City, reveals the inconsistencies in the hearings 
process.  Complaints about the process eventually led the Justice Department to issue a series of 
remedial instructions to the hearing boards, beginning in February 1942 and continuing through 
1943.  Those instructions are in many ways the best evidence that the alien enemy hearings could 
have been uniformly fairer.  Unfortunately, for the majority of Italian internees already interned 
within the first six months of the alien enemy hearing program, the attempt to improve due 
process did not affect the earlier determinations of internment.   
Some of the case studies below illustrate the types of defective process that the Justice 
Department addressed, such as the lack of formal charges against the subjects, while others 
exhibit the failure of the board to admit testimony favorable to the subject.  In other instances, 
cultural biases of board members and the political influence of witnesses compromised 
institutional standards and prevailed over objectively measurable threats, sometimes serving to 
disadvantage a subject and at other times positively affecting outcomes, such as cases where 
Italian American hearing board members or government attorneys were involved.   Still other 
cases, like that of Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini below, offer narratives of a more thoughtful process, of 
hearing boards grappling with the meaning of due process as it pertained to enemy aliens and 
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striving for a contextualized adjudicatory process, and the Justice Department carefully 
reviewing board recommendations.  Cases where multiple hearings were held, particularly when 
individuals were interned longer, not only gave subjects the opportunity eventually to address the 
government’s concerns, but also allowed boards to more thoroughly examine the behavior and 
mindset of the subjects.  
In addition to setting forth discrepancies between what the Justice Department expected  
hearing boards to do and how they actually functioned, this chapter reveals the tension between 
what internees felt was a just process for deciding whether they posed a danger to society and the 
then-existing legal guarantees for enemy aliens.  The fact that hearings were provided at all when 
neither U.S. nor international treaty law required them for nationals of countries at war with the 
United States indicates a commitment, even in the atmosphere of war, to the democratic ideals of 
justice. 
As a naturalized citizen in the Territory of Hawaii, Valdastri presents a case unique from 
the other internees profiled in this chapter and gives us an opportunity to understand civil-
military relations during war time.  The U.S. government’s treatment of U.S. citizens in Hawaii 
relied upon the pronouncement of martial law there after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
declaration of the Hawaiian Islands as a war zone.  Since it was a potential target for invasion 
and a place that agents of the enemy might infiltrate, the territorial governor had suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus.  This meant that there was no constitutional protection for U.S. citizens 
against imprisonment or detention without judicial order.  During the period of martial law, 
which lasted until October 1944, the military oversaw the Hawaiian legal system, resulting in the 
trial of cases in military courts, even those not involving national security.
6
    
                                                          
6
 See Daniel White and  Daniel P. Murphy, “Hawaii under Martial Law,” accessed October 28, 2013,  
http://www.netplaces.com/world-war-ii/the-united-states-enters-the-war/hawaii-under-martial-law.htm.  Note that 
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Valdastri was born in Italy in 1896, and as a teenager in 1909 came to the United States 
where he then resided continuously.  In 1918, he became an American citizen when he enlisted 
in the U.S. Army to serve in France during World War I, receiving an honorable discharge the 
following year.  Upon his return to civilian life, he married an American citizen of Italian origin, 
had two children, and built a successful contracting business in Honolulu, Hawaii.
7
  When FBI 
agents arrested Valdastri on December 8, 1941 in Honolulu, he was in ill health.  
At his hearing at Fort Shafter on Hawaii before a board of Army officers and civilians, 
Valdastri appeared without counsel.  While Valdastri was out of the room, an FBI agent gave 
testimony that upon his return from a trip to Europe in 1933, “he expressed himself as quite pro-
Fascist, which attitude has become more pronounced since the start of the recent war” as well as 
pro-Nazi, and even held meetings of local Italians at his home “to forward the cause of Fascism 
in the Islands.”  Most suspicious was his allegedly close friendship with the former secretary to 
the Italian Consul in Honolulu who was suspected of espionage activity.  After the president’s 
closure of Italian consulates, it was believed that the Italian Consul asked Valdastri to carry on 
some of the activities of the consulate.  In response to questioning by the board, Valdastri 
admitted to expressing pro-Fascist leanings until 1935 and stated that since then he “detested the 
movement of Fascism” and had “nothing to do with the Germans” or Nazism.  He admitted to his 
acquaintance with the consul’s secretary, but characterized the nature of his meetings at the 
consulate as relating to the development of commerce and the financial business of the Italian 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the writ of habeas corpus was only suspended within Hawaii and therefore, martial law would not have followed 
Valdastri to the mainland.  As several amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008) have argued, the writ applies to the status of the jailor, not the citizenship of the jailed.  See, e.g., Brief of 
Legal Historians as Amici Curiae In Support of the Petitioners, accessed October 28, 2013, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/probono_Boumediene_FINAL.pdf. Thus, there is an argument 
that the “jailors” at internment camps in the United States would have been subject to the writ. 
7
 Mario Valdastri to the President of the United States, May 28, 1942, Folder of Mario Valdastri, Box 20, PMG 
Records of Italian Civilian Internees, NARA. 
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Club which he later disbanded for political differences, rather than representing the actions of the 
governments of Germany and Italy.
8
  The hearing board clearly felt that Valdastri’s ties to 
Fascist government officials and his former leadership of the Hawaiian Italian Club with its 
Fascist leanings were too recent for the U.S. government to trust his loyalty to the United States.  
Since Valdastri fit the profile of someone capable of inciting others because of his prominence in 
business and political circles, U.S. authorities chose not to take a risk with him. 
After three months of detention at the Honolulu Immigration Station and a facility on 
Sand Island (within Honolulu proper), during which time he was not allowed to have visitors, he 
was transferred to two army camps for internment, first Fort McDowell on Angel Island in San 
Francisco and then Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.  In an appeal to the ACLU in New York, Valdastri 
spoke of the injustice he experienced, stating that he had never been formally charged and that, 
as an American citizen, he felt that he was entitled to “an opportunity of having my case brought 
before a regular court and of assuring my defense.”9  There is no evidence in Valdastri’s file that 
the ACLU came to his defense.   
Upon his return to Sand Island in June 1942, Valdastri’s daughter Frances wrote to Allen 
Gullion, the Provost Marshall General during most of World War II.  She requested his release 
                                                          
8
 Record of the Hearings of a Board of Officers and Civilians, Hawaiian Department, 14 December 1941, Folder of 
Mario Valdastri, Box 2643, Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Subject File, 1942-46, Hawaii, 
Civilian Internees, Record Group 389; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.  Apparently Lawrence 
DiStasi was not aware of this transcript which provides reasons for Valdastri’s internment.  In his book of essays, 
Una Storia Segreta, he cites to an interview with Valdastri’s son, Mario Valdastri, Jr., which offers his father’s 
dispute with a powerful businessman on Oahu and mistaken identity when the elder Valdastri first arrived in Hawaii 
as the most likely reasons for his internment.  DiStasi dismisses such evidence as “tenuous and circumstantial.”  See 
DiStasi, “A Tale of Two Citizens,” in Una Storia Segreta, DiStasi, ed., 150-51. 
9
 Mario Valdastri to American Civil Liberties, New York, NY, May 10, 1942, Folder of Mario Valdastri, Box 20, 
PMG Records of Italian Civilian Internees, NARA.   
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after Valdastri’s own letter to Gullion went unanswered.10  Major General Gullion assured 
Frances Valdastri that her father had undergone a hearing before a board comprised of three 
civilians before his internment, under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department.  In fact, contrary to Gullion’s representation of Valdastri’s hearing, the 
transcript of his December 1941 hearing at Fort Shafter indicates that the board was comprised 
of both military officers and civilians.  Speaking of Valdastri as if he were an alien enemy 
instead of a naturalized U.S. citizen, Gullion explained that the hearing was “not held as a matter 
of right but was allowed in order to avoid injustice.”  Gullion cited “[c]onsiderations of national 
security, dependent upon the military factors involved” as governing the decision to intern 
Valdastri.  His release was dependent upon a determination by the Hawaiian Department that 
“such release would in no way endanger the public safety of the United States or be detrimental 
to the war effort.”11   
Valdastri was released in late February 1943 after a second hearing board concluded that 
he was not a danger to the United States.  One of the factors contributing to his release at that 
time was that the military needed Valdastri’s skills in construction.  In 1967, he chose to retire 
with his wife in Italy and lived to be eighty-two.
12
  Of the Italian internees in my study, 
Valdastri’s prominence and apparent connections to Fascism placed him among those that gave 
the U.S. government the most concern, which raises the issue, addressed in the Conclusion, of 
                                                          
10
 Frances Valdastri to Allen W. Gullion, Provost Marshall General, July 18, 1942;  Mario Valdastri to Allen W. 
Gullion, Provost Marshall General, June 1, 1942, Folder of Mario Valdastri, Box 20, PMG Records of Italian 
Civilian Internees, NARA. 
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 Major General Allen W. Gullion to Frances Valdastri, July 28, 1942, Folder of Mario Valdastri, Box 20, PMG 
Records of Italian Civilian Internees, NARA.  The label “Aliens Div.” which appears in the upper right-hand corner 
of the letter indicates that Valdastri was categorized as an alien despite his American citizenship.     
12
 DiStasi, “A Tale of Two Citizens,” 151. 
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whether the government was justified in grouping naturalized American citizens together with 
Italian aliens.
13
   
 In contrast to Valdastri’s situation in Hawaii, where being under martial law made a 
critical difference, in the matter of the internment of Italian aliens who had been residents on the 
mainland, the wartime detention plans envisioned entirely civilian proceedings from the arrest, as 
authorized by Presidential proclamation, to the issuance of warrants by the Attorney General for 
searches of enemy aliens’ homes, through the alien enemy hearings.  The Justice Department 
could also consider prosecution under the Smith Act of 1940 or denaturalization proceedings for 
naturalized American citizens not subject to internment who were suspected of subversive 
activities, specifically urging military insubordination or the violent overthrow of the 
government.
14
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the INS based its entire internment program on various 
articles of the 1929 Geneva Convention and its camp commanders interpreted the convention’s 
provisions to apply to civilian internees.  Thus, an internee who had grievances would have 
relied upon the Convention in making arguments for his case.
15
  Part III of Chapter 3 of the 1929 
Convention, entitled “Penal sanctions with regard to prisoners of war,” concerns judicial 
proceedings which followed the laws, regulations, and orders of the armed forces and were to be 
applied if a prisoner violated such a law and regulation and was brought up for punishment.  
Unfortunately for the internees, these provisions, akin to procedural protections for criminal 
                                                          
13
 Valdastri is the only subject in my study for whom there remains a classified file of the Justice Department at 
NARA at College Park, MD. 
14
 See Senate Intelligence Report, 419-20.  Other statutory tools were the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the 
Voorhis Act of 1941 requiring organizations with foreign ties advocating the violent overthrow of the government to 
formally register. 
15
 General Research Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Administrative History, 382. 
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defendants, were not interpreted to have any applicability to the alien enemy hearings.
16
  The 
provisions of Article 60, paragraph (c) which required that prisoners of war receive a “Statement 
of the charge or charges, and of the legal provisions applicable” were not construed to apply to 
interned enemy aliens, most likely because they had not been charged with any criminal 
offenses.  Not surprisingly, internees habitually complained that they were not notified of any 
charges against them and that the government did not explain the legal ramifications of their 
statements in the hearings.  As will be shown in the following section, unlike prisoners of war 
who had the right to an attorney in proceedings and the right of appeal, enemy aliens were not 
afforded the same procedural guarantees.
17
    
The hearings before the alien enemy hearing boards during World War II more nearly 
modeled on deportation hearings of the same time period.  The deportation process consisted of 
both a preliminary hearing and a formal hearing.  In the preliminary hearing, an inspector 
conducted an examination of the alien to obtain information in order to make out a prima facie 
case, and the warrant for arrest was based on this information.
18
  At such preliminary hearings, 
the alien was rarely represented by counsel and usually was not acquainted with the charges 
against him because the purpose of the hearing was to discover evidence to be used against 
him.
19
   
                                                          
16
 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July, 1929 (hereafter “1929 Geneva 
Convention”), Part III, accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/305?OpenDocument.  
17
 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on Its Activities During the Second World War, 574-75. 
18
 Report of the Secretary of Labor’s Committee of Administrative Procedure, Department of Labor, The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., Miscellaneous Documents Vol. 587, c. 1 of 
“Unclassified Collection.” (1940) (hereafter “Labor Committee Report”), 26.  The purpose of the report was to 
explain the present state of exclusion and deportation hearings and to suggest methods for improving the fairness of 
such hearings.  Article 62 of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides the right to an attorney and Article 64 the right 
of appeal. 
19
 Labor Committee Report, 26. 
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The more formal hearing in the second stage of deportation proceedings better comported 
with due process in a court of law.  For instance, the alien had a right to counsel and to hear the 
charges against him before the inspector questioned him about his background and the particular 
circumstances of his case.
20
  Additionally, the alien or his counsel had the opportunity to cross 
examine government witnesses.
21
  Inspectors admitted hearsay evidence since they did not 
follow any formal rules of evidence or procedure.
22
  Finally, there was a record of the hearing, 
often prepared by the inspector himself.
23
   
The hearings before the alien enemy hearing boards resembled the informality of the 
preliminary hearings in deportation, and the minimal protections of the alien’s rights were also 
comparable.  The hearings lasted from twenty minutes to half an hour and were conducted 
without adherence to the rules of evidence:  a U.S. attorney presented each case to the board; the 
FBI agents read their reports which could be challenged by the U.S. attorney when opinions 
rather than facts were put forth; the alien answered questions from the agents and the board 
members and presented affidavits or called witnesses in special cases.
24
  Circumstances such as 
the use of translators and the desire of busy hearing board members to hear as many cases as 
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 Labor Committee Report, 27. 
21
 Labor Committee Report, 27.  
22
 Labor Committee Report, 27.  Note that hearsay is the report of someone’s words by a witness which cannot be 
substantiated and therefore, is inadmissible as evidence in a court of law.  For example, an anonymous informant 
might have attended a meeting of the Sons of Italy and reported to an FBI agent that a subject alien spoke with 
fervor about Fascism.  Such occurrence could not be verified but was acceptable evidence for the proceedings 
discussed here. 
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 Labor Committee Report, 27. 
24
 Fox, Uncivil Liberties, 200. 
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possible on any given evening, even if it meant going late into the night, prevented 
comprehensive, fair hearings in many instances.
25
   
Unlike deportation hearings where transcripts were regularly kept, the absence of 
transcripts or records with justifications from hearing boards often prevented Attorney General 
Biddle from fairly determining whether or not to uphold or overrule the board decision.  Thus, 
although both types of proceedings lacked the due process of a criminal hearing, there were some 
procedural mechanisms in place in deportation hearings to afford aliens of non-enemy countries 
greater protections than alien enemies.
 26
  In the alien enemy hearings, board members could base 
their recommendations for internment on information in FBI reports which subjects were not 
given the opportunity to refute.   
The case of Biagio Farese, a radio announcer born in Italy in 1897 who was among the 
first aliens to be apprehended in Boston, illustrates the differences between deportation and alien 
enemy proceedings, and how they operated separately within the Justice Department.  As 
indicated in the statistical portion of Chapter 3, at least ten of the subject internees had 
undergone deportation proceedings by the time they were interned or were labeled a “criminal 
deportable alien enemy.”  Farese simultaneously underwent deportation proceedings through the 
INS and alien enemy hearings through the Alien Enemy Control Unit.  His case shows how the 
legal distinction between an alien and an enemy alien affected the procedural rights afforded him.   
Farese’s story is also important because it illustrates the long reach of the Alien Enemy 
Act and highlights the complicated issues that holding multiple citizenships caused Italians who 
                                                          
25
 U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, 285. 
26
 See Labor Committee Report.  For a recent interpretation of how courts should draw the line between regulatory 
deportation procedures and punitive ones requiring constitutional protections like those afforded alleged criminals, 
see Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation:  Outsiders in American History (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 2010). 
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migrated to the United States through other locations on the American continent.  Since the Alien 
Enemy Act applies to “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or 
government,” it did not matter that Farese had more recently become a citizen of either Canada 
or Great Britain, both friendly nations.  All that mattered was that he was born in Italy, a country 
at war with the United States at the time.   
Farese came to the attention of the FBI because of his uncertain citizenship status as well 
as his associations with organizations and individuals in Canada and in the Boston area believed 
to be promoting Fascism.  In 1929, seven years after illegally entering Canada by deserting an 
Italian ship, Farese became a naturalized citizen of that country.  There he was an editor of an 
Italian newspaper printed in Montreal called Il Cittadino, a pro-Italy paper alleged to have spread 
Fascist ideology.  He entered the United States in 1936 by train into upper New York under the 
temporary status of a visitor, that is, without a visa, certificate or other documentation, but ended 
up residing first in New York and then in the Boston area where he registered as an alien under 
the Alien Registration Act of 1940.  In Boston he engaged in the radio advertising business with 
a fellow Italian, which allegedly allowed him to broadcast pro-Fascist propaganda, and produced 
a comedy portraying an Italian family.
27
   
How Farese proceeded to navigate the immigration system, claiming three different 
citizenships at separate hearings, shows how the war context created difficulties for individuals 
who followed a transmigratory path to the United States.  When war between Great Britain and 
Italy made his return to Canada unfavorable, Farese sought the assistance of U.S. Congressman 
Thomas A. Flaherty to obtain a visa from Cuba to permit his migration to the United States from 
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 FBI Reports re. Biagio Farese, with aliases Biagio Faresa and Blaise Farese, 1-14-42 and 1-16-42, Farese’s A-
File. 
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that country.
28
  That effort never came to fruition because in October 1940 Farese was arrested 
for illegal entry and for overstaying his leave from Canada, initiating multiple deportation 
hearings.  At the first hearing in December 1940, with the representation of counsel, he claimed 
to be a Canadian citizen.  The outcome was a recommendation of deportation to Italy.
29
  At the 
second hearing held in May 1941 to consider his application for suspension of deportation or for 
voluntary departure, topics of questioning included his presidency of the Federation of Italian 
World War Veterans (Associazione Nazionale ex-Combattenti) in Boston and his association 
with the Italian Consul.  He denied all allegations of Fascist or “un-American” activities, stating 
that his solicitation of funds on behalf of the Federation was to benefit innocent women and 
children who were the victims of war in Italy.
30
  Believing that he had lost his Canadian 
citizenship due to his absence from Canada for over a year, and anxious not to return to Canada 
where he was certain that he would be interned along with his Italian comrades, he stated that he 
was an Italian citizen.
31
  A third hearing was held in October 1941 to allow Farese to answer 
certain allegations made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the FBI regarding 
potentially Fascist activities.  Again with the assistance of counsel, he denied joining the Italian 
army to engage in the Italian-Ethiopian War and denied ever being a member of the Fascist 
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 Telegram, U.S. Congressman Thomas A. Flaherty to Edward J. Shaughnessey, Deputy Assistant, Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization, August 28, 1940, Farese’s A-File. 
29
 FBI Report re. Biagio Farese, 1-14-42, Farese’s A-File. 
30
 Transcript of Deportation Hearing in the case of Biagio Farese, May 14, 1941, Farese’s A-File. 
31
 Transcript of Deportation Hearing in the case of Biagio Farese, May 14, 1941 and FBI Report re. Biagio Farese, 
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Party.
32
  The outcome of the three hearings was a recommendation for deportation to Italy since 
he appeared to be “inimical to the welfare of this country.” 33  
While Farese’s immigration status was pending final determination by the immigration 
headquarters in Washington, he came within the custody of the Alien Enemy Control Unit when 
he was arrested under Presidential warrant on December 8, 1941, underwent a hearing on 
January 17, 1942, and received his internment order on January 31.
34
  At his alien enemy 
hearing, he claimed British citizenship.  Even though he had lost his Canadian citizenship due to 
his absence from Canada for six years, he remained a British subject under Canadian 
immigration law.
35
  As in the deportation hearings, at issue were his prior military service for 
Italy, his employment history, and his involvement in the Federation of Italian World War 
Veterans.
36
  Although both alien enemy and deportation proceedings were under the jurisdiction 
of the Justice Department, the hearing boards were separate judicial bodies and apparently did 
not share information for the purpose of affecting the outcome of the cases concerning the same 
individual.  In Farese’s case, a favorable camp record based principally upon his time at Fort 
Missoula, where he remained until May 1943 before being transferred to Ellis Island, had no 
positive bearing upon the status of his deportation case.  The record indicated that “he remained 
aloof from the known ardent Fascists” and cooperated with questioning from camp officials. 
During the course of Farese’s internment in August 1943, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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 Transcript of Deportation Hearing in the case of Biagio Farese, October 22, 1941, Farese’s A-File. 
33
 FBI Report re. Biagio Farese, 1-14-42, Farese’s A-File.   
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 Folder of Biagio Farese, Box 8, PMG Records of Italian Civilian Internees, NARA. 
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determined that “because he [was] being interned as an alien enemy,” he should be deported to 
Canada based on his violation of the Immigration Act of 1924 by remaining in the United States 
for longer than permitted.
37
  This logic was reversed some months later when the Board of 
Immigration Appeals suggested to the Attorney General that if he continued Farese’s internment, 
his deportation would be deferred until the end of the war.
38
 
Through good camp demeanor, favorable performance on work projects off the camps, 
and association with known anti-Fascists in the camps, Farese eventually earned parole in 
August 1944.  At a hearing on Ellis Island before a Special Alien Enemy Hearing Board in the 
summer of 1944, he asserted his disgust with Mussolini and loyalty to the United States which 
made his continued internment not required for the protection of the internal security of this 
country.  His parole was conditioned on close supervision by the Immigration Service and his not 
accepting employment in radio broadcasting.  Farese told his district parole officer that while 
interned he delved into the principles of the Fascist government and came to the realization that 
the progress claimed by Mussolini’s government toward improving Italy was a sham, leading 
him to appreciate democracy and to hope for Italy to have a similar form of government some 
day.  He claimed that his support of Italy had been out of pride for his homeland.  Farese’s only 
complaint was that the terms of his parole kept him from finding employment in his line of work, 
and due to his being interned during the war, he had difficulty convincing people that he was 
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 See A. E. Hanney, Acting Chief, Detention and Deportation Section, Ellis Island, to Mr. Edward J. Ennis, May 25, 
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anti-Fascist.
39
  Farese was finally released from the custody of the Alien Enemy Control Unit in 
November 1945, six months after the end of the war in Europe.
40
 
With internment behind him, Farese’s deportation case was reopened in May 1947 for 
further consideration of his application for discretionary relief based on the economic detriment 
that his deportation would cause his wife, a naturalized citizen, who was in poor health.  As an 
alien in the deportation proceedings, Farese could assert family circumstances as a reason to 
avoid deportation, an opportunity that was not available to him as an enemy alien in the 
internment process.  By this time, Farese and his wife were living in New York City where he 
was employed as a radio script writer and part-time actor on a radio station.  In July 1947, the 
presiding inspector of the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an opinion proposing 
that Farese’s outstanding warrant of deportation be withdrawn and that he be given an 
opportunity to depart voluntarily from the United States on the basis of discretionary relief due to 
his wife’s circumstances.41   Thus, after multiple hearings at which Farese could address the 
allegations against him and through various procedural mechanisms, Farese was able to obtain 
suspension of the deportation order and ultimately relief.  Farese eventually became an American 
citizen in 1951 in Boston, and was residing in New York at the time of his death in 1969.
42
   
While these case studies reveal the process at work, it will also be useful to try and 
outline the attitudes of Justice Department officials and legislators about the process they were 
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creating.  Those attitudes created the policy, although they did so in dialogue with the relevant 
legal precedents regarding constitutional protections for aliens. 
The Long Reach of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 and “Courtesy” Alien Enemy Hearings 
Director Edward Ennis of the Alien Enemy Control Unit established the procedures for 
hearing and reviewing cases of resident Italian aliens who had been arrested.  The hearing board 
in every federal judicial district was to consist of “three citizen civilians at least one of whom 
should be an attorney, appointed by the Attorney General.”43  The hearings were adversarial in 
nature.  A U.S. Attorney was to act as “the administrative officer of the Board [to] present to it 
the facts bearing on the alien enemy’s case,” and representatives of the INS and FBI were to be 
present with the board.
44
  The boards counted university presidents, deans and professors of law 
schools, newspaper publishers, and prominent businessmen among their members.
45
  Hearing 
board members received a token $1.00 a year plus travel expenses.
46
  It was considered an honor 
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for “respected and outstanding men in each federal judicial district” to serve the country in this 
capacity.
47
   
A typical case file assigned to an Assistant U.S. Attorney consisted of a summary report 
on the subject alien from the FBI, the alien’s INS file, and an “Alien Enemy Questionnaire.”48  
Aside from hearing the facts of each case presented by the Assistant U.S. Attorneys, the board 
was authorized to interrogate the alien and to decide whether to recommend internment, parole, 
or release on the basis of affidavits from the alien, witness statements, documents, and 
statements of the INS officer and FBI agent.
49
  The instructions stated that the alien could not 
have attorney representation and was not permitted to object to the hearing or any questions 
asked of the alien or other evidence adduced.
50
  In his memoir, Francis Biddle explained that the 
exclusion of attorneys from the proceedings “greatly expedited action,” and put the hearing on a 
“common-sense basis.”51  The board was to transmit its recommendations to Attorney General 
Biddle who made the final decision on each case.  Its recommendations were to follow general 
guidelines:  internment was for one of “dangerous character”; those “considered not so 
dangerous” were granted parole with or without bond and had to report periodically to a parole 
officer where they lived; and release from government custody was for those “found to be 
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harmless to the public safety.”52  While such nebulous categorizations left much discretion in the 
hands of hearing board members, the standard to be followed by the hearing boards dictated that 
any doubts about an alien’s loyalty were to be resolved in the government’s favor.53  As of May 
1942, the disposition in approximately 42 percent of Italian alien enemy cases was internment.
54
 
The following discussion among Dr. W.G. Everson, the chairman of the Alien Enemy 
Hearing Board in Oregon, and members of the Tolan Committee explains how the alien enemy 
hearing boards were to be conducted in each federal judicial district.  It raises the issue of the 
type of procedure owed an enemy alien and how proceedings would differ from court trials. 
DR. EVERSON.  The responsibility rests with the Attorney General in Washington.  
The various boards conduct the hearings.  The boards consist of three members – 
United States attorney, a representative of the naturalization immigration 
department, and a representative of the F.B.I., the three members, after hearing 
the case, send in through the United States attorney a recommendation to the 
Attorney General in Washington, and he only has the final disposition.
55
 
 
THE CHAIRMAN.  Doctor, is there anything obligatory on the Justice Department 
to turn these cases over to you? 
 
DR. EVERSON.  No. 
 
THE CHAIRMAN.  In other words, can they intern them without coming to you at 
all? 
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DR. EVERSON.  Yes.  The alien is not entitled to hearing; it is not a trial.  It is a 
courtesy that is granted to the enemy alien by the Government.  The Government 
is under no obligation to conduct a hearing in any of these cases. 
 
THE CHAIRMAN
 
.  What you are trying to fix is the loyalty or disloyalty of the 
particular aliens who come before you? 
 
DR. EVERSON
 
.  We are trying to determine their present loyalty to the United 
States, or possible subsequent acts of disloyalty. 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .. .  
 
MR. SPARKMAN.   And these people who are interned so far, are what might be 
classed as dangerous enemy aliens, aren’t they? 
 
 DR. EVERSON
 
.  We feel that they have done things that indicate they are disloyal 
to the United States Government, or, perhaps they have done things that would 
lead us to believe that they would be dangerous if left in their communities.
56
   
 
The Tolan Committee was cognizant that rights under the Constitution endure in 
wartime, stating that “suspension of this writ [of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion] 
does not abrogate the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which provide for due process and equal 
protection of the laws” because “[e]ven aliens are guaranteed certain protection afforded by the 
Constitution.”57  Yet Attorney General Biddle recognized a distinction in the treatment of alien 
enemies, that is, citizens of countries at war with the United States, as opposed to any alien, 
arguing that “[a]ll alien enemies are subject to detention and internment for the duration of the 
war without hearing” since it is “not a matter of right.”  He nonetheless decided that hearings 
were to be provided “in order to permit them to present facts in their behalf.”58  This was 
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consistent with the policy established by the Justice Department and the War Department in 
November 1941 that there be a hearing before internment “under alien enemy proceedings.”59 
Before considering what constituted a fair hearing in the context of alien enemies, a look 
at developments in the law’s treatment of aliens is informative.  Under the plenary power 
doctrine, the federal government had substantive power to exclude and deport aliens, which was 
not subject to judicial review.
60
  However, in cases in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as protecting all 
“persons,” that is, citizens and non-citizens, who were in the territorial United States.61  It 
considered aliens “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases involving 
state action.
62
   
With respect to the procedural rights of aliens, the law made a distinction between 
proceedings for deportation which is not punishment for a crime and criminal proceedings in 
which aliens could benefit from the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.
63
  But in 1903, the Supreme Court questioned the plenary power doctrine in the 
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context of deportation as well, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applied to deportation proceedings to determine an alien’s right to remain in the United States.64  
As legal historian Kunal Parker suggests, with this decision the “Court recognized that over time, 
territorially present immigrants might acquire a stake in American society and slowly become 
insiders themselves.”65  However, as the Department of Labor’s Committee of Administrative 
Procedure reported in 1940, the Supreme Court had not been able to summarize the “elementary 
standards of fairness and reasonableness,” because no specific precedents existed, thereby 
leaving administrative agencies with little guidance on how to conduct hearings.  The Committee 
was also concerned that the Labor Department assumed “that any hearing which may be 
accorded an alien is a privilege and not a right.”66   
Attorney General Biddle made this distinction when calling hearings for enemy aliens a 
“courtesy” rather than a right, but the treatment of enemy aliens has a statutory grounding.  
Biddle’s justification relied upon a different status with respect to the Constitution for aliens of 
enemy countries as opposed to aliens of countries not at war with the United States.   The Alien 
Enemy Act of 1798 allows the government to detain and deport aliens of enemy countries 
without any hearing or lawyers for the suspect.  No individualized finding of culpability, 
dangerousness, or suspicion is required; the government need only prove citizenship of a nation 
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at war with the United States.
67
  Congress has not narrowed the provisions of this Act despite 
earlier Court rulings, including those cited above, that the Constitution affords certain protections 
to persons who are in the United States but are not citizens.
68
   
The first wave of examinations of Italians arrested by alien enemy hearing boards for a 
determination of internment, parole, or release fell short of the minimal expectations of Attorney 
General Biddle.  He did not believe that the hearing boards assisted him in the way that he had 
intended.  On several occasions, Biddle had to ask the hearing boards to provide him with more 
data on which they based their opinions regarding whether or not to intern the alien enemy 
because the reports forwarded to him were too sketchy for him to make a fair assessment of the 
board’s recommendation.  He called for a “sufficiently full summary of the testimony or other 
matters brought out at the hearing . .  . [to] be set forth to permit [him] to make that independent 
judgment on the facts which the regulations require.”69  Deficiencies in the records transmitted to 
him not only jeopardized the fairness of the internment process but slowed down the processing 
of subjects awaiting an order from the Justice Department while in detention facilities. 
A factor contributing to the ad hoc nature of the proceedings was the variance in the 
backgrounds and attitudes of board members.
70
  For instance, in regions of the United States 
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where there were larger populations of Italians and board members lived and worked among 
Italians, they could contextualize information from FBI reports better than board members who 
only encountered Italians in the adversarial setting of the hearings.  This observation helps 
explain how the Alien Enemy Hearing Board in Boston functioned, as shown below.  This is not 
to say, of course, that all boards did not feel the pressures of their important role in helping to 
ensure the security of the nation, which necessarily infused fears into the process of determining 
the loyalties of the aliens before them.   
Another issue in analyzing how hearing boards conducted proceedings is the extent of 
background information provided to them on the Italian American organizations in which 
membership or affiliation often formed the basis of recommendations for internment.  According 
to one historian relying upon an army report, the hearing boards, the army, its intelligence 
division, and the commanding generals of the defense commands did not have sufficient 
information on Italian American organizations until “many months after war started.”71  With 
respect to such organizations, Attorney General Biddle guarded against unfair presumptions 
based on membership alone in instructing that “the activity of the individual rather than the 
nature of the organization” should be scrutinized.  The citizenship and standing in the 
community of witnesses who spoke on behalf of the alien were also to be noted for purposes of 
credibility and the precise nature of their relationship with the alien.
72
  But barring evidence of 
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specific acts of disloyalty or threats to the public’s safety, the board’s determination of loyalty 
through interrogation of the alien enemies was necessarily flawed.   
Erwin Griswold, a professor at Harvard Law School at the time and later the law school’s 
dean, served as chairman of the Alien Enemy Hearing Board for the District of Massachusetts in 
Boston in December 1941.  In numerous cases of Japanese, German, and Italian aliens, Griswold 
expressed his views on whether evidence of the alien’s past activities or contacts were indicative 
of future espionage or subversive activities.  For example, in the case of Albert Matthew Di 
Cillis, a forty-eight year old alien who had lived in the United States for thirty years, and was 
believed to have associated with Fascist sympathizers, Griswold recommended parole as 
opposed to internment because there was no evidence that Di Cillis was or had been “an agent or 
operative of the Italian or any other government” or had frequented the Italian Consulate.73  
Griswold stated that Di Cillis was not unlike other Italians in the United States who not long 
before the outbreak of World War II were “pro-Italy” as opposed to “anti-America.”74  Griswold 
appreciated the difference between having associations with the enemy and active participation 
in initiatives against the United States and took a cautious approach in recommending internment 
only for those enemy aliens who fell in the latter category.  In this manner, he upheld the spirit of 
due process standards in the hearings in which he officiated. 
The matter of Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini, a sixty-four year-old accountant turned Boston 
radio show host and correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Progresso, exemplifies the 
unpredictability of the hearings process.  Griswold’s board carefully weighed evidence, going so 
far as to give Guidi-Buttrini the benefit of the doubt concerning his loyalty to the United States.  
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Their approach ran counter to the standard that the Alien Enemy Control Unit expected of 
deciding doubtful cases in favor of the government, effectively providing Guidi-Buttrini greater 
rights than the law owed him.  At the time of Guidi-Buttrini’s arrest on December 9, 1941, he 
expressed his love for Italy and indicated that he had no intention of becoming an American 
citizen.  The findings of Griswold’s board in Boston after hearings on January 7 and 10, 1942 
were that Guidi-Buttrini had been “an ardent advocate of Fascism” who, as a member of the 
media, posed a threat in “the effect his utterances may have upon his fellow countrymen residing 
here.”  Astonishingly, board members had reservations about internment and recommended 
parole with supervision.  This decision was overruled by Attorney General Biddle who ordered 
internment on February 19, 1942.
75
   
By Guidi-Buttrini’s second hearing on December 14, 1942, which occurred upon motion 
of the board in Boston, additional FBI reports were put into evidence.  In this rare instance where 
the file contains a transcript of the rehearing, we are provided some insight into the standard of 
review applied by this board.  The board felt that reports of Guidi-Buttrini’s efforts at gathering 
Italians in New England to protest the League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy during the 
Ethiopian campaign and his organization of a program to collect gold for the Italian government 
pointed to his leadership in subversive activities, but that favorable witnesses outweighed this 
evidence.  Members were impressed with the stature of the witnesses who spoke to his fine 
character in the community, which included two Massachusetts Superior Court judges and a City 
of Boston official.  One of the judges was Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Felix Forte who 
was “supreme venerable” of the Order of the Sons of Italy, a position that very likely put him in 
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the same social circles as Guidi-Buttrini.
76
  The board viewed Guidi-Buttrini’s speeches in Italian 
over the radio and at public events as indications of pride in his Italian descent and love of his 
homeland, rather than opposition to democracy or ill will toward the U.S. government, supported 
by the fact that two of his sons and both of his sons-in-law served in the U.S. armed forces.  It 
was only out of “abundant caution” that the board recommended parole because it believed that 
“the alien’s absolute release would involve no danger to our war effort.”77  Griswold challenged 
the government on the charge that Guidi-Buttrini received payments from the Italian Consul by 
pointing out that the allegation lacked evidentiary support, particularly since Guidi-Buttrini and 
his daughter had already explained the sums of money deposited in their Boston bank account as 
funds for advertising.
78
   
 Although the political clout of the Massachusetts judges and Boston city official may 
have influenced the Boston hearing board to decide in Guidi-Buttrini’s favor, it did not persuade 
the Office of the Attorney General that he was not dangerous.  In this, as in many internee cases, 
Attorney General Biddle exercised his power to overrule the decision of the local hearing board.  
Despite two findings by the Boston hearing board that Guidi-Buttrini should not be interned, 
Biddle decided that he should remain interned through the duration of the war.  It appears that 
the most damaging allegations against him were that he was involved with Mussolini’s secret 
police force, OVRA (Opera Voluntaria Repressione Anti-Fascista), an allegation first heard 
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before the Dies Committee in the late 1930s, and charges that he was a Fascist propagandist paid 
by the Italian Consul.  Unfavorable reports from Army camp officials and immigration 
inspectors indicating that he subjected other internees to his ardent Fascist views must have also 
convinced the Justice Department that he continued to be a security risk.
79
  In the last two years 
of internment, inquiries by his son who was serving overseas and appeals from his state 
representative and a director from the National Catholic Welfare Conference failed to change 
Guidi-Buttrini’s fate.80  Ultimately, even the support of many prominent politicians did not 
guarantee a favorable outcome for Guidi-Buttrini because the government believed that he was 
in a unique position to persuade other aliens to be pro-Italy and anti-America.  The Alien Enemy 
Control Unit did not believe that it was safe to parole him until May 1945, by which time 
relations between the United States and Italy had changed dramatically.  In addition, the factors 
of his advanced age and his family of loyal citizens convinced them that he no longer presented a 
security risk. 
There were miscommunications between the hearing boards and Attorney Biddle’s office 
with respect to how their duties were to be performed, as verified by Griswold’s correspondence 
with the Alien Enemy Control Unit pertaining to the enemy alien cases in general.  In response to 
complaints directed at the Boston hearing board about the form of the recommendations, namely 
that evidence was not discussed in full, Griswold explained that he and other board members 
understood that the cases were to be heard within ten days, and mistakenly thought that the 
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hearing board in each district made final decisions which were relayed to the Justice Department 
only for a stamp of approval.
81
  
Although the final authority on the outcome of each case rested with the Justice 
Department, the alien enemy hearing boards appeared to have discretion in the form and 
substance of the questions posed to the aliens which meant that the experience of the hearings 
could vary drastically across the federal districts.  A transcript from a hearing before Alien 
Enemy Hearing Board No. 1 for the Southern District of New York, chaired by Edward Corsi, 
who had a long career in the government in the areas of immigration, labor relations, and social 
welfare, indicates that board’s efforts to understand the alien’s views on Italy’s government 
versus that of the United States.   First, it is worth mentioning that Corsi was an Italian 
immigrant who had been naturalized.  It is surprising that the government was unconcerned that 
a naturalized citizen of Italian origin might have sympathized with the persons he was examining 
and jeopardized the fairness of the hearings process.  That fact aside, Corsi’s aim in the hearings 
was sensible.  He stated that the purpose of the hearing was “to determine the measure of [the 
alien’s] views toward America” and one’s “attitude toward our own democratic system in the 
United States and . . . the very important fact that these two systems are at war at this time.”82  
Questions investigated the hearts and minds of the alien by asking what membership in the 
Fascist Party meant to him, his hopes for the future of Italy, and whether he intended to become 
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an American citizen.
83
  This board’s approach of searching the mindset of the alien included 
considering lying to be evidence itself which had a bearing on the alien’s character and the 
ultimate question of how great a danger he was to public safety.
84
 
The Alien Enemy Hearing Board No. 4 in New York City chaired by Nicholas Kelley, a 
former secretary in the U.S. Department of Treasury and a lawyer specializing in arbitration and 
labor law, was primarily interested in political activities and affiliations both in Italy and the 
United States.
85
  This board’s questions also probed the alien’s ties to family members in Italy, 
why they did not come to the United States, and the nature of communications with the alien’s 
homeland.
86
  In some cases, the board asked the alien if he would do anything to harm the United 
States if requested to do so through Italian channels.
87
  Without the benefit of transcripts, 
however, there is no way to surmise how the alien’s answers to specific questions may have 
affected the outcome of the hearing. 
In mid-February 1942, after more than 100 Italians had been interned, the Alien Enemy 
Control Unit addressed this problem through supplemental instructions to the alien enemy 
hearing boards to take a transcript “of all the testimony,” particularly “in doubtful cases.”   It also 
requested that instead of merely summarizing reports, the board “should attempt to transmit its 
impressions on matters arising at the hearing, such as the demeanor of the alien, its judgment on 
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the testimony of the witnesses and specific grounds which form the bases for its 
recommendation.”88  Thus, Edward Ennis emphasized the importance of a record for Attorney 
General Biddle’s proper assessment of cases.  The Justice Department even went so far as to 
remove hearing board members whom it believed did not apply a strict enough standard of 
review to alleviate what it perceived as a problem of lenient decisions.
89
   
By late August 1942, when over 200 Italians had already been interned, the Justice 
Department adopted a policy by which alien enemy hearing boards would rehear cases if 
authorized by the director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit or the U.S. Attorney responsible for 
the alien.  The granting of a new hearing could be based upon several factors.  The first factor 
addressed concerns of abuse or misconduct at the first hearing, namely disallowing witnesses to 
testify.  Other factors to be considered in granting a rehearing were as follows:  giving 
insufficient notice of the hearing; pertinent evidence not produced at the first hearing; lack of 
uniformity in how early cases were conducted as compared to later cases; illness of the alien 
making internment difficult and the danger of parole or release less likely; and age of the alien.  
For those aliens already in internment camps, a rehearing could occur in their absence since the 
procedure was “a matter of grace and not of right.” 90  Undoubtedly the practice of not giving 
some internees the chance to provide personal testimony at their rehearings must have 
contributed to their feelings of injustice. 
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As late as March 1943, the Justice Department reported to all alien enemy hearing boards 
that after a review of 10,000 cases, it determined “that the source of complaint most frequently 
encountered is the fact that alien enemies are not sufficiently informed of the charges against 
them.”  In some cases, this procedural deficiency resulted in internment that could have been 
prevented if the subject understood the circumstances that the board deemed suspicious and had 
an opportunity to refute the allegations.  In response to this problem, Director Ennis notified all 
alien enemy hearing boards that in future hearings “full and detailed disclosure of all charges 
against the alien enemy” were to be made, and if requested by the alien, “an opportunity to rebut 
the charges by direct evidence” was to be afforded.  The board was to withhold the names of 
informants and any other information that might jeopardize the FBI’s investigation, but it 
retained discretion in deciding when to disclose the charges since it might obtain more truthful 
responses if disclosure did not occur until after the alien’s testimony.91   
Beginning in August 1943, pursuant to instructions of Attorney General Biddle, a Special 
Hearing Board, comprised of persons from the pool of approximately 400 members of the alien 
enemy hearing boards across the judicial districts, convened at the internment camps to rehear 
cases of internees when there were a sufficient number of cases at any one camp to warrant the 
time and expense.
92
  At the conclusion of the rehearing, the Special Hearing Board was required 
to submit its report and recommendation with a transcript of the rehearing to Biddle and the U.S. 
Attorney for the district where the case originated.  The original hearing board then had the 
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opportunity to review findings made in the rehearing and consider it along with any new 
evidence before submitting its report to the Attorney General.
93
  Thus the final recommendation 
rested with the original hearing board.  This new protocol would of course delay a final decision.  
When Edward Ennis altered the protocol by advising that orders could be entered based solely on 
the Special Hearing Board’s recommendation because the original hearing boards could offer 
value to the reconsideration of an alien’s status only if they had relevant information concerning 
that alien’s local community, he met with some resistance from hearing board members who 
wanted to retain some control over internees initially before them.
94
  For example, the U.S. 
Attorney in the Southern District of New York pointed out that good conduct at an internment 
camp was not “a sufficient guaranty against a clever alien’s working later to undermine the 
firmness of our people in carrying on the war.” 95  Ultimately, it was left within the discretion of 
the U.S. Attorney whether to consult the original board.
96
   
The case of Angelo Gloria, a radio personality and one of the most vocal Fascists among 
the internees, exemplifies the extended role that an original hearing board could play.  The 
Justice Department paid heed to Edward Corsi’s opinion that Gloria was “just one of those 
fellows who may have done things that might now indicate an attitude of disloyalty to the 
Country but who fundamentally are harmless and innocuous.”97  Gloria was paroled a few days 
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later after almost two years of internment, and died shortly thereafter.
98
  Given Gloria’s 
reputation, his release before the end of the war speaks to the influence that Corsi had.  
Regardless of whether Corsi’s Italian heritage allowed him to better evaluate Gloria’s mindset 
and the likelihood that he would commit sedition or it unfairly influenced the decision about 
Gloria’s internment, the outcome in Gloria’s case is just another example of inconsistencies in 
the internment process. 
The Justice Department’s continual reevaluation of the structure of the hearings and the 
method for reaching decisions shows an effort to create a uniform system of justice for 
evaluating the loyalty of the Italian aliens.  However, the majority of Italian internees who 
underwent initial hearings in the first six months of the United States’ entry into the war were not 
afforded the benefit of the perfected hearing process.  Instead, my study reveals that they were 
forced to await rehearings by special hearing boards that did not occur until after they had spent 
at least a year in internment, and, as the case of Francesco Fragale illustrates below, there was 
the risk that biases of the initial alien enemy hearing board would continue to taint the process.   
The Hearing Boards Provide Rough Justice for Italian Enemy Aliens 
Turning from issues of process, the specific case files of Italians who came before the 
alien enemy hearing boards provide valuable insight into how the boards at both the local district 
level and the special boards in the internment camps reached individual determinations of 
disloyalty and national security risk.  In most cases, as evidenced by the series of remedial 
instructions which the Justice Department sent to the hearing boards, the hearing board’s 
decision-making process was flawed because there was not an opportunity for a full development 
of facts and circumstances surrounding government allegations.  As Pericle Chieri’s case 
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exhibits below, subjects could not rebut charges that were not revealed to them.  Boards relied 
upon FBI reports of anonymous informants who had gathered information about the aliens’ 
affiliations and employment, leading to presumptions about an individual’s connections to 
Mussolini’s government and beliefs in Fascism.  The hearings failed to base decisions upon 
evidence of specific acts of disloyalty, and in some instances did not take into consideration 
letters and affidavits attesting to the internee’s good character and loyalty.  In the cases of aliens 
employed in the media, hearing boards often had the benefit of translations of editorials and 
radio shows that they could scrutinize for pro-Fascist and anti-American rhetoric that might stir 
up the national pride of Italian immigrants and turn them against the United States, but 
information was not necessarily contemporary.  For example, sources from the mid 1930s when 
the United States’ views of Mussolini’s government were favorable might not have presented an 
accurate picture of the alien’s sentiment at the time of his hearing.   
The following case studies also illustrate the extent of influence that appeals of 
politicians, religious leaders, and family and friends had on decisions of hearing boards which 
contributed to discrepancies in the rendering of justice across the districts.  For members of the 
media, such as Guidi-Buttrini, who were under the greatest suspicion, such patronage proved to 
be of minimal help in accelerating an alien’s release date.  Many former Italian newspaper 
editors and radio announcers who were interned or paroled throughout the war were released by 
the Justice Department only after Italy’s position in the war had weakened so much that the 
government believed they no longer had any sway over the sentiment of Italian communities.  
For Italian aliens of less high-profile professions, that is, owners of local businesses such as a 
baker in San Francisco’s North Beach or a butcher in Boston’s North End, the good word of a 
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city official or district attorney about the alien’s membership in the community and commitment 
to his family could go a long way in saving him from internment. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the professions of the Italian internees ran the gamut from 
unskilled laborer to sophisticated and highly successful businessman.  The case of Pericle 
Adriano Carlo Chieri, a thirty-seven year-old mechanical engineering professor who was 
interned for nine months in 1943, shows the sort of employment activity and expertise that could 
bring someone to the attention of federal authorities and draw suspicion from the hearing 
board.
99
  It also provides an example of how the government’s failure to state charges against a 
subject could have prejudiced his case.  Like Farese, Chieri was simultaneously undergoing 
deportation proceedings due to his alien status.  He came to the attention of authorities as a result 
of an arrest upon an immigration warrant.  Chieri’s initial internment hearings occurred in 
December 1942 and January 1943, before the Justice Department’s pronouncement several 
months later that subjects were to be informed of charges against them.  Chieri maintained that 
he was unaware of the grounds for internment, and therefore could not have known what 
information to provide in his defense.
100
  If he had been given this opportunity in the initial alien 
enemy hearing, his internment of approximately nine months might have been avoided. 
A native of China and a citizen of Italy, Chieri was admitted to the United States on July 
20, 1939 as a non-immigrant alien under Sec. 3(1) of the Immigration Act of 1924.  In deciding 
upon his request for a change in his immigration status and his application to be employed, the 
State Department considered him a “dangerous enemy alien.”  The alien enemy hearing board 
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had the following information about his history:  he worked as a technical secretary-clerk at the 
Italian Embassy in Washington D.C. from 1939 to 1941 under the direction of the Italian Air 
Attache, compiling information concerning aviation matters in the United States; he served in the 
Engineer Corps of the Italian Air Force as a lieutenant in 1937 and from 1938 to 1939; and in 
1933, he became a member of the Fascist Party in Italy, and last paid dues to the party in 1938, 
which he explained was a requirement for his job with a shipping company in Italy.  The 
government’s concern appears to have been that Chieri had access to blueprints of air bases in 
the United States and could copy them for the Italian government.
101
 
The Alien Enemy Hearing Board in Detroit decided in early February 1943 that 
internment was in order.  Board members believed that the circumstances of Chieri’s departure 
from the Italian Embassy were not clear, and wondered why he kept a job at the Embassy when 
he claimed he did not want to do anything contrary to the interests of the United States.  In 
particular, it felt that “his experience as an officer of an Italian-Chinese aircraft company makes 
it clear that his professional careers have been in competition with American interests.”  Instead 
of allowing Chieri the opportunity to explain aspects of his employment history that gave board 
members concern, they appeared to rely upon adverse reports of other departments of the 
government, leading it to conclude that he was an agent of a foreign country and “potentially 
dangerous to the security of the United States.”102  Chieri had been under FBI surveillance for 
several years since he was suspected of espionage.
 
  As revealed in later proceedings, Chieri’s 
employment at the Italian Embassy merely required him to translate technical articles into Italian 
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for the press and technical magazines, none of which were of a confidential nature concerning 
national defense, which information he gave to the Air Attache at the Embassy.  He claimed 
never to have obtained information on foreign planes for the Italian government.
103
   
In his request for a rehearing, Chieri expressed his plan to remain in the United States so 
that he could be with his wife, an American citizen, in South Carolina.
 
  Upon rehearing Chieri’s 
case in June 1943, despite favorable testimony from his wife, the Detroit board again 
recommended internment.
104
  It believed that Chieri sought American citizenship only when it 
became evident that it would be to his best advantage after release from service of the Italian 
Embassy.
105
  Chieri was held in detention facilities in Detroit, transferred to Chicago, then Camp 
McCoy in Wisconsin, and ended up in Fort Missoula, Montana where in September 1943 he 
went before a Special Hearing Board.  Chieri testified that his sympathies were with the policies 
of the United States in the months preceding hostilities with Italy, which led the board to 
conclude that he was a man of integrity.  In light of his favorable record from Camp McCoy and 
Fort Missoula, his demeanor, general attitude, and disposition towards the United States, his 
marriage to an American-born citizen, and the responsible character of his sponsors, the board 
recommended his release the following month.
106
  The surrender of Italy on September 8 likely 
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played a role as well in Chieri’s release.  After a long battle, Chieri finally obtained his American 
citizenship in 1952.
107
   
Like Chieri, Aldo Ghirardi, who was taken from his San Francisco home on the day after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been under FBI surveillance which led to his arrest.
108
  Ghirardi’s 
case exemplifies the problem of a hearing board’s reliance upon evidence of Fascist sympathies 
from many years earlier that may not have accurately reflected the alien’s state of mind by the 
time of the hearing.  On February 12, 1942, he was brought before the Alien Enemy Hearing 
Board for the Northern District of San Francisco on charges of dangerousness.  Ghirardi, an 
elevator operator and building manager, was apprehended on the basis of reports from FBI 
informants that he was a member of the Fascist Party and was promoting Fascism through his 
affiliation with the Sons of Italy.  Among evidence of his Fascist views was a letter from the 
Italian Consulate acknowledging his donation of three silver medals for the Ethiopian War, an 
application for a medal from Mussolini for participating in the March on Rome in 1922, and a 
photo of Ghirardi with the Black Shirts on the march.  Despite the passage of time since these 
events, the San Francisco hearing board noted that “[t]he subject appears to be an enthusiastic 
Fascist and speaks of Fascism with pride and loyalty.”  On September 24, 1943, after close to 
two years of internment, a Special Alien Enemy Hearing Board at Fort Missoula recommended 
unconditional release based on reports of favorable behavior and cooperation in the camp as well 
as Ghirardi’s expressed desire to remain in the United States and to become a citizen and serve in 
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the armed forces.  After living in the United States as an alien for over twenty years, Ghirardi 
became an American citizen in 1947.
109
 
In some instances, the alien enemy hearing board did not consider available letters of 
recommendation and affidavits of the alien enemy’s character in the initial hearing.  Like 
numerous other Italian internees, Mario Giovanni Favoino was employed in the media as an 
Italian newspaper and magazine editor, author, and radio commentator.
110
  Apprehended in 
Mount Vernon, New York on December 9, 1941, Favoino was the subject of FBI reports from a 
“highly confidential informant in June 1940” which stated that he “scorned democracy and 
exalted Fascism” as a radio announcer for a New York City station.  As mentioned above, 
transcripts of his radio programs in his file indicate that he “insinuat[ed] that the system of 
government in the United States has broken down, and when a machine has broken down, the 
thing to do is to ‘get a good mechanic’ to repair the damage and operate the machine.”111  Also 
considered suspicious were his memberships in the Squadristi, a Fascist militia in Italy, and in 
the New York branch of the Italian Fascists Abroad in which he served as secretary.  A note in 
Favoino’s case file indicates that the Alien Enemy Hearing Board of the Southern District of 
New York did not make letters of recommendation and affidavits concerning his character part 
of his record when it examined him on January 7, 1942.  After Favoino received an order for 
internment on January 26, 1942, he made the usual circuit of camps, first interned on Ellis Island 
and Camp Upton in New York, then Fort Meade in Maryland, and finally Fort Missoula in 
Montana.  Edward Ennis promised Favoino’s wife that the Review Section of the Alien Enemy 
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Control Unit would examine the additional evidence concerning her husband, but it is unclear 
from the file whether it was actually considered.  On September 14, 1942, the Review Section 
recommended continuing Favoino’s internment, reporting that the hearing board had formed a 
bad opinion of Favoino when he asked for an interpreter since he claimed that he did not speak 
English well.  The Review Section found that Favoino was a “dangerous alien enemy who has 
been actively engaged in the distribution of propaganda unfavorable to the cause of the Allies 
and the prosecution of the present war.”   
The absence of the letters and affidavits, at least in the initial hearing, certainly gave the 
subject and his family the impression that the process was unjust, but there is no telling whether 
they were positive enough to outweigh the damaging information already before the hearing 
board.  Favoino was paroled in November 1943, two months after Italy’s surrender, and was not 
fully released until two years later, on November 15, 1945, after the war had ended.
112
  Favoino 
was never naturalized.  He repatriated to Italy where he died in 1967.
113
 
The case of Francesco (Frank) Larencesco Fragale illustrates how a poor first impression 
on the hearing board could follow an internee through the duration of the war despite favorable 
affidavits from military officers and personal friends arguing for a change of heart and patriotism 
toward America.  A twenty year-old waiter when he was apprehended by FBI agents in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin on December 9, 1941, Fragale became one of the youngest Italian 
civilian internees.
114
  The hearing board that examined Fragale on January 13, 1942 had an FBI 
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report indicating that he was a member of the Fascist Youth Movement in Italy, worked for his 
uncle who was the former Italian Consul in Milwaukee upon his arrival in the United States, and 
corresponded with the Fascist government in Rome concerning his organization of Fascists in 
Milwaukee.  In his “enemy alien questionnaire,” he claimed to have owned and operated an 
Italian newspaper, Il Corriere Italiano.  When FBI agents had questioned him about the articles’ 
extreme Fascist views, he claimed that they were copied from other sources.  Despite a reference 
from his manager at the Hotel Astor in Milwaukee that he never showed pro-Axis tendencies nor 
spoke against the United States, Fragale gave the hearing board the impression that he was the 
“‘cocky’ type,” and “a witness of shiftiness and evasiveness.”115  The board reached a unanimous 
decision:  Fragale “was an opportunist who was willing at one time to follow the ‘party line’ and 
try to keep the Italians of Milwaukee lined up with the fatherland.  He seems a willing tool, and 
potentially dangerous.”  The first report of his conduct at McAlester Internment Camp confirmed 
board’s impression as military officers gave him “unfavorable” ratings in the following 
categories:  “Character of associates or groups of associates among internees”; “Expressed views 
with respect to the position of the United States in the present war”; “Reaction to war news 
favorable to the United States.”116  Such reports indicate that camp officials observed internees 
carefully for any signs of disloyalty or behavior unbefitting of a potential American citizen. 
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At the time that the alien enemy hearing board considered his request for a rehearing in 
September 1943, apparently the only document before it was a report of camp conduct with a 
notation about an army report stating that he was a “good worker,” but “liable to passing 
information he obtains to other internees.”117 The board unanimously denied Fragale’s request 
for a rehearing because his anti-American statements and association with an extreme Fascist 
group in camp were consistent with activities that warranted his internment in the first place.
118
  
Fragale pursued the matter with the Department of Justice.  He wrote that he hoped to obtain 
parole and to go live with a relative, claiming that he had done nothing “that may have been 
considered harmful to the safety of this Nation” nor made statements that could be considered 
“against the principle and the Constitution” of the U.S. government.  He had in fact received his 
first citizenship papers in January 1943 while interned.
119
  He had also produced numerous 
affidavits from military officers from the camps where he was interned attesting to his 
trustworthy and cooperative character as well as confirmations of his loyalty to the United States 
from school administrators and relatives, but they did not effectuate parole.
120
  Despite a Fort 
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Missoula parole officer’s recommendation in May 1944 that Fragale be paroled because he was 
an honest and dependable worker off station and that he expressed loyalty to the United States 
and a willingness to fight in the armed forces, he did not receive a parole order until November 
30, 1944.  Given Fragale’s former Fascist activities, he was paroled under the strictest 
supervision on the condition that he agree not to work for a newspaper or radio station.
121
  Once 
paroled, Fragale showed himself to be true to his expressed intentions by joining the U.S. armed 
services.  He finally received his release order on July 3, 1945.
122
  He served in the Army from 
1945 to 1947, receiving his American citizenship in Seoul, Korea in 1946.  He died in 
Milwaukee in 1988.
123
 
 What is remarkable about Fragale’s case is the delay in his parole, despite overwhelming 
testimony from military officers and members of the community that he held allegiance to the 
United States.  He could not overcome the impression that he left on the initial hearing board that 
he was of the “‘cocky’ type” and that he espoused Fascism when the United States was on the 
brink of entering war against the Axis powers.  His close associations with Mussolini’s 
government are likely what kept him interned for so long, as he was one of a few internees who 
received two successive internment orders.  Successive hearing boards seemed to view his case 
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through the lens of the initial board, specifically that there was a sizeable Italian population in 
Milwaukee at the time, approximately 25,000, whom Fragale could potentially influence.  They 
continued to believe that Fragale was in a strategic position, as a writer and as the nephew to the 
former Italian Consul, to turn many Italian immigrants away from the American cause, despite 
evidence that his views had changed.
124
  
Pauline Tedesco was one of a couple of women interned on her own account, that is, she 
did not volunteer to be with a male family member.  A middle-aged Italian alien from Scranton, 
Pennsylvania who identified herself as a housekeeper separated from her husband, Tedesco was 
ordered interned in March 1942.
 125
  Her case is not only interesting for the fact of her being a 
woman interned for over a year, but for the insight that it provides into the government’s 
perception of proper female roles and the connections that officials made between morally 
objectionable behavior and the likelihood for committing sedition against the United States.   
Tedesco, who went by numerous aliases, came to the attention of the government for 
several reasons, the most important of which was her practice of prostitution and operation of 
houses of prostitution in at least six locations in the late 1930s, for which she paid fines and 
served short-term jail sentences.  Her business reportedly made her a wealthy woman, but she 
admitted to never paying income taxes.  She also admitted to violating the 1940 Alien 
Registration Act by failing to register as an alien and travelling without a permit, and to 
possessing a short-wave radio in violation of wartime restrictions on Italian aliens.  In addition to 
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citing all of these legal violations and FBI reports of her alleged un-American statements and 
pro-Italian sympathies as grounds for Tedesco’s internment, the Alien Enemy Hearing Board in 
Nanticoke, Pennsylvania found her undocumented marriage to a man from whom she had been 
estranged for over twenty years and more recent cohabitation with a man as factors contributing 
to their opinion that her “underworld associations” made her “potentially dangerous.”126 
Tedesco was detained at the Gloucester City Detention Center in New Jersey until 
September 1942 when her threat to commit suicide unless she was released caused the INS 
Border Patrol to transfer her to the internment camp at Seagoville, Texas.  She remained there in 
better facilities until her parole in May 1943.
127
  Despite favorable testimony from neighbors that 
Tedesco appeared to be loyal to the United States and did not associate with any subversive 
organizations, at the rehearing of her case in October 1943 the Alien Enemy Hearing Board in 
Scranton determined on the basis of her past criminal record that she should not be 
unconditionally released.
128
  She continued to be paroled.  When interviewed by an INS 
inspector almost a year later, Tedesco, who had obtained a job at a carpet company as a parolee 
in an attempt to rehabilitate her former reputation, believed that the U.S. government “unjustly 
persecuted” her because of her past reputation which she felt “in no way reflect[ed] against her 
loyalty to this country.”129  Ultimately, in December 1944, Tedesco was released from alien 
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enemy parole but subject to regulations of the immigration authorities as a deportable alien.
130
  
She did eventually obtain her American citizenship in 1962 in Brooklyn, and was living in 
Manhattan at the time of her death in 1990.
131
 
In evaluating her case, it appears that the facts that her siblings had obtained their U.S. 
citizenship and that she had family members serving in the war did not convince the Justice 
Department that she too could be a loyal American citizen.  Despite her efforts at rehabilitation, 
Tedesco could not erase the immoral nature of her prior crimes.  In addition, the hearing board 
placed undue significance upon her marital status and liaison with another man, betraying an 
assumption that a woman who was not lawfully married to a man was suspect.
132
   In order to test 
this theory, as well as the possibility that the government underestimated women’s agency in the 
national security state, it would be necessary to view the files of other women whom the 
government detained for questioning to compare their backgrounds as well as to analyze the 
examiners’ perception of their potential for danger.133 
In cases of individuals who did not have a prior criminal history, the involvement of an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney or Assistant District Attorney in submitting affidavits attesting to their 
good character may have accelerated their parole or release.  Calogero Carolo, a fruit peddler in 
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New York City for close to twenty years who had intentions of returning to Sicily, was 
apprehended on a presidential warrant on June 19, 1942.
134
  His file with the Justice Department 
indicates that he was affiliated with the Lictor, a member and vice president of Circulo 
Francesco Crispi, a branch of the Italian Blackshirts, and that he had no strong bonds to the 
United States.  He had a small farm in Sicily where his family lived and made two trips back and 
forth to Italy even though he had permanent residence status in the United States.  In the 
Summary and Recommendation issued by the alien enemy hearing board in New York, a “salient 
fact” in their evaulation was that Carolo’s sole purpose in the United States was making money 
to send back to Italy and eventually returning.
135
  Thus, Carolo’s lack of interest in obtaining 
American citizenship made an unfavorable impression on the board.  FBI agents thought it was 
significant to a determination of his loyalty to America that he had a copy of the Italian 
newspaper, Il Grido della Stirpe (The Cry of the Ancestry), as well as the sheet music of a 
Fascist hymn.  After being interned for over a year, he had a rehearing at Fort Missoula on 
September 25, 1943 at which time the board considered affidavits that had been sent to the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Office regarding Carolo’s honorable character and hard-working attitude.  The 
favorable reports appear to have sped up his parole order, issued on November 4, 1943, but he 
was not ordered released by Attorney General Biddle until June 28, 1945.  Carolo never became 
an American citizen.  He repatriated to Italy where he died in 1978.
136
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The oral histories of two government attorneys in San Francisco confirm the extent of 
influence that persons with political clout had on the fate of the internees.  Those interviewed by 
Stephen Fox were of Italian descent and were able to convince the boards that certain Italian 
aliens with whom they were familiar were upstanding citizens who retained no allegiance to 
Italy, thereby saving them from internment.  In recalling his involvement in these proceedings, 
Alfonso Zirpoli, who had been an Assistant U.S. Attorney during World War II, said that he 
presented the cases of aliens detained at Sharp Park, an INS facility.  “Some of those who 
testified would say, ‘I’m a good friend of Assistant U.S. Attorney Zirpoli.  We’re members of the 
same club – Il Cenacolo.’”137   
As noted above with respect to Edward Corsi, the familiarity that government employees 
of Italian heritage had with the Italian community may have helped educate boards about the 
particular mindset of the Italian immigrant or inform them on matters such as the mission of 
Italian American organizations or the extent of influence that the Italian media had.  But just as 
likely as these positive aspects of their participation in the process is the possibility that subjects 
assigned to an Italian American board member or government attorney received an unfair 
advantage in the internment process. 
John Molinari, who was an Assistant District Attorney during World War II, presents still 
another example of this potential bias in the hearings process.  Molinari recalled receiving phone 
calls from mothers and wives whose husbands and sons had been taken into custody and then 
going to the Salvation Home in San Francisco to see if he could vouch for people he knew.  He 
described the hearings to examine them as follows:  “They had military tribunals to screen them.  
It was sort of an informal hearing.  Some of the hearing officers were reserve lawyers that I 
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knew, who were reserves in the judge advocate department of the military.”138  If Molinari was 
able to describe the individual being examined as “loyal” or “not a problem,” he was released 
within a few days.
139
  In comparing modern litigious society to the 1940s, he said:  “Nobody ever 
attacked Hoover on whether the FBI had probable cause [to arrest these people] or not. . . . In 
those days, you were a little hesitant about taking on the government in wartime.  You might be 
accused of being disloyal if you took the cudgels from one of these persons.”140  Molinari’s 
references to military tribunals and probable cause most likely describe exclusion hearings which 
were conducted by a board of three military officers for naturalized citizens under suspicion or 
those who lived in a military zone.
141
  Unlike alien enemy hearings, the military board generally 
informed individuals of the evidence against them, without disclosure of confidential sources.  
Suspects were allowed legal counsel to serve solely as a personal advisor, not to examine 
witnesses.
142
  Regardless of the type of hearing, however, Molinari confirms the power of having 
a respected government official vouch for a suspect’s loyalty and good character, and attests to 
the inconsistencies in the process. 
There could be a lot of variety in the nature of the hearing across the districts, and over 
time, and indeed, some internees reported having no hearings at all.  In his oral history, Alfredo 
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Cipolato recalled detainment at Ellis Island before taking the train to Fort Missoula:  “There 
were never any hearings, either in New York, Ellis Island, or later at Fort Missoula, and we were 
never interrogated.”143  Since Cipolato was arrested in July 1941, before the United States 
declared war on Italy, he could not have gone before an alien enemy hearing board since they 
were formed later.  For some persons afforded hearings, the board was not sensitive to their poor 
command of the English language which necessitated at least a translator, if not representation 
by an attorney to inquire into exact charges and communicate a defense.
144
  There were 
complaints from members of the alien enemy hearing boards as well who were concerned with 
the overwhelming numbers of cases that they were expected to hear.  They called for as many as 
500 boards (as opposed to the approximately 100 boards that existed) nationwide and suggested 
that the boards would not have to include lawyers or specialists.
145
  A proposal for the 
decentralization of the system would have charged district attorneys with reviewing cases, 
instead of the Attorney General’s Office, or in the alternative, an appeals board in each district 
could have been set up.
146
  While such changes in the system might have achieved a more 
expedient resolution for each enemy alien, there would have been even less uniformity in the 
process across the districts without the input of the Attorney General.  
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In its annual report for the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1943, the Attorney General’s 
Office reported that of a total of 599,111 Italian aliens, excluding seamen, 653 had undergone a 
hearing before alien enemy hearing boards, of which 232 had received internment orders, and 
265 were placed on parole.
147
  Italy surrendered on September 8, 1943 and, most of the Italian 
internees were released by the end of 1943.
148
  Data from my study shows that the exception was 
the group of Italians identified as the most ardent Fascists and perceived as influential leaders in 
their community, particularly those in the media, who were also among the first to be 
apprehended.  By March 1944, Director Ennis wrote to the Attorney General, recommending the 
parole of Italian seamen and civilian internees.  With respect to civilian internees, his 
justification was that “[e]ven the few internees who are not politically demoralized by Italy’s fall 
know that their Fascist views are completely discredited in their communities and they would not 
be a danger to their community if returned on parole.”149  In the subject group, 64 Italian 
internees were not released until 1945.  Given that most of the members of the subject group 
were apprehended in the first six months of the war, those remaining had spent at least three 
years in internment camps.  There were only a handful of men who remained in INS custody by 
the fall of 1945, such as Frank Membrini who had been denaturalized prior to internment and 
Biagio Farese who was simultaneously undergoing deportation proceedings. 
The following chapter explores what life was like on a day-to-day basis for internees in 
the camps.  Many hoped that a rehearing at the camps would once and for all clear their names 
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and restore their normal lives.  While some sought to prove their loyal and obedient character 
through cooperation in camp duties or in work projects off site, others composed letters to Justice 
Department officials explaining what they believed could have been mistakenly construed by the 
government as suspicious aspects of their prior lives.  Above all, they sought to prove that they 
were in fact loyal to the United States and would be upstanding citizens if released.
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CHAPTER 5:  BOCCE BEHIND BARBED WIRE:  CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 
POWER IN THE CAMPS 
 
All accounts of life in the internment camps, whether in INS reports, memoranda of camp 
officers, or in the letters of internees, paint a picture of the resiliency of Italian aliens during their 
course of internment in bleak surroundings.  The sense of normalcy that the internees created 
through volunteering for work projects, participating in musical and sports activities, celebrating 
their cultural heritage in meals and in holiday traditions, and in forging friendships with fellow 
internees allowed them to regain their dignity and gave them a sense of agency while confined.   
Although their agency was limited by the strictures of the camp environment, that 
environment was itself ameliorated by U.S. commitments to international law.  As explained in 
Chapter 2, although member states to the 1929 Geneva Convention were not obligated to extend 
prisoner of war protections in the treaty to civilian internees, the United States followed this 
proposal of the International Committee for the Red Cross, thereby affording the internees the 
greatest check on government power in the camps.  The 1929 Convention guaranteed safe and 
humane treatment, a good standard of living, and a means of redressing complaints about their 
conditions.
1
  Beyond the treaty, however, the Italians took initiatives to influence their fate so 
that they might gain freedom.  In the face of the government’s preponderance of power -- 
internment without notice of charges, frequent movement from camp to camp, interference in 
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their relationships with their families through censorship of mail and monitoring of visits -- the 
Italian aliens individually sought to prove that they could be loyal American citizens through 
their work ethic, their cooperative demeanor, and by expressing their patriotism in camp and in 
letters to the Justice Department.  In some cases, such efforts may have secured an earlier parole 
or release, while in other cases, the government’s adherence to damaging FBI reports prevented 
an alien’s explanations for suspicious information about his past from having any positive effect 
on his fate.  Thus, while the Italian aliens frequently challenged the power asserted by Justice 
Department officials and military personnel, the government ultimately had the upper hand.  This 
chapter tells those stories, and by doing so, narrates the personal consequences of the legal and 
political manipulations described in the preceding chapters. 
This account of camp life draws upon various sources of sometimes dubious reliability.  
While INS reports provided information on the structure of camp life as well as the 
administrative history of operational decisions, they better reflect the aspirations and goals of the 
system than the actual experiences of the internees.  The accounts of Jerre Mangione, director of 
the public relations program for the INS, may be an exception, however, because he had the 
advantage of visiting every INS camp and speaking with and observing camp officials and 
internees, and wrote about camp conditions when he was no longer employed by the INS.  The 
letters between internees and their loved ones do a much better job of giving us a picture of how 
the internees felt and how they spent their time, however the system of censorship and the 
internees’ desire to paint a rosier picture of camp life to save their wives from worry were both 
factors that compromised the truth of what they wrote.  In contrast, government officials did not 
censor internees’ appeals to the Justice Department, the State Department, or to the Swiss 
Legation as the Protecting Power, lending more veracity to their statements about confinement.  
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Finally, accounts provided in interviews of former internees and their family members many 
years after internment may be truthful because there was no risk of reprisals for criticizing the 
government, but the passage of time undoubtedly altered their memory of events. 
*************************************  
The INS, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice, had detention facilities in 
almost every large port in the United States and converted space in county jails and other 
publicly owned buildings for the purpose of holding enemy aliens.  It had custody of all enemy 
aliens until the Alien Enemy Control Unit reached a decision to intern, parole, or release each 
individual.  Those sentenced to internment were turned over to the U.S. Army for detention at 
their camps, with the exception of women internees who remained in INS custody.
2
  For 
example, Pauline Tedesco, profiled in the previous chapter, was first detained at the INS 
detention center at Gloucester City in New Jersey before being transferred to Seagoville, Texas, 
another INS facility.  Unlike the other internees, she did not make the circuit of Army camps.  As 
explained below, the Latin American internees also remained at INS facilities. 
At the outbreak of the war, the INS was already operating internment camps at Fort 
Stanton in New Mexico, Fort Missoula in Montana, and Fort Lincoln in Bismarck, North Dakota, 
all of which had been established to detain Italian and German seamen taken from vessels in 
American ports and the Panama Canal in 1939 and 1941 and prevent sabotage.
3
  Just after the 
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United States entered World War II in December 1941, Italians and Japanese from the West 
Coast were sent to Fort Missoula, formerly an Army post.
4
  INS reports indicate that Fort 
Missoula housed 1,317 Italian seamen in all.
5
     
The other permanent INS internment camps or facilities considered suitable for long-term 
detention were as follows:  Santa Fe in New Mexico; Kenedy, Seagoville, and Crystal City in 
Texas (established for family groups such as those from Latin America pursuant to the State 
Department’s agreement); Sharp Park outside San Francisco; Kooskia in Idaho; Algiers in 
Louisiana; Gloucester City in New Jersey; and Ellis Island in New York.  In the latter part of 
1942, the State Department and the Provost Marshal General requested the INS assume custody 
of civilian internees being held in Army camps since the Army was preparing to house hundreds 
of prisoners of war.  On February 27, 1943, the Attorney General and Secretary of War agreed to 
return the civilian internees, numbering approximately 4,200, to INS custody.
6
  By June 1943, a 
total of 4,029 had been transferred back to the INS.
7
  In March 1944, the remaining Italian 
civilian internees were moved to Ellis Island, and the Army regained custody of the camp at Fort 
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Missoula on July 1, 1944.
8
  As late as May 31, 1945, there were twelve persons of Italian 
nationality held in Crystal City.
9
 
The Provost Marshal General files for Italian civilian internees indicate that they were 
held at the following Army camps:  Fort George Meade, Maryland; Fort McAlester, Oklahoma; 
Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Camp Forrest, Tennessee; Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; and Fort 
McDowell on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay.  In most instances an internee stayed at 
multiple army camps over the course of his internment, being forced to move every few months.  
This appears to be the result of bureaucracy and logistics.  As explained above, custody of the 
enemy aliens was initially split between the INS and the Army, but the Army’s need for space 
for prisoners of war required the shift in custody back to the INS.  The shuffling of internees also 
occurred as a result of reuniting families from Latin America at the INS camps designed for 
family units as well as the staggered parole dates for internees which freed up housing at various 
times.
10
  As a general rule, the U.S. government disapproved of American wives joining their 
alien husbands in internment camps.
11
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The treatment of internees at INS camps differed from that at Army camps.  Any 
differences in protocol may be attributed to the fact that the Army camps functioned under 
military regulations, while the U.S. Border Patrol operated the INS camps under less stringent 
standards.  However, in his letter to the editor of the Honolulu Star Bulletin detailing the 
experience of Italians and Japanese taken from Hawaii, Mario Valdastri recognized “the 
considerate attitude and human understanding of the officers” at the Army camp at Fort McCoy, 
which undoubtedly influenced the mutual respect that internees showed one another.
12
  
Valdastri’s entire letter expresses positive sentiment about his camp experience but its reliability 
is compromised by the filter of censoring that he knew his letter would have to pass.  In this 
respect, the policies for censorship of correspondence entering and leaving the INS and Army 
camps resembled each other.
13
      
The United States abided by the terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention with respect to the 
set-up and organization of internment camps, and to all aspects of the day-to-day existence of the 
internees such as the provision of food, canteens, recreation, and education.  The permanent 
internment camps followed a fairly standard pattern of organization:  Headquarters, Internal 
Security, Surveillance, Services and Supplies, Maintenance, and Medical.
14
  Crystal City, known 
as the family camp, did not fit this organizational structure because families required additional 
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services such as a maternity ward, adequate schools for children, a more complex system of 
issuing clothing, and more diversified production projects.
15
   
On his tour of internment camps, Jerre Mangione visited Seagoville Internment Camp, 
formerly a federal minimum-security reformatory on the outskirts of Dallas, and reported that the 
$1.8 million facility on an 830-acre tract resembled a “prosperous college campus.”16  The one- 
and two-story red brick buildings with cream-colored limestone trim were in the architectural 
style of contemporary Southern Colonial and faced on two quadrangles.
17
  Intended as the 
internment camp for aliens who would be repatriated at the end of the war, it first housed 
families from Latin America, then predominantly single women who lived in comfortable 
dormitories and couples who lived in eighteen-foot-square “Victory Huts.”  Seagoville had an 
auditorium where women performed ballet and theater, a library with an extensive collection of 
foreign language books, a weaving room, and a garment factory.  Letters screened by staff 
censors revealed that internees at least claimed to be pleased with the food and housing at 
Seagoville, especially those Latin Americans who had been living in poverty in their native 
countries, and many found the American staff “‘considerate’” and “‘gentle.’”18 
In sharp contrast to the attractive setting of Seagoville stood Kenedy Internment Camp in 
south Texas, which housed mostly Japanese and Germans as well as a diverse group of Latin 
Americans, including those Italians, interned in the United States pursuant to a State Department 
agreement, as discussed in chapter 2.  The first group of internees that arrived in April 1942 had 
                                                          
15
 See General Research Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Administrative History, 326. 
16
 Mangione, “Concentration Camps—American Style,” 121-23.   
17
 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 36. 
18
 Mangione, “Concentration Camps—American Style,” 121-23.  Mangione said that Seagoville, unlike the other 
internment camps, had a trained dietician on staff who planned healthy meals that conformed to each ethnic group’s 
tastes; see also General Research Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Administrative History, 301-02. 
181 
 
456 Germans, 156 Japanese, and 14 Italians.
19
  Kenedy was an abandoned federal facility built 
by and for the Civilian Conservation Corps which had nine barracks measuring twenty by 120 
feet and some smaller structures on twenty-two acres.  Remodeling involved the construction of 
more than two hundred prefabricated huts to house five or six persons, and the building of a 
dining hall, kitchen, hospital, headquarters, accommodation for officers and nurses, warehouses, 
and latrines.
20
  Mangione, writing after the war, described how the “tall barbed-wire chain fence 
and guard towers surrounding [the camp] dominated the desolate landscape like a harbinger of 
doom.”21  As at the other INS camps, clothes, shoes, and linens as well as toiletries and smoking 
tobacco were issued to internees pursuant to the terms of the Geneva Convention.
22
  Internees 
could purchase food products and other items at the camp canteen at local market price.
23
  The 
whereabouts of internees at Kenedy were monitored day and night.  Elected captains assisted 
internees in lining up at 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. for head counts when the sirens sounded, and 
the staff conducted three or four bed checks nightly.
24
  Of all the attempts at escape in the history 
of the INS internment program, none of which were successful, three occurred at Kenedy.
25
  
Interestingly, there were no Italian or Japanese enemy aliens who attempted to escape; all twenty 
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attempts were made by German nationals.
26
  Despite its bleakness, the camp’s improvised 
wooden chapel contained a vivid mural depicting the life of Christ and His resurrection, which 
Mangione found to be “the only visual symbol of hope” in all the camps.27   
The third internment camp in Texas, Crystal City, was the largest INS detention facility, 
housing the families with children from Latin America, including a few Italian families.  Wives 
of interned husbands volunteered for internment here with their children to keep their families 
intact.  Located on a former migrant farm labor camp consisting of 41 small three-room cottages, 
118 one-room structures, and service buildings, Crystal City grew with the construction of 219 
temporary duplex, triplex, and quadruplex housing units, 15 additional three-room cottages, and 
103 plywood huts.  The total capacity of the camp was 962 families, most of whom were 
Japanese.  Each housing unit was equipped for cooking, and materials were supplied to the 
internees to construct furniture and furnishings.  Communities were established based on 
nationality and race.
28
  Mangione described Crystal City’s atmosphere as “almost cheerful” in its 
resemblance to a bustling southwestern town with a school, hospital, community center, bakery, 
and stores.  Since it contained a polyglot population both in terms of ages and ethnic diversity, it 
presented challenges in medical services and dietary offerings.  Families were provided a weekly 
allowance to buy their own food.
29
  Mangione was impressed with the community’s self-
governance through democratic procedures whereby each language group in the camp elected its 
own council with a spokesman who served as an intermediary between the internees and the 
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administration, and as a liaison to designated foreign emissaries for issues that infringed on 
internee rights under the Geneva Convention.
30
 
Set in the picturesque mountains of Montana, Fort Missoula had the largest population of 
Italians among the internment camps.  Ironically known as Camp Bella Vista by the Italians, Fort 
Missoula was barricaded by 2400 feet of chain-link fence topped by barbed wire, and had 60-
foot guard towers at the north and south gates manned all day and night.  A 50-foot iron 
searchlight tower overlooked the barracks which consisted of housing units, each 
accommodating fifty men in double bunks, a hospital, a school, a library, a theater, a mess hall, 
and a recreation hall.
31
  The men woke up at 6:00 a.m., ate breakfast in shifts, and answered roll 
call at 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.  They were expected to participate in jobs necessary for the 
operation of the camp, such as serving food, on a rotating basis.  Internees could earn eighty 
cents a day for specialized work such as carpentry, mattress making, sewing, furniture making, 
and construction work.
32
  The Italian internees had a general council, a governing board of 
twenty-eight members elected by the men themselves which included a mayor, police chief, 
parks commissioner, and sanitation commissioner.
33
 
Early reports on Fort Missoula in 1941 when it housed seamen and the foreign employees 
of the 1939-1940 World’s Fair were positive, conveying the picture of a camp that allowed the 
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internees much autonomy and time for leisure.
34
  Alfredo Cipolato, one of the men who worked 
at the World’s Fair and one of the first to be interned at Fort Missoula, described life as calm 
with few disruptions among beautiful facilities such as the library and tennis courts.
35
  After 
Pearl Harbor, however, when Japanese, Germans, and Italians were interned together at Fort 
Missoula, conditions seemed to change.  Mangione had an opportunity to observe the “lack of 
love” among these groups of men.  While the Japanese ignored the Germans and Italians, the 
latter two groups showed contempt for the Japanese and dislike for each other, sometimes 
descending into fist fights.
36
  Another contemporary report of conditions at Fort Missoula 
confirms Mangione’s impression of animosity among the national groups.  A Wide World news 
reporter who visited the camp revealed that the Italians and Japanese shared no camaraderie as 
fellow members of Axis powers; instead they were known to “glower at each other.”  Camp 
guards observed that the Italians never said so much as “‘good morning’” to the Japanese.37  
While the Japanese had their own mess hall where the staples were rice, soybeans, and fish, the 
Germans and Italians shared a mess hall but also maintained separate menus.  The Italians turned 
up their noses at sauerkraut, while the Germans showed their distaste for spaghetti.
38
   
The Italians at Fort Missoula found ways to assert their cultural traditions.  In the face of 
a ban on alcohol, they made their own wine with dried raisins, prunes, apricots, and figs that they 
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saved from desserts after meals.
39
  As a show of national pride, portraits of Benito Mussolini and 
King Victor Emmanuel III lined one wall of the mess hall.
40
  But even within the Italian 
population of internees at Fort Missoula, there was friction between Fascists and anti-Fascists 
that erupted into a riot at the camp in September 1942.  Guards had to use tear gas and the threat 
of submachine guns in order to contain it.
41
    
The impressions that each ethnic group made on camp officials, specifically how 
“Americanized” they appeared in terms of their work ethic, undoubtedly found their way into 
reports on each internee for use by hearing boards reconsidering each internee’s status.  Upon 
interviewing the camp commander at Fort Missoula, Mangione learned that Italian internees fit 
the stereotype of their ethnic group as temperamental but also “‘the most human,’” in the words 
of the commander, while the Japanese proved to be the most cooperative in participating in 
menial chores like scrubbing toilets, regardless of social rank.
42
   The fact that the first item on 
the Alien Enemy Control Unit’s form report for internee behavior at the camp was “General 
attitude and cooperativeness with Camp authorities” proves the importance of a cooperative 
attitude in evaluating whether an internee presented a security risk.  Camp officials also typically 
commented on with whom the internee associated and whether the internee was a good influence 
on other internees.
43
  For example, in a report on Francesco Fragale, the young, brash internee 
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profiled in the previous chapter, camp officials noted that he “associates with the extreme Fascist 
group” and named the individuals of that group.44  Army reports on the behavior of Ubaldo 
Guidi-Buttrini, the Boston radio commentator also profiled earlier, indicated that he was a bad 
influence on other internees with his Fascist speeches and could be blamed for the Army’s 
failure to enlist the seamen with whom he was interned at Fort Missoula to man Allied merchant 
vessels or Italian ships bound for Italy.
45
 
From the reports of internees who spent time at numerous Army camps which were 
operated by the Provost Marshal General’s Office and the War Department and from accounts of 
family members who visited them, we learn that security was comparable to that at the INS 
camps.  The daughter of a former internee recalled Fort Sam Houston’s intimidating aura upon 
visiting her father; the camp was surrounded by “a double-fenced enclosure made of heavy 
cyclone fencing with barbed wire across the top,” and under the gaze of two armed guards in 
towers at each corner of the camp.
46
  However, the accommodations at the Army camps were 
generally more primitive than those at the INS camps.  Living quarters at Fort Meade and Fort 
Houston consisted of tents instead of housing structures.
47
  In Carmelo Ilacqua’s letters home, he 
wrote positively of the tent he shared with three other Italians at Fort Houston and commented 
that he was treated better there than at Fort Missoula “where authorities attitude was as though 
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we had broken laws.”48  Thus the type of treatment internees received most likely colored their 
feelings about their physical surroundings.  Likewise, Valdastri was pleased with the barracks at 
Fort McCoy.  He described how quarters housed forty men each, equipped with beds and linens, 
cannon heaters, and writing tables, and were kept “immaculately clean” by room service on a 
rotating schedule.
49
   
There appear to have been more restrictions on internees’ movement at the Army camps 
as opposed to the INS camps where internees wore civilian clothes and could work outside the 
camps for pay.   For example, internees at Fort Meade reportedly had to wear shirts with “POW” 
printed on the back.
50
  At Fort McCoy, internees had to answer to frequent roll calls, as opposed 
to just morning and evening.  But the daily routines and organizational structure at the two types 
of camps resembled one another.  Just as the INS established rules for the daily work routine of 
the internees, there were work rosters at the Army camps.  At Fort McCoy, rosters assigned 
internees shifts to work in the mess hall or to clean up the camp grounds.  Similar to the system 
of self-governance observed at Fort Missoula and Crystal City, nationality groups at Fort McCoy 
had elected leaders to represent their respective interests.
51
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Reports of the extent of care for the physical and mental wellbeing of internees varied 
among the camps.  While some camps had medical specialists on hand, others did not.  Certain 
types of illnesses, namely mental insanity, cancer, and tuberculosis, required the removal of 
afflicted internees to proper medical facilities, often Public Health Service Hospitals.
52
  Valdastri 
described a regimen of frequent physical exams by a staff of three Japanese doctors who 
prescribed a healthy diet and exercise routine for the men at Fort McCoy, as well as dental 
examinations.
53
  However, at Fort Missoula, getting competent medical care proved to be a 
continuous problem.  After an unsuccessful stint by an Italian doctor from one of the ships, a 
professionally incompetent and temperamentally unsuitable doctor named Orvall Smiley was 
assigned to the camp in late 1941.  He reportedly conducted “bestial prostate exams” and used 
medication obsolete for almost forty years.
54
  Smiley had contempt for the Italian internees, 
referring to them as “neurotic, paranoid” and “hypochondriacs.”55   In addition to problems with 
Dr. Smiley, camp directors could not get eye doctors or dentists assigned to the camp due to the 
lack of availability and a lack of interest in working with patients with language barriers and 
persistent demands.
56
 
The Provost Marshal General files indicate that there were at least seven men in my study 
of 343 Italians selectively interned who died in the camps.  Questions remain as to whether these 
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men suffered from untreated conditions that were indicated in their medical history or had their 
first onset of illness in the camps.  For example, in the case of Giuseppe Protto, the death 
certificate in his file from Camp Forrest, where he spent about a couple months, says “Cerebral 
embolus – cause undetermined.”57  Mental illness was common, and often marked by frequent 
complaints of indefinable physical ailments.  There were approximately eight men among those 
studied who were diagnosed with psychosis who were committed to mental institutions during 
the time of their internment.  More common, of course, were cases of depression and anxiety, 
likely caused by the internees’ frustration at being held against their will and exacerbated by 
increasingly longer periods of separation from loved ones. 
As for the moral and spiritual well-being of the internees, the Geneva Convention granted 
“complete freedom in the performance of their religious duties, including attendance at the 
services of their faith.”58  Army chaplains performed services, and the internees’ own Christian, 
Buddhist, or Shinto priests were permitted to conduct services in their native tongue.
59
  Papers of 
the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) indicate that that the U.S.-based Catholic 
missionaries, the Maryknoll Fathers, Sisters and Brothers, proposed having an actual presence in 
the internment camps by living on the compounds to carry on religious care of the interned.  The 
Catholic organization particularly expressed a spiritual responsibility to the Japanese while they 
were confined.  But the federal government did not comply with this request.
60
  More successful 
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were efforts by the NCWC to provide organized Catholic faith services and to make Catholic 
books in the internees’ languages available on the camps so that men – Germans, Italians, and 
Japanese alike - could satisfy their spiritual needs. 
61
  The War Department’s response was 
favorable; the Provost Marshal General arranged for the office of the Chief of Chaplains to 
coordinate visits by Catholic clergy and agreed to have camp commanders distribute Catholic 
prayer books and other religious literature.
62
   
By all accounts, living conditions were generally good, although the internees judged 
their treatment relative to their lives prior to internment or what their confinement protected them 
from, such as service in the Italian Army or life in a war-torn country.  The United States took its 
obligations under the Geneva Convention seriously, which led to some resentment in the 
American population, as we shall see below.  Through the function of reciprocity, the U.S. 
government had to abide by the Convention’s assurances of safety and humane treatment of 
internees to protect Americans who were prisoners in enemy countries. As explained in Chapter 
2, the monitoring system of neutral protectorate countries made enemy nations that were 
signatories to the treaty accountable to each other.  For example, the United States decided to 
follow the Convention’s standard for prisoners of war that the food be “equivalent in quantity 
and quality” to that served to U.S. troops at base camps.63  This meant that internees were served 
food that was strictly rationed for Americans, such as meat products.
64
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The INS recognized that internee labor was a good administrative policy for a number of 
reasons.  First, a work program could utilize internee labor without creating competition within 
the civilian workforce because at the time there was a severe shortage of unskilled labor in some 
sections of the country.  Second, it would reduce internment costs without impacting supervision 
at the camps.  And finally, employment would combat the “psychoneurotic tendencies among 
internees,” by engaging internees in productive activity that got them away from the camp and 
took their minds off of their confinement.
65
 
Under the terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention, prisoners of war could be employed in 
work for which they were physically fit.
66
  The detaining power was responsible for “the 
maintenance, care, treatment and the payment of the wages of prisoners of war working for 
private individuals.”67  According to the Regulations Governing Civilian Internees pursuant to 
the Convention, internees working outside the camp could earn wages at the rate of eighty cents 
per day.  Money earned was to be credited to the internee’s account and not paid directly to him 
until his release or repatriation, or in the case of his death, to his heirs.  Subject to the approval of 
the commanding officer of the internment camp, the internee could draw on his account up to ten 
dollars per month which was issued in the form of canteen coupons.
68
  Thus pleas by family 
members who wished for their interned loved one to work in order to help support his family at 
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home, like Mrs. Pidala whose husband Anthony was interned at Camp McAlester, were futile 
because the system did not allow money earned through work projects to leave the camps.
69
 
Under the terms allowed by the Convention, arrangements were made for internees to 
work for the Western Montana Beet Growers Association which was badly in need of help 
during the war.  Approximately 300 Italian seamen interned at Fort Missoula in 1942 were the 
first group of internees to be employed on the sugar beet fields, returning nightly to the 
internment camp.
70
  Initially, the workers were transported under heavy security to the beet 
fields, but eventually policies became more relaxed.
71
  The success of that program both in 
increasing the productivity of the farms and in improving public relations in Missoula County led 
to a more expansive program the following year.  In March 1943, when funds became available, 
the INS established a pay-work program whereby internees voluntarily worked both on projects 
at the internment camps and off site for private employers and other government agencies at the 
rate of ten cents an hour, not to exceed an eight-hour workday.  As internees could only be 
compelled to perform work that was incident to the administration, management, and 
maintenance of the camps, any internee who wished to work in the pay-work program had to get 
approval from the Alien Enemy Control Unit which reviewed issues of internal security.
72
   
Not only did the program put money into the camps, but it had a great effect on the 
morale of the internees.  The establishment of this program coincided with the transfer of all 
remaining civilian internees from army camps to INS custody.  Thus the swollen population of 
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internees at INS camps filled a void in unskilled and semi-skilled labor across the country, 
particularly for farms around Fort Lincoln in Bismarck, North Dakota and those surrounding Fort 
Missoula in Montana.  In addition to work on farms, the projects ranged from Forest Service 
projects to railroad maintenance to work in hospitals.
73
  Alfredo Cipolato recalled being trained 
as an orderly at St. Patrick’s Hospital in Missoula since most of the orderlies and doctors were in 
the service.  Although it was a unique opportunity, he and his fellow internees were restricted 
from going beyond one block in each direction from the hospital.
74
 
At Crystal City, located in a climate suitable for agriculture, internees had more 
opportunities than internees elsewhere to participate in a pay-work program.  Some planted and 
kept vegetable gardens while others produced eggs and tended to poultry, cured meats, prepared 
baked goods, repaired shoes, or manufactured furniture.  Internees could also do office work and 
even served as instructors as part of the work program.
75
 
The Justice Department Litigation files for each internee indicate that an internee’s 
performance and attitude on his job were factors considered by the alien enemy hearing boards 
on reconsideration of an internee’s status.  For example, reports of Francesco Fragale’s 
cooperative behavior while working for the Forest Service at Missoula, later as a bell boy and 
waiter at a Missoula hotel, and finally at the factory for the American Crystal Sugar Company 
where he was described as “hard-working” and “dependable, trustworthy, ambitious,” figured 
prominently in the decision to parole him in late 1944.  As was the case with other internees on a 
particular work project, Fragale was allowed to live for close to a year off the internment camp at 
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the Penwell Hotel, and therefore had the benefit of reports from his landlord that he had good 
manners and was well behaved.
76
  Thus, in some instances, work projects offered internees the 
opportunity to assert some control over their fate by exhibiting qualities that could positively 
influence the reviewing board’s opinion of their loyalty to the United States and potential to be 
good American citizens. 
Aside from work opportunities, entertainment and group activities were the best method 
to combat the “barbed wire sickness” of boredom.77  In both the INS and Army camps, internees 
were allowed to organize musical groups, sports activities, and to engage in educational and 
cultural activities.  Valdastri described evenings of entertainment where there was a cultural 
exchange of music as part of the social life at Fort McCoy; sounds from the Orient created “a 
strange mood of baffled amazement to ears which never heard them before.”78  Thus, music 
served to aid in each nationality’s appreciation and understanding of the other.  Perhaps the camp 
with the best music was Fort Missoula since there were a number of famous Italian musicians 
interned there, including seven violinists, most likely entertainers aboard the Italian luxury liner 
Conte Biancamano that was seized in the Panama Canal in 1939, as well as musicians from the 
World’s Fair.  Every night after the 5:00 p.m. supper, a band played while other internees sang.79  
Concerts held at the recreation hall open to the public raised close to $300 for the Italian welfare 
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fund.  Theater was also common among both the Italians, who favored heavy drama, and the 
Germans who preferred lighter entertainment.
80
 
The activities that were most successful in lifting the spirits of the Italian internees were 
sports like soccer and bocce ball, particularly in the summer months, and boxing or skating in the 
winter.
81
  But young and old also formed teams with internees of the other nationalities to 
compete in the all-American sport of baseball.  Valdastri captured the spirit of men regaining 
their dignity through athletics in describing how “[y]oung men showed remarkable feats in 
beautiful teamwork, old men seemed to be rejuvenated until there was no resemblance to the 
little heaps of misery beaten down by an unmerciful fate who had left Hawaii mentally and 
physically broken only a short time ago.”82  Despite this display of control by the internees, the 
government had the upper hand even in the arena of sports and other recreational activities.  
Although the activities were organized and directed by the internees themselves, camp officials 
could use the opportunity to participate in recreation as a form of disciplining the internees.  For 
example, an internee could be prevented from taking part in sports and leisure activities by 
failing to cooperate in the camp and perform all expected duties.
83
 
The internees also creatively devised ways to pass the time in a variety of hobbies, from 
handicrafts like sandal making, to building bird nests in empty cans salvaged from the camp, to 
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collecting rocks for polishing and painting.
84
  The allotment of space for individual flower 
gardens must have pleased those Italians accustomed to gardening at home.
85
  Other internees 
occupied themselves in educational courses in practical skills, such as that for Italian seamen 
seeking advancement in their careers, as well as language courses in English, Spanish, German, 
and Italian.
86
  Valdastri reported that “lectures about professional topics and classes of various 
languages” were offered at Fort McCoy.87  Newsletters advertising activities and events which 
were circulated among internees contributed to a sense of community. 
A key morale boost for internees was being allowed off the premises of the internment 
camps for work projects.  Like Francesco Fragale, many used the opportunity to prove that they 
possessed a work ethic and demeanor worthy of release from government custody and perhaps 
future American citizenship.  At some camps, the internees even got passes on occasion for visits 
to town, initially accompanied by guards, to shop at places like the Missoula Mercantile where 
Italians and Japanese were reportedly well received.
88
  But what most internees craved was to see 
and hear from their families.  Visits home were granted only in extreme circumstances, such as a 
death in the family.  More frequent were visits by family members to the camps, but the visits 
were restricted in number and held under strict surveillance.  The military advised internees that 
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they could only have two visitors per month and that each visit could last no longer than twenty-
five minutes.
89
   
Lucetta Berizzi Drypolcher’s description of her visit to her father, Louis Berizzi, at Fort 
Meade shows how uncomfortable these meetings could be:  We could only speak English.  The 
meeting room was cold and crowded, and he didn’t look well.  He was underweight – just not the 
same, in a fatigue uniform with “PW” on the back.  There was sort of a general room where we 
met with him.  The internees would come from their quarters.  They were behind barbed wire, 
we could see that as we entered.  We were very close, so it was very difficult being there.
90
 
Undoubtedly these visits were unsatisfying for both internees and family members.  The 
meetings gave no opportunity for internees to express their feelings about internment or to tell 
their loved ones how things really were in the camp.  Certainly the prohibition against speaking 
Italian added to the strangeness of visits given that many family members were accustomed to 
communicating in their native tongue.
91
  Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini’s daughter Temi merely asked 
her father Come stai (How are you?) before receiving a rebuke from the officer monitoring her 
visit.
92
 
Mario Valdastri was not allowed to see his family from his detention at the Honolulu 
Immigration Station in early December 1941 through his first stay on Sand Island in the 
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Territory of Hawaii and his transport to the mainland.
93
  Valdastri’s son recalled visiting his 
father at Sand Island once he had returned from the mainland in late 1942.  After crossing 
Honolulu harbor by boat, visitors had to walk about a half mile to the camp which was 
surrounded by double, twelve-foot high, barbed-wire fences.  He met his father at a picnic table 
in a tent that housed Italians.  Not long after that, Valdastri’s daughter was killed in an 
automobile accident.  Valdastri was allowed to view his daughter’s body for only an hour in the 
funeral home with the escort of two armed guards.  A short time before his daughter’s death, 
Valdastri had not been allowed to attend her wedding.
94
  Such stories reveal how internment 
completely disrupted family relationships. 
The INS camps utilized a variety of methods for monitoring conversations between 
internees and their visitors depending upon the size and location of the facility.  In camps located 
near the homes of the internees’ families and friends, such as Ellis Island, where the numbers of 
visitors were the heaviest, officials were able to reduce the number of guards required for 
monitoring by requiring that “conversations [be] held across a table which was partitioned to 
prevent the unseen passage of messages.”95  At other camps, the internee and his visitor sat on 
benches facing each other with a space in between for observation, or they were allowed to sit 
together in the presence of a guard.
96
 
Internees were entitled to receive a quota of authorized publications.  Once that quota 
was reached, camp officials had the authority to cancel additional subscriptions.  For example, 
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Mario Ricciardelli, a china and glassware repairman who was also a journalist for the weekly 
Italian newspaper Grido della Stirpe, believed to be the voice for Fascist propaganda, lost his 
subscription to the Washington Sun when the adjutant at his camp determined that his quota had 
already been filled.
97
  It must have been demoralizing to an internee used to staying abreast of 
news to have limits placed on his sources to the outside world.  Valdastri described the eagerness 
of internees to get updates on what was happening outside the camps.  Since not every internee 
could obtain newspapers in their native language or knew English well enough to understand 
news over the radio, a few of the most linguistically talented internees prepared daily news 
reports.
98
 
As internees were not allowed to make or receive telephone calls at the camps, their only 
form of communication with their friends and family members was the mail system.  Internees 
were permitted to write two letters and one postcard a week.  Photos from the camps were 
prohibited.
99
  Officials at the INS internment camps recorded and examined all mail to and from 
internees for any trace of plans for subversive activity, a method of screening allowed under the 
Geneva Convention.
100
  Mail destined for locations outside the continental United States was 
sent under seal to the Office of Censorship for additional review by personnel competent in the 
Japanese, German, and Italian languages.  The system of censorship allowed the INS to 
determine the “general attitude, possible improper plans, conditions of health and morale, and 
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identity and addresses of close relatives and friends of the internees.”  If any suspicious excerpts 
were found in an internee’s correspondence, they were forwarded to the INS Central Office and 
the Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Justice Department, and in special cases, to 
the FBI, Military and Naval Intelligence, and to the Special War Problems Division of the State 
Department.
101
  Regulations published on April 15, 1942, which were designed to standardize the 
censorship practices between the INS and other agencies, directed that “malicious and false 
complaints regarding conditions of detention” should be deleted from letters, but there would be 
no censorship of letters addressed to the Justice Department, the State Department, or to the 
Protecting Power.
 102
  Thus, internees did enjoy the freedom of speech with respect to 
communicating their feelings about their confinement to government authorities.   
The file of Mario Ricciardelli presents an example of an uncensored letter.  In a letter to 
H.E.N.D. Borgus, the Swiss Minister, Ricciardelli wrote of the “abuse and humiliation” of being 
handcuffed on the train when being transferred from Fort McAlester to a rehearing at an INS 
facility to determine whether he might be released from internment.  He demanded to know 
whether such treatment of a civilian internee was in violation of the Geneva Convention.
103
  As 
Lawrence DiStasi points out, the presence of this letter in Ricciardelli’s file indicates that it was 
either forwarded to or intercepted by the War Department.
104
  The fact that Ricciardelli received 
a second order of internment on December 30, 1942 and was not paroled until September 15, 
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1943 confirms that his rehearing was not successful.
105
  One can only speculate whether his letter 
to the Swiss Minister hurt him in this respect. 
Family members tried to keep their interned loved ones abreast of all events at home, 
important ones like births, marriages, and deaths, and updates on the development of the 
internees’ children, and other more mundane issues like how productive the gardens were at 
home.  They sent items that they thought the internees might enjoy like candy, cigarettes, and 
books.  In turn, internees reported on the state of their health and diet at the camps as well as 
musical or sports events.  However, the internees were prevented from relating any negative 
accounts of internment as indicated in numerous examples of deleted messages in 
correspondence.  Notes of camp officials reviewing internees’ correspondence indicated the 
sender and intended recipient and the deleted passages in Italian, with rough translations.  For 
example, a note in the file of Anthony Tribuiani, a news reporter apprehended on December 8, 
1941, indicates that camp officials deleted Tribuiani’s sentiments about the conditions of his 
internment from a letter to Adele Tribuiani, presumably his wife.  Tribuiani wrote that conditions 
at his internment camp were better “than Gloucester (Gloucester City detention facility in New 
Jersey), but altogether the lack of LIBERTY oppresses one’s spirit and heart.”106  Similarly, the 
following thoughts of Filippo Romano, a journalist for Popolo Italiano, written in a letter to his 
loved one, Mrs. Maria Romano, were deleted:  expressions of il nostro dolore (our grief) and 
l’umanita (inhumanity) of censorship of letters which has agravando la nostra tragica situazione 
(aggravated our tragic situation).  In an earlier letter, deletions included his resentment that the 
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government interned “the barons, dukes, counts, artists, and professional people who represent 
the Flower of Italy, who have come here I know not why, while the true criminals continue to 
amass millions of dollars.”107  It would make sense that camp officials gave particular attention 
to the correspondence of internees in the media profession since they feared the influence of 
these internees who were adept at expressing their opinions, and as public figures, probably still 
had a following outside the camps.   
Letters coming into the camp were scanned for sentiments, whether of emotional 
attachment or complaints about their loved ones’ fate, out of fear that they might negatively 
affect the morale of internees.  In some cases, the deletions were understandable in view of this 
concern.  For example, Velleda Guidi’s complaint to her father - “it was very mean that we were 
allowed only 25 minutes with you . . . Imagine, we traveled 30 hours straight to be allowed only 
25 minutes with you” - might have served to anger Guidi-Buttrini and make him less obedient 
toward military officials.
108
  On the other hand, some deletions by military officials censoring 
letters seemed to work against this purpose.  Censors deleted verse in a letter written to Alfredo 
Tribuiani entitled “Let’s Keep Smiling,” which spoke of brighter days and the need to keep 
courage up, presumably positive sentiment for an internee, for the reason that it had “possible 
hidden meaning.”109  Similarly ambiguous was the deletion of Mariana Fabbri’s cartoons of 
herself and her dog in letters to her husband Alessandro, a business manager from New York 
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City and a veteran of the Italian Army who spent about a year and a half in internment.
110
  Most 
likely the government’s concern for hidden meaning affected the Fabbris’ correspondence as 
well.  What is certain is that censoring violated the personal relationships of internees and their 
loved ones and made both sides wonder what information was kept from them. 
The internee letters did not always express despair about their confinement.  For 
example, in his conversations with Dr. Amy N. Stannard, the officer in charge of Seagoville who 
received information from the staff censors, Jerre Mangione learned that many of the Latin 
Americans who had been living in poverty expressed gratitude in their letters for the good food 
and housing at Seagoville.  However, what these letters had in common with the letters Italian 
aliens sent to their friends and family in the United States was anguish over being parted from 
loved ones.
111
  Many, like Carmelo Ilacqua, a business man and employee at the Italian 
Consulate in San Francisco, assured their loved ones that they were fine and that there was no 
need to worry because they were “meeting this storm with courage and fortitude, we will be able 
to withstand it and we, too, will see the sunshine again.”112 
Many families of internees were not only worried about the welfare of their loved ones in 
camp, but also about how they were going to survive.  Without the income of their husbands, 
many wives faced severe financial problems during their husbands’ internment.  We know from 
the file of Giovanni Maiorana, a fisherman from San Francisco, that in some cases the Federal 
Reserve Bank, pursuant to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, could arrange for the 
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accounts, safe deposit boxes, and securities of internees to be blocked.
113
  Such restrictions 
would affect family members.  However, the fact that the “Basic Personnel Record” for each 
internee in the Provost Marshall General files indicates the “Number of dependents and 
relationship,” suggests that some provision of financial aid for wives and children was intended.  
There was an assistance program, officially called “Service and Assistance to Enemy Aliens and 
Others Affected by Restrictive Governmental Action,” established through Presidential 
Allotment in February 1942, which continued until June 1944.  The intention of the program was 
to assist enemy aliens and their families affected by the government’s relocation of families from 
military areas and detention and internment.  The Bureau of Public Assistance administered the 
program through state public assistance agencies which operated on behalf of the Social Security 
Board.
114
   
As previous scholars have discovered, however, the number of enemy alien families who 
actually received government aid and the amount of that aid is unclear, suggesting that the 
program was not regularly administered to families in need.  Rose Scherini asserted that the 
families of internees “were given no financial assistance by the U.S. government, although there 
were reports that the American Red Cross and the Federal War Relief Agency would help 
families.”115  Stephen Fox was unable to retrieve detailed records of assistance to Italian and 
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German aliens in 1942, but he determined that payments across counties in California were 
inconsistent.  The fact that some counties disbursed almost nothing explains why most aliens do 
not recall that the program existed.
116
  Further evidence that not every family knew that aid was 
available exists in the file of Anthony Pidala.  Apparently Mrs. Pidala, upon inquiry about 
receiving the wages from her husband’s work while interned, learned for the first time from the 
colonel in the Aliens Division that assistance could be sought from the Regional Office of the 
Federal Security Agency in Chicago.
117
  Family members having financial difficulties were also 
referred to the office of the Commissioner of the INS.
118
 
Pleas from internees to politicians and others in positions of influence for help in getting 
released or at least paroled have already been discussed in the case studies of individuals in the 
prior chapter.  Inquiries by the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born to the 
Alien Enemy Control Unit about the status of alien groups or particular aliens who had been 
interned indicate that this organization was monitoring the situation throughout the war.
119
  The 
NCWC deserves highlighting because it had a continual role in the handling of the nationals of 
all three Axis powers, from the government’s announcement of mandatory registration of aliens 
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in 1940 through the relocation and internment of enemy aliens.  The papers of the NCWC 
indicate that this organization was discriminating in determining which Italian internees to aid by 
considering the particular circumstances of each individual.  In the case of Prince Boncompagno 
Boncompagni-Ludovisi, an export broker interned at Camp Meade, the NCWC refused his 
request to solicit a letter from an ecclesiastical representative of the pope vouching for his 
character and good standing.  The NCWC would not support Boncompagni-Ludovisi because he 
was implicated in an allegedly illegal exchange of Italian currency which could only be handled 
by the Italian government.
120
  In the case of Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini, Bruce Mohler, the NCWC’s 
Director of the Bureau of Immigration, carefully qualified the organization’s position as not 
being able “to judge [  ] the innocence or guilt” of Guidi-Buttrini when he presented a favorable 
letter from the internee’s son, an American serviceman, to Edward Ennis.121  However, the 
NCWC was willing to assist a former seaman, Guglielmo d’Amico, interned at Fort Missoula, by 
supplying favorable information about him so that the Apostolic Delegation could contact 
Edward Ennis to discuss his parole.
122
  It appears that the NCWC could justify coming to the aid 
of the seamen who were interned solely on the basis of being on the crew of an Italian ship taken 
by the U.S. government, whereas the Italians selected for internment on the basis of their 
professions and associations after December 7, 1941 presented a much greater ethical dilemma.  
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The NCWC also took an interest in the plight of the Latin American internees by assisting their 
efforts with the Department of State to return to their families and homes in Latin America.
123
 
Instead of relying on outside organizations to assist them in getting paroled or released, 
many internees wrote directly to the Justice Department to describe their background and explain 
any suspicious associations or activities that may have gotten them interned.  These internees felt 
that they could reverse their fate by forcing the government to understand their circumstances 
and realize that they were in fact patriotic to the United States.  For example, Diego Riggio, a 
tailor originally from Sicily who had lived in the United States for close to twenty years, 
suspected that his internment was based on his affiliation with Circolo 9 Maggio, a small 
organization of Italians in his Brooklyn neighborhood.  He explained that this group “had never a 
political character” nor did he hear any “comment unfavorable to the United States,” but in fact it 
encouraged American citizenship which he had sought through the help of his daughter.  To 
further prove his loyalty to the United States, Riggio claimed membership in the Labor Party, to 
have participated in the campaign to reelect Roosevelt in 1940, and to have financially 
contributed to Mayor LaGuardia’s election.  Whether this appeal sped up his release in April 
1944 is unclear.
124
 
Dr. Domenico Rosati, who was interned for a month, released, and then interned again 
after a rehearing, tried to convince the Attorney General and the Alien Division of the War 
Department that his profession was “to serve humanity, more so in time of war than in peace, 
and it can never be dangerous.”  He expressed a willingness to serve at hospitals “under close 
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surveillance.”125 Presuming that his internment was based on his service in the Medical 
Commission at the Italian Consulate where he examined disabled war veterans, and on his offer 
of services during the Ethiopian crisis, he explained that he withdrew from colonial activities 
after 1937 and retained only a “business and social” relationship with the consulate thereafter.  
When the State Department offered him repatriation, he stated his desire to remain in the United 
States.  As further proof of his loyalty, he registered with the American Medical Association to 
serve in the Army in September 1940, and later registered with the Procurement Service, listing 
the Army as his first choice and the Health Service as his second choice.
126
  Unfortunately, Dr. 
Rosati’s arguments on his behalf were not successful, as he was one of the last internees to be 
released in June 1945, two years after Italy had abandoned the conflict. 
Michael Angelo Scicchitani also touted his refusal to repatriate to Italy as evidence that 
he had adopted the United States as his home and desired “to observe and respect the laws and 
principles of this Nation and to become an [sic] useful member of its vast and productive 
family.”  In his letter to Attorney General Biddle, he stated his belief that his internment was due 
to his involvement in the Ethiopian War.  He explained his military service in the Italian Army to 
the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to his case as “the result of a political upheaval of which I 
was an obedient participant . . . just obeying orders,” which was the circumstance of many other 
internees who had no choice but to serve a mandatory term in the service.  He further explained 
his membership in the Italian War Veterans, another organization targeted by the U.S. 
government, as “merely spiritual” since he became a member with “the sole intention of bringing 
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closer ties between the Italian War Veterans and those of the former comrade-in-arms from 
America.”127  What probably kept Scicchitani interned until June 1945, however, was his alleged 
involvement as a squad leader for the Fascist Party, his solicitation of members for the Spanish 
Civil War, and commendation by Fascist leaders for his devotion to the cause for which he 
offered no explanation.
128
   
In a system based on mere appearances of Fascist sympathies based on the associations 
that an alien had, no matter how far back they occurred and regardless of whether they were 
meant to be social rather than political, explanations of the exact nature of such affiliations were 
not given fair consideration.  Such appeals to the Justice Department may have made the aliens 
feel empowered, but in reality the government had the upper hand.  As the following section 
reveals, the Geneva Convention provided the aliens an instrument for their grievances regarding 
their living conditions in camp, but did not provide grounds for protesting the fact of their 
internment without notice of charges and without a hearing that conformed with due process 
guarantees. 
************************************* 
At the start of the war, public knowledge of the conditions of internment of enemy aliens 
was limited.
129
  Generally the media abided by the Justice Department’s warning that publicity 
would interfere with the government’s adherence to the terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention, 
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as well as threaten national security.
130
  Thus the INS felt that it was best to follow an overly 
cautious policy of no publicity about the camps out of concern that the average person would 
think that the internees were being pampered while American prisoners abroad were being 
treated very poorly.  Camp officials enlisted the cooperation of the local press and influential 
people in the surrounding communities to squash criticisms and rumors.  Their compliance was 
assured by the fact that the camps boosted their towns’ economies.131  In the special case of Fort 
Missoula, public relations with the town were strengthened by the opening up of musical and 
theatrical performances at the camp to the public.
132
   
Ellis Island’s location in New York Harbor, visible by binoculars on a clear day from 
Battery Park or the Staten Island ferries, presented an exception to the low profile of internment 
camps.  In an article accompanied by a photo of Axis nationals boarding a boat for Ellis Island, a 
New York Times reporter wrote of hundreds of Italians, Germans, and Japanese “inside the wire 
of their bleak and treeless exercise ground” marching in endless circles on the island, “the trade-
mark of a concentration camp.”  Presumably based on firsthand encounters with them, the 
reporter described the internees as having “faces of small professional and business people,” 
among whom there were a few Germans and Italians who would be at home “behind the counters 
of corner delicatessen shops or plying shaving brushes in barber shops.”  The privileges granted 
to internees, namely visits and correspondence with family and friends and access to books in 
any language caused the author to remark that the island’s “concentration camp” was “as humane 
as such places can be made, far more humane than German and Italian camps.”133  Despite the 
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reporter’s caveat, even using this comparison must have angered the families of American 
servicemen held as prisoners of war overseas. 
There were, in fact, complaints from the public that the U.S. government was pampering 
alien enemies.  Negative sentiment for the internees can be traced in The Boston Daily Globe 
towards the end of World War II.  A July 26, 1944 article expressed the outrage of the State 
Commander of the American Legion members who, responding to news of outbreaks of Italians 
from internment camps, called for the treatment of Italian prisoners “as prisoners of war rather 
than guests enjoying the hospitality of a nation.”  Particular resentment was felt among American 
veterans of World War I who had been held in Italy under much less desirable circumstances and 
treated with much less leniency.  The Legion presented a resolution to the Veterans of Foreign 
Affairs “deploring the coddling of foreign prisoners,” while Natick mothers of servicemen being 
held as prisoners of war abroad demanded a ban on the entertainment of Italian internees in that 
town.
134
  Such complainants were most likely unaware of the Geneva Convention guarantees, 
guarantees that the United States extended to the internees.  The International Committee for the 
Red Cross and Protecting Powers supervised the treatment of internees.  Their records indicate 
that delegates made regular visits to the Ellis Island and Crystal City camps to inspect the 
internees’ living conditions and to confirm that they met required standards.135  A typical 
inspection report indicated whether improvements had been made since the last visit as well as 
the state of medical care, food, opportunities for work, amusements, and education.   Inspectors 
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held interviews with the camp chiefs to determine the relationship between camp authorities and 
the internees.
136
  There were also charges by the public that camp officials were excessively 
lenient in their discipline of the internees.
137
  Under the Geneva Convention, the Detaining 
Powers reserved the right to supervise and discipline internees for minor infractions at the camps 
as they saw fit, with the understanding that the law of the detaining state would supply the 
applicable rules of law, even for civilians of enemy status.
138
 
From his discussions with internees at Fort Missoula, Mangione determined that the least 
likely group of Italian internees to complain was the seamen, who arrived before the Italian 
aliens apprehended by the FBI and lived alongside this latter group.  While the long-term 
resident Italians questioned their misfortune at being chosen from among the six hundred 
thousand Italians living in the United States at the time and labeled Fascist, the seamen did not 
question the U.S. government’s right to intern them during the war, “an attitude which enabled 
them to accept their detention with far more grace than the civilian Italians.”  Many were openly 
supportive of the United States and hoped to become permanent American residents after the 
war.
139
  The seamen were generally young men used to being away at sea for long periods and 
living in cramped quarters, which made them appreciate the more favorable conditions at Fort 
Missoula as well as the distance from the war.
140
  Their positive experience at Fort Missoula has 
been chronicled by Umberto Benedetti, a former crewman on the Conte Biancanamo, who 
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claimed that accommodations at Missoula “far exceeded the guidelines set down by the Geneva 
Convention”; there was no food rationing at the camp, and “the internees were accepted by the 
community,” many choosing to make it their home once released.141 
In contrast, the Italian aliens who had been pulled away from their established homes and 
professions in the United States complained vociferously about the conditions of their 
confinement.  Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, a prisoner of war, and by extension, an 
internee could not be punished for submitting a complaint either to military authorities or to 
representatives of the Protecting Power about the conditions of his captivity.
142
  At INS camps, 
the mayor handled grievances by serving as the spokesman for the entire group in 
communications with camp officials.
143
  When the Swiss legation became aware of complaints, 
such as those about medical and dental service, they would investigate the situation during 
periodic visits to the camps.
144
  Other than medical issues, the most common complaints were 
those regarding the mail system – the limitation on the number of pieces of mail that internees 
could send and the delays experienced by internees and their family members in receiving mail 
due to censorship.  Francesco Panciatichi, a newspaper editor from Long Island, served as a 
spokesman for the Italians at his military camp, appealing to Attorney General Biddle to 
eliminate mail delays as long as thirty-eight days.  He not only described the uneasiness and 
worry of the men in his group on account of not hearing from their loved ones, but also the 
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“torturing anxiety” of “our families whose members are mostly American by birth.”145  In 
response to Panciatichi’s appeal and a letter from Panciatichi’s wife regarding delays on her end, 
Edward Ennis suggested to Brigadier General Bryan that the War Department adopt the same 
procedure as INS camps of using their own personnel to censor domestic mail instead of the 
longer process through the Office of Censorship which already screened international mail.
146
 
Common complaints of Latin American internees concerned their treatment.  Older 
internees complained that their work was too strenuous, but they were only allowed relief from 
their duties if they had a medical reason.  Some Italians who had been under the impression in 
Latin America that they would receive the same treatment as diplomats insisted that they should 
be lodged in hotels where they would not be expected to operate kitchens and provide their own 
janitorial and maid service.  Such complaints proved futile as accommodations were not altered 
to suit the desired status of any internee.  Other complaints, such as those about the high prices 
for items at the canteens and a lack of variety of merchandise, eventually subsided as camp 
administrators made improvements to increase the popularity of the canteens.
147
 
Many internees complained to the Justice Department of their inability to have a 
rehearing at the camps.  In one appeal to Attorney General Biddle, Frank Caracciolo, a sewing 
machine mechanic who had lived in the United States for over twenty years, asked for 
reconsideration of his case and a chance to prove his sincerity and devotion to the United States.  
Caracciolo explained that he was never “mixed up in any political movements,” but was a 
member of an Italian Society only to gain Italian clientele when he sold olive oil after losing his 
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job.  He argued that the greatest testament to his loyalty to the United States was his refusal to 
repatriate when the Swiss Legation, unbeknownst to him, placed him on a repatriation list.   
Caracciolo begged for a rehearing so that he might have “an occasion to further demonstrate 
[his] fidelity to this Nation, the Country of [his] adoption, the Country of [his] children.”148  
Likewise, Ilidio Di Bugnara, a tailor from Brooklyn, wrote to Edward Ennis and the U.S. District 
Attorney in Savannah, Georgia from Fort McAlester for an opportunity to have another hearing 
to demonstrate that he was not an enemy of the United States but willing to participate in the 
American war effort if he were to be released on parole.
149
 
In some instances, internees filed joint complaints.  When a group of men at Fort 
Missoula witnessed the release of approximately 130 of their fellow Italians by the end of 1943, 
they presented a petition to the Honorable Ugo Carusi of the Justice Department for clemency in 
view of the upcoming holidays.  Expressing their discouragement “at the sudden slowing down 
of further releases,” and perplexity over why rehearings expected in the prior month had not 
occurred, they claimed inconsistency in the Justice Department’s handling of cases.  They 
believed that the only factor setting them apart from the released men was that most of them 
were single.
150
  However, it is probably significant that several of the men in this group of 
petitioners had been identified as unquestionably Fascist.
151
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The most legitimate and best organized complaint that Mangione became aware of during 
his visits of the camps was a petition to President Roosevelt and Attorney General Biddle by 
twenty-five Germans at Fort Lincoln who had been interned without a hearing.  The objections 
that the complaint raised with respect to the rights of the interned to be informed of specific 
charges against them, to face their accusers, to examine the evidence against them, and to 
prepare a defense with legal counsel were equally applicable to the many Italian aliens who were 
apprehended by FBI agents and detained in the days following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.  The German petitioners eventually were granted hearings before civilian hearing 
boards, but none of the procedural rights that they claimed were granted for the reasons of 
executive privilege under the Alien Enemy Act of 1789 and the absence of constitutional 
guarantees for alien enemies, as discussed in the previous chapter.
152
   
Although internment frustrated and bewildered them, the internees maintained their spirit 
by making the most of their time in the camps and retaining their sense of identity.  Some even 
planned for their lives once released, although that time came later than they had hoped.  Their 
greatest concerns were reconnecting with their families and rehabilitating their reputations in 
their communities.  How they would be received upon their return home, however, remained 
uncertain.
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
 
The story of internment and other restrictions in the United States during World War II is 
about how the government categorized persons of belligerent nations based on citizenship and 
race and thereby made assumptions about their loyalty and the national security risk that they 
presented.  In its May 1942 Fourth Interim Report, the Tolan Committee concluded that it was 
wrong to equate ethnicity with loyalty.  After hearing testimony about the commitment that 
Italian aliens had to the United States, the committee reported:  “This testimony has impressed 
upon us in convincing fashion the fundamental fact that place of birth and technical non-
citizenship alone provide no decisive criteria for assessing the alinement [sic] of loyalties in this 
world-wide conflict.”1  The reason why many Italians had not become American citizens by the 
start of World War II, although resident in the United States for many years, was not their 
continued allegiance to Italy, but their illiteracy which prevented them from passing the 
citizenship exams.  Yet, their classification as enemy aliens meant that the United States 
questioned their loyalty and placed restrictions upon them to ensure safety within its borders.  
Against the backdrop of wartime emergency, the federal government felt constrained to remove 
from the general population all aliens who could potentially present a security risk.  The positive 
result of the selective internment process for Italians was that only a fractional percent of the 
700,000 aliens were interned.  However, those who underwent the internment process faced 
hearings that often failed to provide a fair opportunity for evaluating each subject’s loyalty to the 
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United States.  By the time the Office of the Attorney General corrected problems in the hearings 
process, it was too late to change the fate of the hundreds of Italians already interned. 
It is true that the government applied a policy of selective internment to Italian aliens and 
a few naturalized citizens and did not engage in mass evacuation and internment like that 
imposed on persons of Japanese descent.  What saved Italians from this fate were the 
overwhelming logistics of relocating their large population and the drain on government 
resources that such a plan would have entailed, as well as the comparative absence of racist 
feeling against Italians.  In comparison with the Japanese population, Italians generally had an 
easier assimilation into American society and by the 1940s had begun to enjoy the public’s 
favorable perception of their work ethic and allegiance to this country.  In contrast, 
discrimination against persons of Japanese descent, already present before World War II, 
heightened considerably after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.  General DeWitt’s racist 
statements regarding the Japanese in his correspondence with the War Department and Governor 
Olson’s assertion in his radio address that the alien registration process could only determine the 
loyalty of Italians and Germans reflected a common attitude among military officials, California 
politicians, and the media.  Unlike the attitude toward Italian aliens, the U.S. government and the 
American public believed that persons of Japanese descent, regardless of their citizenship status, 
did not deserve the same protection of civil liberties. 
While the government did not treat Italians on the whole as poorly as persons of Japanese 
descent, there was a noticeable difference in the treatment of Italian aliens on the West Coast as 
compared to those on the East, mostly resulting from the perceived threat in those regions of the 
country.  The location of crucial airplane factories and naval shipyards, and proximity to Pearl 
Harbor were all important factors in the placing of greater restrictions on Italians on the West 
219 
 
Coast.  It was only on the West Coast that Italians, numbering close to 10,000, were relocated for 
a period of time without first being given the chance to undergo a loyalty hearing.  Their 
nationality and residence in what the military designated as prohibited zones, rather than any 
finding of disloyalty, were the reasons that they were forced to uproot their families for a time 
and move to an unfamiliar area.  But as suggested in Chapter 3, the different philosophies of the 
defense commanders, the more stringent philosophy of General DeWitt versus the individualized 
approach of General Drum, also accounted for the greater disruption of Italian communities on 
the West Coast than on the East Coast.  Data from the social profile of internees shows that 
proportionately more Italians from the West Coast were interned than from the East Coast where 
the population of Italians was eight times greater than on the West Coast.  This varying 
implementation of government policy reflected the crisis in which decisions had to be made 
quickly by one sector of government and put into action in an ad hoc manner by another.   
Equally important to the government’s policies with respect to Italians was the economic 
and political clout that the Italian community enjoyed, as made apparent at the Tolan Committee 
hearings.  Fellow Italians who were citizens in positions of prominence, such as San Francisco 
Mayor Angelo Rossi, vouched for Italians’ value to the war effort, both in terms of contributing 
soldiers and working in war industries.  But perhaps the greatest demonstration of how politics 
influenced government policy was the choice of Columbus Day on October 12, 1942 as the day 
for Attorney General Biddle to announce the removal of Italians from the category of alien 
enemies.  Columbus Day is the only American holiday that commemorates the accomplishment 
of an Italian and is celebrated in Italian American communities across the country.  The 
proclamation removing alien enemy status put an end to travel restrictions, notification 
requirements for changes in residence or employment, and prohibitions against cameras, short 
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wave radios, and signaling devices.  Permits and curfews in military zones were also dissolved.  
Obviously, this announcement did not affect the status of Italian aliens already interned or 
paroled by the Attorney General.
2
  
The motives for the October 12, 1942 change in policy for Italian aliens appear to have 
been largely political, as pressure from Italian American politicians and trade union leaders was 
mounting.  The government sought this community’s support for the war, particularly 
considering the prospects of an invasion of Italy in the following spring and the need for the 
Italian community to supply troops for the U.S. armed services.  More importantly, 
Congressional elections were to be held the following month, and candidates relied upon the 
voting bloc of the largest immigrant population.
3
  In its annual report for the fiscal year that 
ended on June 30, 1943, the Attorney General’s Office explained that “[o]fficial recognition of 
the loyalty of Italian aliens” in the removal of alien enemy status for persons of Italian 
nationality was “an act of justice,” as well as “an important weapon in the field of psychological 
warfare” which was proven in subsequent military operations in Italy.4 
Historians have debated whether reclassification of Italian aliens was the idea of Edward 
Ennis or the Office of War Intelligence, but all agree that it was a clever political strategy to 
soften resistance from Italy to an Allied invasion.
5
  Although Roosevelt had not been particularly 
concerned that Italians posed a real threat to national security even though he agreed with 
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Biddle’s suggestion of selective internment for suspect Italians, the morale of the Italian 
community had been a constant concern for him.  The Columbus Day pronouncement that Italian 
aliens were no longer “enemy aliens” gave him an opportunity to lure back to the Democratic 
Party those who had been angered by his 1940 commencement speech accusing Mussolini of 
striking his neighbor with a dagger in the back.   
The lifting of alien enemy status only applied to the Italian alien population and suggests 
their preferential treatment among the enemy alien groups in the United States.  Indeed a 
comparison of the number of Italian persons received by the INS under the alien enemy program 
throughout the war (3,278) with those of Germans (10,905) and Japanese (16,849), when the 
population of persons of Italian descent far outnumbered the populations of Germans and 
Japanese, further supports this conclusion.
6
  Beyond the perspective that a comparison of the 
alien enemy groups within the United States during World War II provides for assessing the 
justice of the process of selective internment of Italians, it is also instructive to consider what 
internment was like overseas.  The example of Great Britain that was foremost in Attorney 
General Biddle’s mind, where approximately 85,000 German and Austrian refugees were 
interned without process, many of whom were Jews persecuted by the Nazi regime, makes the 
American style of individually determining who should be interned seem relatively fair.
7
  At the 
time, approximately 19,000 Italians lived in Great Britain, some of whom had been there for 
                                                          
6
 W. F. Kelly, Assistant Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Service, to Mr. A. Vulliet World Alliance of 
Young Men’s Christian Associations, August 9, 1948, in German-Americans in the World Wars, ed. Tolzmann, 
1513.  These numbers include those received from outside continental United States and those who were voluntarily 
interned to join the internee-head of the family.  The other nationalities represented were as follows:  Hungary (53), 
Romania (25), Bulgaria (5), and other (161). 
7
 See Mangione, An Ethnic at Large, 320; see also Stone, Perilous Times, 285, who gives 74,000 as the number of 
German and Austrian nationals interned.  Note that these numbers are much higher than numbers reported in other 
sources.  See, e.g., “My dad, sent to a prison camp for being Italian,” BBC News Magazine, accessed October 26, 
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22278664 which cites 30,000 as the number of Germans and Austrians 
interned. 
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decades.
8
  Most of the 4,000 Italians interned in Great Britain were sent to the Isle of Man.
9
  
Likewise, in the other Anglo countries of Canada and Australia, internment affected a much 
greater percentage of the Italian population than in the United States.  In 1939 when World War 
II broke out in Europe, approximately 600 of the 31,000 Italians residing in Canada were 
arrested and interned on suspicion of Fascist leanings.
10
  After Italy entered World War II in June 
1940, just over twenty-one percent of Australia’s Italian population was interned on suspicion of 
Fascist sympathies or the subject’s occupation.  Although there were tribunals established to hear 
petitions in late 1940, releases from Australian internment camps came slowly.
11
  Aside from the 
seemingly fairer process for evaluating the status of internees, as indicated in Chapter 5, 
conditions in the American internment camps were also more favorable given that the United 
States chose to abide by the 1929 Geneva Convention’s provisions for prisoners of war in its 
treatment of internees and instructed its camps accordingly.
12
   
                                                          
8
 See “WW2 People’s War:  An archive of World War Two memories – written by the public, gathered by the BBC, 
Fact File:  Civilian Internment 1939-1945,” accessed October 26, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a6651858.shtml . 
9
 See “My dad, sent to a prison camp for being Italian,” BBC News Magazine, accessed October 26, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22278664. 
10
 See Government of Canada, “Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Italian-Canadian Community Projects,” 
accessed October 26, 2013, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/programs/italian.asp. 
11
 See National Archives of Australia, “Wartime Internment Camps in Australia:  World War II, accessed October 
26, 2013, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/snapshots/internment-camps/introduction.aspx.  See Gitano Rando, 
“Italo-Australians During the Second World War:  Some perceptions of internment,” accessed October 26, 2013, 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=artspapers.  Gitano estimates that 4,700 mainly 
Italian Australian men were interned when the Italian Australian community of 30,000 was viewed by the Australian 
government as posing a national security threat.  The tribunals granted fewer than 150 releases after a year of 
operation. 
12
 See U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, Instruction No. 58 “To The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service:  Subject:  Instructions concerning the treatment of alien enemy detainees” from Lemuel 
B. Schofield, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, April 28, 1942, in German-Americans in the World Wars, 
ed. Tolzmann, 1580-89. 
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While the above comparisons indicate that Italians elsewhere during World War II may 
have suffered much worse situations, Italians in the United States faced injustice from the 
inconsistent and ad hoc implementation of policies as much as the substance of the policies 
themselves.  As my analysis in Chapter 4 shows, the urgency of the perceived wartime security 
threats and the necessity of the Justice Department’s delegation of authority to approximately 
one hundred hearing boards nationwide through a series of often contradictory instructions 
created an imperfect process.  My case studies raise questions that continue to have relevance 
today.  How should the U.S. government assess the loyalty of individuals – what role do various 
categories of citizenship play, what types of evidence are productive and predictive, and how do 
cultural biases factor into the final determination? 
The evaluation of alien enemy hearing boards conducted here suggests that the greatest 
source of injustice in the adjudicatory process was the unreliability of the FBI’s Custodial 
Detention List for identifying persons and the evidence collected by the FBI on each subject.  
The FBI’s list cast a wide net among Italian aliens, often based on mere membership in an Italian 
organization, pointing to men who had lived for many years in the United States, were loyal to 
their adopted country, and cherished democracy, but simply never took the time to learn English 
in order to pass the citizenship examination.  Well into the alien enemy program, Attorney 
General Biddle came to believe that the FBI’s classification system was flawed in how it 
designated individuals who might threaten the country’s security, and that the FBI’s list should 
not be used for any purpose.  The hearing boards’ reliance upon FBI reports of anonymous 
informants alleging Fascist affiliations or activities when making their recommendations of 
internment led to the greatest deprivations of civil liberties, specifically the freedoms of speech 
and association.  Boards often did not have information on the particular context in which a 
224 
 
subject made a seemingly anti-American or pro-Fascist statement, or in which he associated with 
certain organizations, or participated in political activities giving rise to suspicion.  In doubtful 
cases where there was no conclusive evidence of subversion, the policy set by the Alien Enemy 
Control Unit was to decide in favor of the government which led to the internment of persons 
based on assumptions rather than information that had been vetted.   
Examination of individual cases in Chapter 4 revealed inequities in the alien enemy 
hearings.  The system of having the Attorney General oversee hearing boards in approximately 
one hundred districts nationwide naturally led to inconsistencies in the implementation of the 
hearings process and much frustration on the part of both the internees and hearing board 
members.  As indicated in debates among members of the Tolan Committee about what alien 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments might survive in wartime, the same 
evidentiary standards of criminal trials in courts of law did not have to be applied to enemy 
aliens because the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 allowed the government to detain and deport aliens 
of enemy countries without any hearing or lawyers for the suspect.  Thus the hearings, which 
followed ad hoc form procedures similar to administrative hearings for deportation, were merely 
a courtesy for enemy aliens, rather than a right.  They met statutory requirements and even 
contained some semblance of due process in their inclusion of an attorney on the board to assess 
evidence.  Yet the case files reveal that the procedure set by the Justice Department did not allow 
the aliens, many of whom were illiterate, to answer to suspicions of disloyalty, by prohibiting 
attorney representation in the hearings and not routinely providing translators.  The result was 
that the hearings before alien enemy hearing boards did not consistently function in a manner 
that would get at the truth behind allegations or anonymous tips that appeared in FBI reports.   
225 
 
To its credit, the Justice Department’s continual reevaluation of the structure of the 
hearings and the method for reaching decisions shows an effort to create a uniform system of 
justice for evaluating the loyalty of the Italian aliens.  Attorney General Biddle took great efforts 
to correct the mishandling of justice by communicating to the alien enemy hearing boards the 
necessity of evaluating each alien’s particular activity and by maintaining for himself the right to 
render the final decision in each case.  However, Biddle could not remedy the misjudgments that 
hearing boards made because they lacked information on the mission of many Italian American 
organizations and the particular role that each suspect Italian alien played in that organization, or 
based their recommendation of internment on evidence of a subject’s Fascist leanings from the 
prior decade.  Biddle’s efforts to make the adjudicatory process fairer -- by advising boards to 
arrange for transcripts of the hearings and to state specific grounds in their recommendations, by 
granting rehearings where the original hearings were defective in not admitting witness 
testimony for instance, and by directing boards to state charges against subjects and allow 
rebuttal evidence – came much too late to effectively insert greater due process into the 
internment proceedings.  By the time internees had rehearings by special hearing boards, they 
had already spent at least a year in internment, and in some cases, the biases of the initial alien 
enemy hearing board continued to taint the process. 
Also supporting my theory of inconsistencies in the hearings process were the varying 
approaches to national security that the hearing boards took.  I have suggested that in regions of 
the United States where there were larger populations of Italians and board members lived and 
worked among Italians, particularly the East Coast, boards could contextualize information from 
FBI reports better than board members who only encountered Italians in the adversarial setting of 
the hearings.  However, there were instances where familiarity could turn into unfair bias, as in 
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the case of Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini in Boston, in which the hearing board afforded him greater 
rights than what the law owed and allowed politically influential witnesses to outweigh the FBI 
evidence.  In still other cases on both the East and West Coasts, the presence of Italian American 
hearing board members and government attorneys who presented cases to the boards placed 
doubt upon the hearing boards’ ability to engage in unbiased adjudication.      
Perhaps the best test of the effectiveness of the government’s policy in identifying 
dangerous Italians is the number of individuals actually proven to have been involved in 
subversive activities in the United States or to have provided aid or threatened to give aid to Italy 
in support of Fascism.  The Justice Department did not prosecute any alien enemy for engaging 
in such activities, but of course the removal of suspect Italians from the general population 
arguably could have prevented the commission of seditious acts.  As for naturalized citizens, no 
Italian American who was under exclusion orders lost his citizenship.  Neither fraud in the 
naturalization process nor disloyalty during the war could be shown.
13
  There were undoubtedly 
Fascist sympathizers in the United States who could have given the federal government 
legitimate reason for concern, if they had been able to amass sufficient support.  As seen in 
Chapters 3 and 4, several internees in the subject group who had worked in the Italian media 
made anti-American and anti-democracy statements that understandably alerted the government 
to a potential risk.  Given the ability of this group of approximately thirty aliens to influence 
other members of the Italian community, they were perhaps the most dangerous among the 
subject internees.  The fact that radio transcripts and newspaper and journal articles provided 
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 Scherini, “When Italian Americans Were ‘Enemy Aliens,” 26.  Scherini relies upon Yale Law School Dean 
Eugene Rostow for the proposition that in court “exclusion can be sustained only on a showing of ‘clear and present 
danger’ of an imminent threat to public safety, or of aid to the enemy.”  This is admittedly a high standard. 
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evidence of their anti-American sentiment distinguishes members of the media from most of the 
other subject internees for whom evidence of a subversive mentality was speculative. 
  Months into the alien enemy program, government officials began to question whether 
reliance on the FBI’s Custodial Detention List yielded the identification of the greatest security 
risks.  It was not until April 1942, after many Italian aliens had been interned and many more had 
been relocated from their homes on the West Coast, that the military began to realize that they 
might not have targeted the most potentially dangerous elements of the Italian communities, 
namely members of the younger generation, alien and citizen.  At that time, Fascist experts 
explained to FBI officials that the younger generation of Italian Americans, that is, first-
generation Italians who had obtained American citizenship by birth but whose parents were 
aliens, were the most militant Fascists.
14
  The fact that the average age of my subject internees 
was forty-three indicates that the government focused on older, more established members of the 
Italian communities who could more easily be identified through employment and membership 
in Italian organizations than the younger generation.  The business, educational, and social 
leaders of the Italian communities seemed like the most obvious suspects, but they might not 
have been in fact. 
In addition to the potential miscalculation of the age of persons who might present a 
security risk, there is also the question of whether the government overlooked persons because 
they were American citizens.  As explained earlier, through the process of exclusion, suspicious 
naturalized citizens were identified and ordered to move from designated areas of the country, 
but the Justice Department chose to prosecute few of these cases.  If persons who were 
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 See Memorandum of Interview of Carmelo Zito, taken by Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., April 10, 1942, in American 
Concentration Camps, Vol. 4, ed. Daniels; Memorandum of Conversation between Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., and Mr. 
Pieper (Regional Head of F.B.I.), April 14, 1942, in American Concentration Camps, Vol. 4, ed. Daniels. 
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potentially greater security risks were shielded by their legal status of citizenship, then should 
citizenship be taken into account in formulating law and public policy designed to investigate 
and prevent terrorism?  The case of Mario Valdastri, the naturalized citizen interned in the 
Territory of Hawaii and on the mainland, for whom there still exists a classified Justice 
Department file in the National Archives, may provide the strongest evidence that the legal status 
of citizenship is not synonymous with loyalty to the United States.  Indeed, FBI reports 
concerning a number of the subject internees associated them with out and out pro-Fascist 
naturalized citizens.
15
  The irony of a policy that distinguished citizens from non-citizens is that 
aliens intent on committing sabotage could have pursued naturalization so that they might gain 
access to areas, such as the California coast, that were off limits to aliens.
16
  Although using non-
citizenship as the primary indicator of a potential national security risk was flawed, isolated 
cases do not make for sound policy.  If the U.S. government had not made distinctions based on 
citizenship, then it would necessarily have made the process of becoming an American citizen 
meaningless and undervalued the rights that come with citizenship.   
An overriding reality throughout these events was the integration of Italian Americans 
into the fabric of American society by the start of World War II.  That Italians were politically 
mature, that is, they constituted a substantial voting bloc and were represented in the legislative 
and judicial branches on the state level and even nationally, influenced the government’s 
policies.  Supportive testimony from prominent Italian American politicians at hearings before 
the Tolan Committee attested to this influence.  Further, the government had come to perceive 
Italians as loyal sons of America.  The fact that the Justice Department trusted an Italian 
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 See, e.g., FBI Report re. Biagio Farese, 1-16-42, 17, Farese’s A-File. 
16
 See Howard Williams (pseudonym), interview by Stephen Fox, Arcata, California, February 6, 1986, in Fox, 
Uncivil Liberties, 45. 
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naturalized citizen, Edward Corsi, to chair an alien enemy hearing board in New York City, a 
district with one of the heaviest caseloads of Italian aliens, is perhaps one of the greatest 
examples of the government’s perception of Italians’ assimilation into American society.   
World War II solidified Italians’ increasing identification as Americans.  Italian men 
served in the war, and Italians on the home front did their part for the American cause in wartime 
industries.  The forming of the Italian-American Victory Council, consisting of societies, clubs, 
fraternal orders, and trade unions, which held rallies and other supportive programs, signified the 
mobilization of Italian Americans behind the war effort, resulting in widespread acceptance of 
Italians as “full-fledged Americans.”17  The war brought Italians full employment and high 
wages.  Work in war industries and military service drew the younger generations of Italian 
Americans out of the “Little Italies” and allowed them to interact with all types of Americans.18  
Italians’ perception of themselves was undoubtedly reflected in the government’s treatment of 
them as less dangerous to national security than persons of Japanese or German descent.  Their 
outward embrace of democratic ideals and appreciation for the civil liberties that they enjoyed as 
U.S. citizens, or hoped to enjoy once naturalized, were important factors in saving the Italian 
population from mass internment.  Thus, it was their rejection of Italian nationality and adoption 
of an American national identity that convinced the government that as a whole, they were a 
loyal immigrant group.
19
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 Thomas Guglielmo, White on Arrival, 172-73.  
18
 Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The Search for an Italian American Identity Continuity and Change,” 98. 
19
 See Gloria Ricci Lothrop, “A Shadow on the Land:  The Impact of Fascism on Los Angeles Italians,” California 
History 75, no. 4 (Winter 1996/1997):  338-53.  Lothrop argues that while the Italo-American community in Los 
Angeles in the 1920s and 1930s had a strong sense of ethnic pride, facilitated by newspapers and radio programs, 
“all these elements were subservient to the fact that Italo-Americans had entrusted themselves and their futures to 
their newly adopted country,” 343. 
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Yet those Italians who drew the suspicion of the federal government and suffered the 
disgrace of internment experienced a reversal of the trajectory of the assimilation processes as 
they felt that the outside world resented them.  In their eyes, the general population believed that 
they were disloyal and that they would have to prove their allegiance to the United States once 
they resumed their normal lives.  This sentiment was reflected in a letter written by Vincent 
Lapenta, a surgeon and chemist from Indianapolis, to the captain at his internment camp, 
expressing how internees felt they were perceived by the American population.  Lapenta spoke 
of the grief which placed him “in such a detestable position before [his] fellow citizens.”  He 
hoped to regain his reputation in his community where he had lived for close to thirty years by 
participating in the war effort, and thereby “vindicate [his] name as a loyal living cell in the 
glorious body of this nation.”20   
Fears of a cold reception upon returning home were not merely imagined.  Indications of 
a lasting hatred for nationals of the Axis powers can be seen in an initiative by the Massachusetts 
American Legion to prevent former Axis soldiers from establishing permanent residents or 
obtaining American citizenship.  Coined the “Alien Hatred Issue,” the resolution stated that it 
“forever prohibits any individual who at any time bore arms against the United States, from 
establishing a permanent domicile in this country or obtaining citizenship papers here.”21 While 
it is unclear whether such provisions were meant to apply to internees, like Michael Angelo 
Scicchitani, who had served in the Italian Army during the Ethiopian War before the United 
States entered World War II, the discriminatory intent against Japanese, Germans, and Italians 
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 V.A. Lapenta to Captain, March 31, 1942, to Captain, File of Vincent Anthony Lapenta, Box 11, PMG Records of 
Italian Civilian Internees, NARA.   
21
 “Alien Hatred Issue Expected to Stir Row at Legion Meet Today,” The Boston Daily Globe, August 12, 1944, 1, 
3. 
231 
 
was unmistakable.  Recognizing it as a form of alien hatred and therefore unacceptable, however, 
prompted other members of the American Legion to fight against its adoption.
22
   
Ironically, a number of former internees either served in the U.S. armed forces upon their 
release, like Frank Fragale who was profiled in Chapter 4, or were employed in other capacities 
domestically.  For example, Carmelo Ilacqua, who had been employed by the Italian Consulate 
in San Francisco before internment, went to work for the U.S. Army as a teacher of the Italian 
language to officers in training at Stanford University who were assigned to occupy Italy after 
the war.
23
  Another example of the government utilizing former internees’ skills was the 
military’s employing Mario Valdastri in construction which gave him access to military bases 
and construction areas in Hawaii merely days after his release from internment.
24
 
But the majority of internees, some of whom had been away for several years, had 
difficulties finding employment and regaining their former lives upon their return home.  
Prospero Cecconi, a pastry man from San Francisco who spent close to two years in internment, 
came home emotionally bitter and physically sick from his experience.  He suffered from 
peritonitis, a result of stomach ulcers for which he was hospitalized in the camps.  With his 
family still in Italy, he relied upon his parole sponsor and the Italian Welfare Agency to care for 
him.  His first attempt at obtaining citizenship in 1945 failed, but he eventually became a citizen 
the following year.  In 1951, Mr. Cecconi left the United States for good, choosing to spend his 
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 Scherini, “Letters to 3024 Pierce,” 235. 
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 Lawrence DiStasi, “A Tale of Two Citizens,” 151. 
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retirement in his hometown in Italy.
25
  Several other former internees, including Mario Valdastri, 
chose to retire in Italy, even after obtaining the long coveted American citizenship.
26
 
Accounts of those Italians and their families who suffered from exclusion or relocation 
also indicate that the financial and emotional damage from the wartime experiences were 
permanent.  Even though the period of exclusion from his home was temporary, Nino Guttadauro 
continued to suffer from the economic disruption and hardship to him and his family of being 
forced to leave his job as an accountant and search in non-prohibited states for an employer who 
would trust him with financial matters.  His first job following exclusion was as a grocery clerk 
in Salt Lake City.  As his son describes it, the psychological scars resulting from his father’s 
belief that his value to himself, his family, his community and society had diminished remained 
with him for the rest of his life.
27
  
 Italian communities also changed because of the events of World War II.  After the war, 
Italians were less likely to join fraternal organizations like the Sons of Italy and other social 
organizations which had drawn suspicion during wartime.  Italian communities such as North 
Beach in San Francisco became more diffused as families moved out to the suburbs.  John 
Molinari recalled that prior to the war, North Beach was “a homogenous community where . . . 
you knew what was going on.”  He attributed the change after the war to the relative inactivity of 
the Italian media.  Prior to the war, there were “two daily Italian newspapers, two or three Italian 
radio programs daily, and morning and afternoon papers, in Italian.”  But after the war, the San 
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 Lawrence DiStasi, “Morto il Camerata,” 8; see also Folder of Prospero Cecconi, Box 6, PMG Records of Italian 
Civilian Internees, NARA 
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 See Lawrence DiStasi, “A Tale of Two Citizens,” 151. 
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Francisco newspapers merged into one and eventually went out of business.
28
  Thus Italians’ 
means of staying connected with their communities in the United States and events in their 
homeland were drastically reduced.  While this may have been the natural result of Italians’ 
further assimilation into American culture, and the passing of older generations, as well as 
deflated pride in Italy, the lesson of Italians’ wartime experience was that a showing of loyalty to 
American ideals and the democratic form of government was not only safer, but more 
advantageous for the prosperity of their families. 
 For most Italians, whether they experienced internment, exclusion, relocation, or other 
restrictions on their freedoms, the entire wartime experience was “blanketed in silence.”29  It was 
not spoken of in families because internees were ashamed to have been determined to have done 
something wrong.  Years later when Stephen Fox and Lawrence DiStasi interviewed people 
affected by the government’s World War II policies, they noted lingering pain but not anger.  
Although recognizing that the past could not be changed, those Italians involved in the initiative 
to obtain acknowledgement from the U.S. government that Italian aliens and their families 
suffered from the events described in this dissertation believed that formal recognition in the 
Italian American Act could help put the matter to rest. 
As we grapple today with the question of what rights are due individuals residing in this 
country whose ties to nations or non-state actors at war with the United States cast suspicion 
upon their activities, the process of selective internment during World War II provides valuable 
lessons.  Certainly we felt the resonances of this period in history in the aftermath of the events 
of September 11, 2001, when the fear of sleeper terrorist cells prevented an effective method of 
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screening loyal citizens from dangerous terrorists.  The vast majority of the greater than 1,200 
non-citizens detained were Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian.  Identified as suspicious 
based on perceptions of their racial, religious, or ethnic identity, none could be connected to 
terrorist activity.
30
  Legal scholars criticized law enforcement tactics for singling out individuals 
“based on group probabilities, not individualized suspicion of wrongdoing or knowledge.”31  
Over-zealous investigations placed both U.S. citizens and non-citizens from Arab and South 
Asian communities in fear of the government.
32
  This is not to say that the Bush Administration 
was not keenly aware of the problems of interning the Nisei during World War II.  He and his 
staff made concerted efforts to avoid historical mistakes by seeking to learn about the American 
Muslim culture through reaching out to Muslim leaders and their organizations.  Although 
controversial because of the radical nature of some of the Muslim groups that the Bush 
Administration befriended, the goal of “Muslim outreach” was to prevent the victimization of 
Arab Americans and to win the hearts and minds of pro-American Muslims.
33
   
The problem of how to effectively detect subversive elements without violating the rights 
of innocent people persists.  Although the Alien Enemy Act provides for the summary detention 
and deportation of alien enemies without affording due process or any hearing at all for that 
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matter, given the serious consequences of internment and repatriation, we would hope that the 
extent of procedural guarantees afforded such individuals could be more commensurate with the 
potential disruption to their lives so that a fairer adjudicatory process might be achieved.  We 
also might expect that the democratic ideals of the inclusive society that the United States strives 
to be would lead its decision makers to apply the spirit of due process to enemy aliens even 
though the law does not require it.  If the government had made its interpretation of due process, 
as well as the rationale for its policy with respect to Italian alien enemies known both to the 
subjects and the general population, then it might have dispelled the sense of injustice and 
powerlessness that internees experienced.  Thus, in addition to hoping that the government might 
strike the proper balance between ensuring the nation’s safety and guaranteeing civil liberties in 
times of crisis, we might wish for more transparency in the policies that it chooses to follow.
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APPENDIX 1:  ITALIANS APPREHENDED PER MONTH 
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APPENDIX 2:  REGIONS/TERRITORIES OF ORIGIN OF  
ITALIAN CIVILIAN INTERNEES 
  
South 
11
West 97 Midwest 24
East 112
Alaska 
2
Hawaii 
3
Puerto 
Rico 1
Southwest 4
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APPENDIX 3:  OCCUPATIONS OF ITALIAN CIVILIAN INTERNEES 
  
29-Media
46- Skilled
107- Unskilled79-
Professional
10-Student
9- Homemaker
17- Business 
Owner
5-Unemployed
41-Unknown
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APPENDIX 4:  TIMING OF AGO’S REMEDIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
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